RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATOLL 88 Island Local Name _— . Code Name Level of Pu Concentration* Remarks Boken IRENE lsopleth J** 1, 2 Runit YVONNE Northern half, Pu 1, 2 Lujor PEARL Hot spot 1, 2 Bokuluo Bokombako ALICE BELLE SALLY Aomon burial grounds Pu burial grounds ‘ 1 2 2 Kirunu Louj Mijikadrek Kidrinen CLARA DAISY KATE LUCY 2 2 2 2 Eleleron RUBY 2 2 OLIVE Agj “Actions assumed for specific ranges of Pu concentration are tabulated as follows: | | Level ——— | 1 2 | | ' Plutonium Concentration (pCi/g Soil} Action > 400 40<C <400 Soil removal by repetitive scraping Individual case consideration All other islands have Pu concentrations < 40 pCi/g and do not require cleanup action. **TAB A, Volume II, NVO 140, Enewetak Radiological Survey. FIGURE 2-4, ISLANDS REQUIRING PLUTONIUM CLEANUP PROCEDURES. | soil on this island.) Case 3 was preferred based on the premise that safeguarding the Enewetak people from harmful radioactivity was of prime importance, and it was uncertain that Case 4 or Case 5 actions would be effective in reducing exposure potentials so that more of the northern teas Case 4: Same cleanup and disposal as Case 3 plus removal of 239,000 cubic yards ofsoil from Enjebi and replacement with imported soil, same island use as Case 3 plus use of Enjebi for residence and some controlled agriculture. This case was rejected because predicted doses from the proposed use of Enjebi exceeded AECcriteria and because of the great Planning and Programming . 89 uncertainty of maintaining the controls necessary to reach those reduced doses. Case 5: Same cleanup as Case 3 plus removal! of over 700,000 cubic yards of soil from other tslands; disposal of contaminated debris and soil by ocean dumping, replacement of soil from scraped areas with imported soil: and use of all islands with no restrictions as indicated in the 1973 Master Plan. This case was rejected because of the uncertainty that it would actually reduce exposures and because it was inordinately expensive. !06 The preferred Case 3 combined Cleanup Action I! and Habitation Plan C and permitted reasonable use of the entire atoll (Figure 2-5). Not all reviewers agreed with the selection of Case 3 as the optimumcase or even that it was an acceptable case. Some AECofficials argued strongly for the cleanup of Enjebi and further study of the Runit cleanup problem. Mostof those involved, however, believed that Case 3 provided a practical basis for cleanup, rehabilitation, and resettlement. LTG Johnson personally presented copies of the DEIS to the Enewetak people and their attorney, Mr. T. R. Mitchell, at a high-level meeting on Enewetak on 7 September 1974. Other attendees included: Mr. Stanley S. Carpenter, Director, Office of Territorial Affairs, DOI; Mr. William Rowe, Deputy Assistant Administrator, EPA; Mr. Peter T. Coleman, Deputy High Commissioner, TTPI, Messrs. Martin Biles, William W. Burr, Jr., and Mahlon E. Gates, of AEC; RADM Swanson, Brigadier General Wesley E. Peel, USA, POD Engineer, Mr. Earl Gilmore, H&N; and Mr. Amata Kabua, then Senator in the Congress of Micronesia and subsequently President of the Marshall Islands. Representatives from the Marshalls District Legislature and the Bikini Atoll Council also participated. Motion pictures and illustrated briefings covering nuclear testing, the Radiological Survey, the Engineering Survey, the Master Plan, and the DEIS were presented in both English and Marshallese to the over 100 dri-Enewetak who attended.!97 The Government’s plans were generally well received by the people; however, they had misgivings about some aspects, particularly not being able to live on Enjebi, the plan for onatoll disposal of radiological contamination, and the possibility that Runit might not be cleaned enoughto preclude the need for quarantine. !98 Upon his return to Washington, LTG Johnson was forced to send the people more discouraging news: Congress had again denied funds to begin ola: 1 4 completed to permit a firm estimate of overall cost.!09.110 ' ine During the conference, it had been agreed that some 50 dri-Enewetak, including the Planning Council, should return to the atoll early and live on Japtan during the cleanup project to consult and advise on cleanup and rehabilitation problems. The early return was contingent on Congress