Droughs to lignt in the progress of studies on the subject during the previous months and requested DOD concurrence and support of CASTLE under these conditions. There remained the matter of se- curing the concurrence of Commander~in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) and the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory. These were soon forthcoming after certain reservations with respect to the security and logistical implications of expansion were studied at CINC- PAC Headquarters and resolved in discussions with JIF 132 representatives. By the time the addition of Bikini Atoll to the PPG was coordinated and approved, the concept to govern its use was fairly firm. Eniwetok would continue to be the main base of operations and would be the normal site for the relatively low-yield PPG detonations, Bikini would be looked upon as a supplemental site for detonations with anticipated yields sufficient to cause damage to base facilities or create a requirement for Eniwetok evacuation. According to this concept, all facilities at Bikini would be kept to a minimum and would, in all cases, be of a temporary nature. After the inclusion of Bikini became firm, the difficulties which were inherent tc its use began to come to light. Inasmuch as Bikini had not been active as a test site since 1946, it was inevitable that a great deal of preparatory effort would be necessary prior to the establishment of temporary camps. Anticipat-— ing an affirmative reaction in Washington to enlargement of the uo PPG, Santa Fe Operations Office (SFOO) had directed the H&N Project