100
RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATOLL
discussion, LTG Johnson said that he proposedto meet with Mr. Mitchell
and tell him that if he demanded that DNA go for a $190M project (Case
5), it would kill the project. He felt morally obligated to push for the
project as currently agreed, even if Mr. Mitchell served notice he would
fight for the maximum degree of cleanup. COL Smith, of MSN, stated that
there was a necessity to retain reasonableness to the project if it was to get
by Congress. LTG Johnsonstated that, on the basis of the discussions at
this meeting, DNA would press ahead with the final EIS, seeking ail the
help they could get from ERDA. Also, he would go to Honolulu and
discuss DNA’s position with Mr. Mitchell and seek an accommodation
with him. He invited representatives of the DOI, ERDA, and EPA to
accompanyhim onhis trip during the week of 17 March 1975.!66
The Honolulu conference was held on 19 March 1975. LTG Johnson
opened with comments to the effect that insistence on ocean dumping of
contaminated material and a Case 5 cleanup would delay, if not cancel, the
project. He advised that he had consulted with Representative Ichord,
Chairman of the House MILCON Subcommittee, who foresaw difficulty
in obtaining approval of even a modest program and wantedassurancethat
Mr. Mitchell, of MLSC, and the dri-Enewetak Iroijs would appear before
the subcommittee to support the project. !6?
Mr. Mitchell accepted fhe invitation to appear at the Congressional
hearing on the MILCON appropriations for the Enewetak Cleanup but
stressed the importance of having Mr. Oscar DeBrum, District
Administrator for the Marshall Islands, also present for the hearings. Mr.
Mitchell also stated that:
a. The MLSC comments on the DEIS asked for the ‘‘ideal’’ cleanup
based upon their duty to seek the best possible solution for their
clients.
b. The dri-Enewetak would make the ultimate decision, not the MLSC
or himself.
c. He remained unconvinced that he should recommend acceptance of
Case 3, but he did not propose to engage in a lengthy court fight to
achieve Case 5. He indicated a desire to get on with the cleanup at
Case 3 level, if necessary, without foreclosing other possibilities.
Mr.Mitchell stressed that he intended to strive for as much as could
reasonably be doneto insure the safety and health of the people. He did
not want to be facing a situation similar to that of Bikini in which the lack
cg
*
:
4
1
168
iterated the point
madein the people’s comments on the DEIS that they did not want money
in any amount. They wanted their land in safe and habitable condition,
regardless of cost. The cost of cleanup would bea fraction ofthe total cost
wt
Manning and Progra thitnine
ivi
The 25 February 1975 meeting of agency representative
s in Washington
and the meeting with Mr. Mitchell on 19 March 1975 cleared
the way for
publication of the final EIS. It was published and filed
with the Council on
Environmental Quality on [5 April 1975. The final EIS
was nearly identical
to the September 1974 draft, with only a few technic
al and clerica]
corrections, and the addition of Volume IV which contai
ned comments
received on the September 1974 DEIS and DNA’s respon
ses to them.
DNA requested authorization and funds from Congre
ss for complete
cleanup of physical and radiological hazards in accordance
with Case 3 of
the EIS.!79 The EIS description of Case 3 cleanup, which
the JCS
subsequently approved as the DNA mission statement, !7'.172)
was
contained in paragraph 5.5.3.2 as follows:
“eanUp Actions. The following actions would be taken
to clean up the
atoll:
@ Physical hazards would be removed from all islands.
@ Obstructions to development of habitations and agricul
ture would be
removed.
® Radioactive scrap would be removedfromall islands in the
atoll.
® Boken, Lujor, and Runit plutonium concentrations greater
than 400
pCi/g would be excised and all other concentrations betwee
n 400 and
40 pCi/g would be dealt with on an individual basis as
described in
AEC Task Group Report. Concentrations of less than 40
pCi/g would
not be disturbed. Cleanup of plutonium was expect
ed to be
performed iteratively until a sufficiently low concentratio
n level well
below 40 pCi/g was attained. Some 79,000 cubic yards
of soil were
estimated to be in this removal.
e@ Plutonium would be removed from the three
burial crypts on
Aomon.
e Unsalvable nonradioactive and noncombustible materia
l would be
disposed of by dumping in the lagoon at selected locatio
ns for
forming artificial reefs.
Radioactive materials would be disposed of as discussed
in Section
5.4.3.2.3, namely by containment in Lacrosse and, if necessa
ry, Cactus
craters on Runit.!73
.
FY 1976 CONCEPT PLANNING: 1974 - 1975
aia
of the nuclear test program and should be considered and funded as an
extension ofthat program. !69
J PAINTS SUTIBTTITCOTIRU Dt UT Crete rar
Fad
y ree aa eer oT
Engineers contract out the cleanup had begun encountering cost
problems
in September 1974, Lack of detailed plans and cost estimate
s had led
Congress to decline authorization of DNA’s original request
which had
been based on the. 1973 Enewetak Engineering Study estimate
of $35.5