The most immediately observed operational difficulty to arise as a result of the decision to use barges was with respect to Navy Task Group operations. The only dependable means of transporting the barges from Eniwetok to Bikini was by LSD. Task Group 7.1 recom- mended the procurement of a second LSD for CASTLE in order to avoid interrupting Navy beat pool operations which were dependent upon the LSD. A second LSD could not be secured, however, and a means of supporting the boat pool during those periods when the LSD was being utilized by Task Group 7.1 had to be devised. Since this was primarily a Navy problem, further discussion is found in the treatment of Task Group 7.3 planning. | Few major difficulties for Task Group 7.1 arose in conjunction with the remaining military support requirements under consideration during this period. Based on previous operational experience and on current information related to the scope of CASTLE operations, estimates of Task Group 7.1 boat, liaison aircraft, helicopter, and vehicle requirements were made and submitted to the Task Force Head quarters. During the fall months, transportation overseas of the devices was the subject of much correspondence and was a problem which was of great concern to Task Group 7.1. Many factors required consider- ation—the security aspects; the safety aspects; the types of transportation to be utilized; andadministrative instructions, all had to be calculated in detail. The USS CURTISS (AV-4), well equipped for such tasks, was to carry the bulk of the AEC materials and she departed with her highly classified cargo on 10 January 1954. 60