ment of the Bikini isiand bases and the revision cf the shot sched- ule which moved!SH073 yp from the final shot to the third shot, placed a considerable workload on the LST's and on the BELLE GROVE (LSD-2), There was several million dollars worth of equip- ment on Eninman Island which was originally slated to remain at Bikini until the final shot. The new schedule meant that it had to be returned to Eniwetok before the third shot. trips were completed between SH/ ‘| ana “SHOT 3 ——— Fourteen LST "and 2,762 tons of equipment were evacuated. Following SWq"/— a Significant additional responsibility had to be assumed by the ships and small craft at Bikini. The orig- inal concept had called for a reentry into the Eninman and Enyu camp sites following #@/"\but this was impossible and the movement to an afloat operation at Bikini very greatly added to small craft re~ quirements. The move meant added responsibility for CTG 7.3 and | placed a requirement on the Navy Task Group which, while anticipated as a possibility, was never considered probable previous to 1 March, It further caused basic revisions in Task Group 7.1 and Task Group 7.5 plans, and persaqnnel of these groups became heavy users of the small craft capability at Bikini. The adjustment to a Bikini afloat operation created many new logistical and operational problems for TG 7.3. Logistics-wise, the move meant that the Bikini boat pool, including both Navy and civilian elements, had a sharply increased workload in order to provide transportation to and from living quarters aboard ship to