138
RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATOLL
Air Force planners proposed to continue contracting out the airfield
operation to H&N under a Field Command-MACagreement as had been
done since early 1976. The Air Force also planned to contract out the
_ communications support operation to H&N. However, the Air Force
General Counsel determined that this would be contrary to the MILCON
Appropriation Act, which he interpreted to require use of military
personnelfor the specific cleanup functions the Air Force had been tasked
to provide.334 This interpretation, in its strictest sense, was upheld by the
DOD Assistant General Counsel.335 DNA and the other Services,
however, did not construe the Act as precluding the Services from
contracting for support for their specific cleanup functions, since the Act .
only specified that troops would be used to accomplish the cleanup.
Support for those cleanup troops could be provided by whatever means
the Services might choose, based on Service policy.336.337 The latter
interpretation was applied by DNA, the Army, and the Navyin providing
support for the project. This interpretation was also concurred in by the
DOD Assistant General Counsel; i.e., the Air Force could not contract
7
— A-Team
with H&N for the communications function because that specific
operational function was assigned to the Air Force, but the Army could
contract with H&N to operate the messhall for its troops on Lojwa because
the Army’s specific operational function was cleanup, which they were
doing, not operating messhalls.
Planning and Programming
d. DNA and ERDA had not agreed on the details of certification by
ERDA.
Requirements for personnel and materiel were not complete by the end
of the conference, but they had progressed well enough that most
requisition actions could be initiated. On his return trip, BG Lacy briefed
the CINCPAC staff on results of the conference and plans for the cleanup
project.339
EARLY RETURN TO JAPTAN: MARCH 1977
During the second OPLAN conference, BG Lacy and Mr. Oscar
DeBrum completed an agreement for the early return of approximately
50
dri-Enewetak to Japtan Island. These officials visited Ujelang Atoll on 25
February 1977 to coordinate with the people on plans for early return,340
On 15 March1977, the two iroijs, Johannes and Binton, with over SO driEnewetak, returned to Enewetak Atoll to live on Japtan during
the
cleanupproject and to consult and advise on the cleanup and rehabilitation
effort (Figure 2-Il). Existing Quonset buildings on Japtan had been
renovated to provide suitable temporary housing. Ceremonies and a
banquet marked the event which was recorded by an American
Only four major issues remained unresolved at the end of the second
OPLAN conference:338
a. The Army believed that at least three landing craft, utility (LCUs)
would be required. The Navy representatives did not believe they
could man more than two LCUs. A strict limitation had been imposed
by the Chief of Naval Operations on the numberof Navy personnel to
be provided for the project.
b. The Army believed that two doctors would be required, one for
Enewetak Base Camp and the other to be stationed at Lojwa Base
Camp. The Air Force, which was to provide medical services,
contended that only one doctor would be necessary, as the medical
evacuation (MEDEVAC)helicopters could transport patients from
Lojwa to Enewetak wherethe facilities would be more complete. The
Army ‘was not so much concerned about emergency medical
treatment as about the day-to-day supervision ofall health and safety
aspects that a doctor could provide at the primitive and hard-working
ea
c. The Army, which wasto provide four helicopters, wanted them to be
used for MEDEVACand search and rescue (SAR) missions only,
while Field Command believed they should be available to the CJTG
for command and control purposesalso.
139
FIGURE 2-11. EARLY RETURN OF THE PEOPLE TO JAPTAN.