FOP-SEORET™
INTRODUCTION
Wehave been appalled by the importance of the subject we have been asked to consider. Over the
past dozen years, we have seen the technological development of frightful weapons of mass destr
common psychological phenomena; and the overcomingof such resistance in order to gain predomjnantly
positive social values is a real challenge in social engineering.
Wehave been asked to makeanestimateof:
A. The effects, over time, on humanattitudes and behavior of (1) general awareness
[by the
civilian population of a nation that an enemy or potential enemy has the technological cagability
of annihilating such nation; (2) the same awareness with the additional factor that the equivalent
technological capability of annihilation is possessed by such nation, or friendly nations, whicll could
produce mutual annihilation in the event of resort to such technological capabilities in a wdr.
B. The probable attitudes (of people) toward the initiation of general war by the congtituted
leaders of nations, or members of powerblocs, possessing mutually destructive technological caphbility.
C. The effects upon the civilian population and upon organized society in a nation engagpd in a
general war wherefull use is made of known and readily foreseeable technological capabilities.
Limitations
As was indicated in the proposal for this specific undertaking, submitted to you on March 2
by Val Peterson, Federal Civil Defense Administrator, some boundaries to the effort were esta
While there was no directed limitation on the point, it was accepted that the Panel’s estimate] would
reflect an inevitable bias in the direction of concentration on the people we know best—the peopl¢ of the
United States. We have developed our conclusions largely—but not entirely—in these terms, with the
understanding that our judgments would becritically reviewed for application to other nations, chiltures,
and peoples by area experts available to our Government.
We have therefore deliberately omitted subparagraph A (1) ' of our assignment, since the pqople of
the United States are not now, nor have they ever been, in a position of helplessness before the fuclear
superiority of any other nation.
With respect to subparagraphB ? of our assignment, we have felt less qualified to render an eqtimate,
since our Panel has not included the balance of “‘area expertise’ that would be required. We havp made
some observations on the point of this subparagraph, as will be noted below, but we feel less cqnfident
in our judgment than in the other subjects we have treated.
Furthermore, we have not attempted fo refine the regional and cultural differences within this fountry
This would be a vast undertaking requiringja great
rere
Me
:
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.
1**The effects, over time, on humanattitudes and behavior of (1) general awareness by the civilian populafion of a
_
nation that an enemyor potential enemy has the technological capability of annihilating such nation”;
3**B. The probable attitudes (of people) toward the initiation of general war by the constituted leaders of ndtions, or
members of power blocs, possessing mutually destructive technological capability.”
.
deal of careful research. It is important, however, to recognize that such differences exist, afd that
there will be significant departures from the behavioral norm, attributable in part to such difffrences.
Such factors as the interdependenceofcity dwellers, degree of assimilation into the community, dfgree of
educational, cultural, and economic advancement, and temperamental differences of various ne
Paeines gat gai tet oopiting te ime vie fie scvoenniegisLey.
that are likely to result in different human reactions.
TOP-CECREF
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