: -yaiue, @ GS the United States must assign a value to the benefit to ‘national security of the testing program, however debatable that _rerefit may he in and of itself. The cost of the direct benefits in this program ror the Luewetak people, such as housing, community development, etc., are a very small fraction of the total, about $5,000,000. And even that portion of the total funding is directly attributable to their forced removal by the United States to make way for the testing program. And as we have said before, the United States undertook trusteeship of the MicronesSian Islands of its own free will ve - a (without consent of the Micronesians) and put Enewetak Atoll, the property of the trust, to its own use for the very nuclear testing wich @erosited the radioactivity. “ This is the only perspective by which to consider and decide upon the outside cost limits of this program. The costs of the radiological and engineering cleanup of the Atoll are properly to be considered ordinary and necessary costs of the testing >Drocram. Indeed, the cleanup should have been planned from the beginning ard funded and done at the end of the testing program about 1958. The Enewetak People do not want money in any amount,. they wo want and are entitled to their land, in safe and habitable condition. In the presentation of future requests to the United States Congress, this general approach should be taken and the leadership of the people themselves should be called to testify. . "Case 3", outlined in Section 5.4.3, Vol. I of the DEIS, is ‘offered as the preferred plan for cleanup and resettlement of the