of 5% sq ft per person, the times required to enter the host town area, and the new population created. Since the times required to enter these towns are less than those required
to leave the critical target areas, it seems clear that they would not constitute a further
bottleneck.
TABLE 6
Some Errects of Evacuatinag Major Target PoruLaTions TO SMALLER TOWNS
Town
Frederick
Hagerstown
Fredericksburg
Basement shelter
Population
available to evacuees,
thous of sq ft
Evacuees who
could be sheltered
18,142
36,260
1900
3800
349,000
698,000
12,156
1300
234,000
Time required
New popu-
7.0
7.8
367,000
734,000
to enter host
town, hr
lation of
host town
5.9
246,000
Feasibility
The claim of feasibility of such a scheme is more vulnerable when one considers the
traffic problem a town with normal provision for 5000 cars would have in trying to provide
egress and storage for 70,000 additional vehicles. Bumper-to-bumper parking could be
provided for this number of vehicles on approximately 350 acres of land (needless to say,
these acres would have to be dry and unblocked by fences, ditches, etc.). The control
and practice required to make such a scheme workable is probably beyond capability.
An even more serious problem is constituted by the new targets presented. Any civil
defense plan must be public to be effective, and hence known in advance to the enemy.
These three towns, beyond the range of present point defenses, would have new popula~tions — 367,000, 734,000, and 246,000, respectively — concentrations worthy of the at-
tention of enemy target analysts.
Furthermore these populations are now so highly con-
centrated that a single 10-Mt weapon can place the entire sheltered population in the
crater or lip, with resulting 100 percent lethality.
In view of the times required to carry out this tactic (11.5 to 15 hr), the magnitude of
the planning and practice required, and the high vulnerability of the new configurations
created, the tactic of evacuating critical targets to satellite towns is not considered feasible.
Onreceipt of a strategic alert of perhaps 24 hr such a plan might be carried out, if only
time is considered. This would not alter the fact that new, highly vulnerable targets have
been created.
It should further be pointed out that people in shelters for a long period
of time require many times the 5 to 10 sq ft of space allotted them in this study.
It does
not seem advisable to attempt to augment existing space with sheds, tents, barns, etc.,
or any structure that will attenuate less than 0.9 of the radiation effects. Figure 13 shows
fallout conditions created by 10-Mt ground bursts on all the rcpa-designated critical
targets within a 300-mile radius of Washington. The method of computation is described
later in this paper,
At least sometime during the 36-day sample of fallout conditions,
Hagerstown and Frederick were exposed to 500 to 1600 r, and Fredericksburg to 100 to
500 r,
It seems clear that only below-grade shelter could be used. On the basis that at least
20 sq ft per occupant would be necessary, only approximately one-fourth of the evacuees
that this study estimates the towns could shelter could actually stay there for extended
periods, and then only after advance preparation of supplies, toilet facilities, etc.
28
ORO~-R-17 {App B)