ae: out that only three devices scheduled for HARDTACK were small enough to be tested within the United States, Also, these she produce very little fallout so that the total off-site fallout of HARDTACK would not be substantially reduced if they were eliminated, In addition, he said with each device tested underground, there is the risk that an earthquake will occur concurrently, causing the public to conclude erroneously that the one caused the other. Mr. Vance said he thought that if the President understoo the need for testing each of the devices proposed for the seri his reservations about the number of shots would be dispelled he would agree to the shot schedule now before the Commission. Mr, Vance proposed, therefore, that the Commission recommend t the President the shot schedule for Operation HARDTACK as presented by the laboratory directors. General Luedecke said the DOD would llke to begin testing their five weapons effects shots about the middle of April. The Commissioners indicated no objection to this. Mr, Libby said he bolieved that before reaching a final decision on the shot schedule, the Commission should obtain th views of the GAC Subcommittee on Weapons which will meet at Les Alamos on November 20, The other Commissioners agreed wit this suggestion and also agreed that for planning purposes, Ma 1, 1953, should be established as the date for beginning testi of the seventeen devices proposed by the AEC laboratory direct The Commissioners indicated they would also review the shot schedule with the MLC at the 114th AEC-MLC Conference on October 25, Mr. Libby restated his belief that the test of a clean weapon for U.N. observers should be cancelled.