164 RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATOLL Mobilization guidelines and procedures, and control would have been established more The absence of a clear line of commandauthority was partially overcome by the professionalism and common sense of most of the key officers assigned during the project. One of the principal points of friction regarding command authority was the relationship between the JTG staff officers and the officers of the Service Elements. Often the responsibilities for planning the cleanup operations overlapped. Priorities for accomplishing tasks were subject to differing interpretations. Differences included resource utilization and availability, logistics support, time lags for off-atoll procurement, resupply means and scheduling, weather, emergency situations, and other considerations which were perceived differently in terms of their potential impact on mission accomplishment. essential to effective operation. 66.67.68 One area of particular concern to Field Command andall three JTG commanderswasthelack of a senior Army Element command echelon at Lojwa. The majority of the Army cleanup forces were located on Lojwa, yet the Army Element command base was on Enewetak Island. The USAE commanders shared this concern to some degree, and studied numerous, alternatives to alleviate the situation. Solutions considered included moving the majority of the USAE headquarters and the commander to Lojwa, moving the $3 operations office there (except for an Operations Liaison Officer to coordinate with the JTG staff), putting the USAE Executive Officer at Lojwa, and developing another commandcell utilizing additional personnel from higher headquarters. At one point, the USAE Commander proposed to the CJTG that he move virtually the entire USAEheadquarters to Lojwa, but after full consideration of the impact on the daily coordination requirements among the USAE, the JTG staff, and the other Service Elements and agencies, this option was not implemented. After detailed consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative, the USAE commander believed mission accamplishment would be best served by the senior Army Company Commander on Lojwaalso serving as the Lojwa base commander. The organization problem was aggravated by the manner in which the JTG staff was mobilized over a period of months. It was activated too late io work together as a team to formulate policies, procedures, and instructions prior to the arrival of the Service Elements and other agencies reporting for duty on the atoll. There was a need for rapid development and publication of local policies. Had this been accomplished prior to deploymentto the atoll, the Service Elements and personnel would have entered an environment which was well organized relative to specific readily.69 A significant organizational shortcoming during the first year was the lack of a JTG deputy commander/chief of staff to relieve the commander of administrative burdens. With much of the work either incomplete in definition or in an experimental phase, the CJTG had to devotehis time and efforts to the operational mission. Eventually, this need was recognized, and a lieutenant colonel position was established, although too late for the initial year of the project. 70 Despite these and other organizational shortcomings and command and control problems, the on-atoll organizational structure for the cleanup forces proved to be workable andeffective. It resulted in highly successful accomplishment of the complex mission, on time and within budget. em In actuality, to complete the project successfully the Director, DNA, the Commander, Field Command, and the CJTG assumed command authority they did not have, and the Service Elements acquiesced in this assumption of authority in a cooperative spirit, recognizing that it was 165 FIELD RADIATION SUPPORT TEAM DEPLOYMENT: 28 JUNE 1977 The Field Radiation Support Team (FRST) was formed on 19 June 1977 at Hickam AFB. FRST personnel were given a 4-day basic radiological indoctrination course at the 25th Infantry Chemical-BiologicalRadiological School, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Initia! FRST personnel deployed to the atoll on 28 June 1977, where they began a 3-week specialized training course in local radiological hazards, the method of cleanup operations, and the instrumentation peculiar to their Enewetak mission. Experience showed that the 4-day basic indoctrination course in Hawaii was unnecessary and, after January 1978, all Enewetak-related training for replacement FRST personne! was accomplished on atoll. The on-atoll specialized FRST training for the first increment was interrupted for an urgent on-site investigation of a suspected radiological burial site near the Erie shot ground zero on south Runit. This investigation, described in Chapter 4, diverted some FRST members from training classes to on-site work. By the time the investigation was completed, other operations had progressed to the point where the initial FRST increment received most of its specialized training by field testing the equipment and procedures the radiological planners had devised for the cleanup project, rather than by classroom training. 7! Most of the radiation safety and detection equipment obtained for the detection equipment was chosen because the one electronics package could be used to measure alpha, beta, or gamma simply by attaching the appropriate probe and adjusting the high voltage setting. The commercial protective masks were chosen to comply with Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s requirements for field of view for heavy