94
RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATOLL
The dri-Enewetak and their attorney were on record as being opposed to
any disposal of radioactive material on the atoll. AEC-NV strongly
supported their position in commenting on the preliminary DEIS. !32
Considering the relatively short radiological half-lives of the fission
products and the induced radioactivity found on much of the debris, the
AEC Task Group suggested that the debris be disposed ofin shallow burial
crypts on the land, in underwater craters, or in the deeper portions of the
lagoon. The Task Group recommendedthat plutonium-contaminatedsoil
and debris be stockpiled on Runit, pending determination of a final
disposal method. Several methods were suggested, including returningit
to the United States, casting it into concrete blocks, dumping it into a
crater with a concrete cap, or dumpingit in the ocean or lagoon. !33
The EPA objected to the lagoon-dumping or ocean-dumping options
contained in the draft AEC Task Group Report, citing Title I, Sec. 101(c) of
Public Law 92-532 whichstates: ‘‘No office, employee, agent, department,
agency, or instrumentality of the United States shall transport from any
location outside the United States any radiological, chemical, or biological
warfare agent or any high-level radioactive waste for the purpose of
dumping it into ocean waters. ’’ EPA’s response to AECalso pointed out
that a United States national policy prohibiting ocean-dumping of
radioactive wastes had been in effect since 1970. Any proposal to reverse
such a policy would have to involve the Department of State because the
United States had already ratified the International Ocean Dumping
Treaty. !34
DNA’s overriding consideration on this issue was the identification of
an option which could gain eventual approval so that the cleanup project
Planning and Programming
95 |
the United States for retrievable storage at Savannah River.!49 The 79,000
to 779,000 cubic yards of contamination the radiological cleanup of
Enewetak might generate clearly represented a much greater problem. The
conferees agreed that CONUSdisposal was uneconomical, would generate
considerable political resistance, and would adversely affect the entire
project.!41 This option was dropped fromfurther consideration in planning
for the disposal of contaminated material.
The conferees discussed the remaining options contained in the DEIS:
use of the craters on Runit, with or without cement slurry and cap. It was
decided that stabilizing the radioactive contaminants in cement would
provide retrievable storage. Until a more permanent solution was found,
retrievable storage continued to be the only method acceptable to the
United States for disposal of such waste. It had been placed in covered
trenches in Los Alamos, and in caves in Nevada; but both DNA and EPA
believed that cement stabilization would be necessary at Enewetak Atoll to
minimize access of the contaminants to the population and
environment. !42
The question of crater volume also was considered at the 8 August 1974
EPA-DNA conference. The April [974 preliminary DEIS had indicated
that Cactus Crater would be used, then Lacrosse Craterif required. It had
been estimated that there were approximately 101,800 cubic yards of
material to be placed in the crater (7,300 cubic yards of debris and scrap,
87,800 cubic yards of contaminated soil-cement mixture, and 6,700 cubic
yards in the concrete cap). It was estimated that Cactus Crater would hold
less than half of that amount (about 52,000 cubic yards). Lacrosse Crater
had an estimated volume of 105,225 cubic yards.!43 The conferees agreed
regarding disposal options in the DEIS. EPA took the same position it had
that Lacrosse Crater should befilled first, even though Cactus Crater was
closer to the island. This made covering the cap with soil, as proposed in
Law 92-532 was to prohibit ocean-dumping of materials produced for
that proposal was abandoned. Entombment in Lacrosse Crater was the
radiological testing instead of warfare, their toxicity and effect on the
radiologically contaminated soil and debris. The conferees also agreed that
uncontaminated scrap and debris should be disposed ofin the deepest part
could proceed. EPA and DNA officials conferred on 8 August 1974
taken with AEC on the ocean-dumping option.!35 The intent of Public
radiological warfare.!36.137 Even though materials had been used for
environment was unchanged. Even if, by some unusual logic, the
contaminated materials were considered an unprohibited waste eligible for
ocean dumping, the law required extensive research and special actions
the preliminary DEIS, less practical (since Lacrosse was on the reef), and
method prescribed in the September 1974 DEIS for disposal of
of the Enewetak Atoll lagoon.!44 This was omitted from the September
1974 DEIS!45 but was included in the final EIS. !46
before EPA would authorize ocean dumping.!38 The materials would have
to be placed in a container that would remain intact until contamination
interpreted to be five half-lives.'39 This would have required the
plutonium-contaminated soil containers to last for nearly 125,000 years.
Ocean dumping appeared to be legally difficult.
After the radiological cleanup at Palomares, Spain, 1,310 cubic yards of
contaminated soil and vegetation in 55-gallon drums had been returned to
OCEAN DUMPING VERSUS CRATER CONTAINMENT:
1974
The AEC remained unconvinced that ocean dumping was not a viable
option for disposal of plutonium contamination. In separate letters on 9
and 23 December 1974, they arguedin favor of ocean dumping instead of