164
RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATOLL
Mobilization
guidelines and procedures, and control would have been established more
The absence of a clear line of commandauthority was partially overcome
by the professionalism and common sense of most of the key officers
assigned during the project. One of the principal points of friction
regarding command authority was the relationship between the JTG staff
officers and the officers of the Service Elements. Often the responsibilities
for planning the cleanup operations overlapped. Priorities for
accomplishing tasks were subject to differing interpretations. Differences
included resource utilization and availability, logistics support, time lags
for off-atoll procurement, resupply means and scheduling, weather,
emergency situations, and other considerations which were perceived
differently in terms of their potential impact on mission accomplishment.
essential to effective operation. 66.67.68
One area of particular concern to Field Command andall three JTG
commanderswasthelack of a senior Army Element command echelon at
Lojwa. The majority of the Army cleanup forces were located on Lojwa,
yet the Army Element command base was on Enewetak Island. The USAE
commanders shared this concern to some degree, and studied numerous,
alternatives to alleviate the situation. Solutions considered included
moving the majority of the USAE headquarters and the commander to
Lojwa, moving the $3 operations office there (except for an Operations
Liaison Officer to coordinate with the JTG staff), putting the USAE
Executive Officer at Lojwa, and developing another commandcell utilizing
additional personnel from higher headquarters. At one point, the USAE
Commander proposed to the CJTG that he move virtually the entire
USAEheadquarters to Lojwa, but after full consideration of the impact on
the daily coordination requirements among the USAE, the JTG staff, and
the other Service Elements and agencies, this option was not
implemented. After detailed consideration of the advantages and
disadvantages of each alternative, the USAE commander believed mission
accamplishment would be best served by the senior Army Company
Commander on Lojwaalso serving as the Lojwa base commander.
The organization problem was aggravated by the manner in which the
JTG staff was mobilized over a period of months. It was activated too late
io work together as a team
to formulate policies, procedures, and
instructions prior to the arrival of the Service Elements and other agencies
reporting for duty on the atoll. There was a need for rapid development
and publication of local policies. Had this been accomplished prior to
deploymentto the atoll, the Service Elements and personnel would have
entered an environment which was well organized relative to specific
readily.69
A significant organizational shortcoming during the first year was the
lack of a JTG deputy commander/chief of staff to relieve the commander
of administrative burdens. With much of the work either incomplete in
definition or in an experimental phase, the CJTG had to devotehis time
and efforts to the operational mission. Eventually, this need was
recognized, and a lieutenant colonel position was established, although too
late for the initial year of the project. 70
Despite these and other organizational shortcomings and command and
control problems, the on-atoll organizational structure for the cleanup
forces proved to be workable andeffective. It resulted in highly successful
accomplishment of the complex mission, on time and within budget.
em
In actuality, to complete the project successfully the Director, DNA, the
Commander, Field Command, and the CJTG assumed command
authority they did not have, and the Service Elements acquiesced in this
assumption of authority in a cooperative spirit, recognizing that it was
165
FIELD RADIATION SUPPORT TEAM DEPLOYMENT: 28 JUNE 1977
The Field Radiation Support Team (FRST) was formed on 19 June 1977
at Hickam AFB. FRST personnel were given a 4-day basic radiological
indoctrination course at the 25th Infantry Chemical-BiologicalRadiological School, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Initia! FRST personnel
deployed to the atoll on 28 June 1977, where they began a 3-week
specialized training course in local radiological hazards, the method of
cleanup operations, and the instrumentation peculiar to their Enewetak
mission. Experience showed that the 4-day basic indoctrination course in
Hawaii was unnecessary and, after January 1978, all Enewetak-related
training for replacement FRST personne! was accomplished on atoll.
The on-atoll specialized FRST training for the first increment was
interrupted for an urgent on-site investigation of a suspected radiological
burial site near the Erie shot ground zero on south Runit. This
investigation, described in Chapter 4, diverted some FRST members from
training classes to on-site work. By the time the investigation was
completed, other operations had progressed to the point where the initial
FRST increment received most of its specialized training by field testing
the equipment and procedures the radiological planners had devised for
the cleanup project, rather than by classroom training. 7!
Most of the radiation safety and detection equipment obtained for the
detection equipment was chosen because the one electronics package
could be used to measure alpha, beta, or gamma simply by attaching the
appropriate probe and adjusting the high voltage setting. The commercial
protective masks were chosen to comply with Occupational Safety and
Health Administration’s requirements for field of view for heavy