impossible of attainment because of the widespread press speculation regarding AEC and Task Force activities. Coupled with this almost continuous speculation are the facts that mil censorship is not imposed on Task Force personnel and, as the operational period epproaches, the frequent, heavy movements of personnel to the forward area are virtually impossible to conceal. Planning also had to envisage the possibility of intentional or unintentional security violations, either internal or external. Inasmuch as the physical execution of the security mission in the forward area fell to the task groups, particularly Task Groups 7.2, 7.3, and 7.5, planning was accomplished in conjunction with these groups and with a view toward the best utilization of the facilities and personnel of these groups which would be available in the for- | ward area. As past experience had reduced the matter almost to one of routine, no significant problems arose in this connection. In order to achieve the maximum of security within the Task Force, a detailed program of personnel indoctrination was planned from the beginning and implemented under the personal direction of the CJTF. A basic criterion adopted in the beginning was that the individual assigned to the Task Force was the key to security. Because he had received clearance, it could not be assumed that he was no longer vulnerable as a potential source for the release, intentional or wmintentional, of valuable information either through correspondence or by careless conversation, With this criterion, the prdblem became a matter of impressing upon each of some 10,000