for Operation HARDTACK, The AEC staff, he said, made the following recommendations: (1) the operation should begin no earlier than May 1, 1957, to allow adequate time for AEC preparations, (2) the number of AEC shots should be seventeen, as requested by the laboratory directors, plus one detonation of a clean weapon to which U.N, observers would be invited, (: three specific contingency shots should be ready for detonattli in the event that some of the other seventeen shots are not successful, (4) two one-point safety tests should be conducte: at the Nevada Test Site during the fall of 1957, and (5) following Operation HARDTACK, two or three devices of less th: two kilotons should be tested underground in the tunnel used during Operation PLUMBBOB. Mr, Norris Bradbury, Director, LASL, then reviewed with aid of charts the devices recommended by LASL for testing dur: HARDTACK, Mr. Libby expressed concern about the amount of of; site fallout which would result if it were necessary to detonm: the contingency devices now included in the plans. to a question by Mr, Libby, In respon General Starbird said no new type weapon has ever been stockpiled without one of its type being tested before entry. Mr. Libby also raised the problem of th increasing proliferation of types of weapons being tested and stockpiled. this problem, General Starbird replied that the staff recogniz He pointed out that AEC had received requireme! from the DOD for warheads for a large number of different wea and that AEC is attempting to develop warheads which will fit several different kinds of carriers and missiles. Mr, Bradbu: added that the laboratories were conscious of the desirabilit; reducing the amount of testing, but said he did not believe tl it would be possible under the present DOD requirements to dispense with any of the shots now scheduled, ~2.- Any of the dev: