ea ere
e
a. A massive nuclear attack on the United States resulting in casualties of the order of 5 ,000,000,
without drastically improved preparation of the people, would jeopardize support of the Nation 1 Government and of the war effort, and might well result in national disintegration (p. 9).
b. The major weakness in the preparedness of our people results from the fact that while pertinent
information has been madeavailable, it has not been successfully conveyed to them. The peo le would,
c. The prospect, however, is not a hopeless one.
= Ss
therefore, be psychologically overwhelmed by the extent of damage and casualties in such an ttempted
“knock-out” attack (p. 10).
|
A vigorously supported program of “inv lvement”’
of the people would bring abouta significant change, not only in post-attack attitudes and be vior, but
also in the necessarily correlated pre-attack attitudes and behavior. A panel of govern ntal and
citizen leaders should plan and implement a program of public education and action designed to involve
progressively increasing numbersof citizens, their leaders, and organizations and institutionsir the issues
of national security in the nuclear age, including preparation for any possible nuclear attack an it designed
to sustain that involvement as necessary over a prolonged period (p. 11).
d. Such program of“involvement” of the people would increase national unity and thereby strengthen
the handsof our leaders in pursuing the policies and taking the actions necessary to preserve : develop
the basic values of democracy. It would also result in greater citizen support of nationalefforts to prevent
war(p. 17).
e. Involvement of the people would be substantially stimulated by independent evidence hat action
is being taken by Governmentat all levels to strengthen our civil defense program. To the maximum
extent,civil defense programs and recommended measures should be blended into the normal goy rernmental
machinery and community patterns, and should have a recognizable social value in peacetim t (p. 13).
jf. Increased awareness of nuclear weaponseffects would, to a varying extent in differe ht nations,
create public attitudes which would tend to restrain the initiation of genera! war by the duly ronstituted
gk me
oe
geal7 p Bs Re, x
pealtelBFEON Heae TT AEade
eT Rg Rp he te wat
no Lene te sy ESete Fins
a
leaders of nations. (See text, page 19, for qualifications of this judgment.)
g. The heritage and institutions of the American people give them the potential strength to meet
successfully the complex problems and perils of the nuclear age, but that strength must be nqurished by
effective knowledge and inspiring leadership (p. 12).
2. While we are unanimousin the judgments expressed above, we suggest that they be tested easily
depen eae
and tools
TOPCEORE
re
408136—56——_2
sa AlleinReaee gerCeaNen
ec
ARANa He
during the period of implementation of any program of action which is adopted. The skil
required for this purpose are themselves well tested and available (p. 12).
a
ey
beoonSAan
"
ae17
Sie et! +t:
yas
ATERROTTEERETRtS ea ga eal
SUMMARY
1. The Panel believes that: