In August, 1953, CTG 7.3 recommended to CINCPACFLT that the then planned security forces--l1 VP squadron (12 P2V-6's), 4 DDE's, and 4 F4LU-5N's—-be augmented in order to execute more fully the security mission. It was pointed out that the danger area for IVY was only sixty per cent of that prescribed for CASTLE and that only a slight augmentation would assure a significant increase in the capability to successfully support the security mission. CTG 7.3 recommended the assignment of an additional Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) ship (DDE or smaller) to assist at Bikini, unless the Eniwetok Underwater Detection Unit could be enlarged for that purpose. In addition, an increase in F4U's from four to six was proposed. CINCPACFLT assigned two additional fighter aircraft and indicated that a PC would be assigned for use as an additional ASW vessel; but the cost for the installation of a hydrophone system at Bikini was determined to be prohibitive. Amphibious ship beachings constituted a knotty Task Group 7.3 problem. The LST operating between Eniwetok and Bikini played an important role in support of the CASTLE logistical mission but was severely hampered on many occasiors in doing so by the inadequate beaching conditions at Bikini. A channel to the pier had been blasted out of the coral bottom creating a narrow trough which allowed only about ten yards clearance to the starboard of a beached LST. Before each beaching it was necessary for H&N to remove large amounts of sand from the channel to providethe proper beaching gradient. To alleviate the undesirable situation, H&N widened the ehannel to about 150 feet. This had an unexpected detrimental