due to the contamination and resultant restriction of Bikini airstrip operations,
There was never a complete device at Bikini
when the security forces were at their lowest efficiency, however,
and no compromises resulted from the stretching of the security
capability.
Other concerns for CTG 7.3 which influenced the pattern of
operations were the reduction in training necessitated by the a-
float program; the personnel morale problems which, although held
to a minimum, could have been considerable under the circumstances;
and the many logistical difficulties arising from decisions of an
operational nature.
In one respect, however, the move afloat eased
one Navy mission as it eliminated further large-scale pre-shot
evacuations at Bikini.
The shift from a land based to a shipboard operation for Task
Group 7.1 multiplied the technical, operation, and personnel problems of that task group.
Prior to the detonation of! SHOT, the
Task Group 7.1 Operations Division, J~3, worked from two offices—
one on Parry Island at Eniwetok Atoll and the other on Eninman
Island at Bikini Atoll,
After{Shor7,) the Bikini office had to be
maintained aboardthe ESTES with additional representation aboard
the BAIROKO, the AINSWORTH and, at times, the CURTISS. “The Parry
J-3 office worked closely with the Bikini J-3 office in coordinating operational requirements and assuring accurate completion of
all details,
Key scientific personnel were quartered aboard the
ESTES while those people requiring laboratory or ship facilities
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