problems which delayed schedules. Rough water, particularly at Bikini, slowed discharge; this condition could not be overcome and had to be accepted. The fact that CASTLE was a two-atoll operation also introduced problems which had not been encountered previously. Close attention to ship routing followed with a corresponding loading plan eased the problems of off-loadings whether first at Fniwetok and last at Bikini or vice versa. The provision of additional and adequately trained stevedore personnel at Bikini and placing ship-discharge in the Eniwetok-Bikini area under the authority of a single military port command are steps indicated as desirable by CASTLE experience. As in previous operations, it was extremely difficult for task groups to accurately estimate air movement requirements for any given operating month. Despite the endeavor to produce real- istic requirements both under and over-generation frequently occurred, Failure to generate traffic resulted in lost airlift ca- pability and created unrealistic under-—commitment of aircraft. Over - generation of traffic resulted in necessary action by the Executive Agent that deprived other users of their own allocations in order to meet the unallocated but high priority requirements of the Task Force, Only by the most careful scrutiny and continuous monitor- ing can the handling of this problem be improved upon; and, be- ~ cause of its significance the matter should be given high priority consideration in the Task Force Headquarters. For Operation CASTLE the organization of the Headquarters 35