Chapter Four
q C 7
0 fl C
ment to a new social environment.
No one tn bOdk Appres hated
the extent to which the islanders would have to modity thea lives
if Kili were chosen for resetelement.
Ronperk and Kwapalei
they
Ive asst that
ther ovennemt ad
at
seal
preoparbacneons \N ie
atelatively sunple mation whieh could: be accomplished
swately ,
and’ with becle planning of difficulty. The Americans
were as
vantages of both sites were posted in their Kwajalein village. The
ther prepared to comprehend the islanders’ deep attachment
to
then ancestial homehind nor were they able to estimate the
ace
ola population which Rongerik or any other atoll could be
ca
pected to support. Even if such matters had been unders
tocd,
there iy no reason to assume that they would lave been piven
wany
decision was rescheduled for June 1. The Bikintans souplias ad
States, While local officals in the Marshalls wha lal the
chives
responsibility dor che istanders’ welfare evidenced real Comer
s
The final choice between Kili and Wotho was to be mide by
a plebiscite of all adults and not by che council which had select
ed Rongerik. ‘To aid the people, aerial photographs and a summary written in Marshallese outlining the advantages and disad
plebiscite was scheduled for May 25, but the people could not
make up their minds and asked fora postponement. ‘Uhe day of
vice from officials and other Marshallese. Vhe former discussed
the cwo alternatives buc stressed that the decision was ultimately
theirs. A few Marshallese employed as interpreters dele thar Kili
was the better choice and they advised the Bikinians accordmyly.
The people cast their voces on June 1. ‘Pwo boxes were
placed in a sinall room—one was labelled Kili and the other Wo
tho, and each bore a photograph and description of the desipnat:
ed site. Each adult was given a metal tag, entered the room alone,
and droppedhis or her token into the box of his choice. Kili
was chosen by a vate of fifty-four to twenty two. The factors
determining the islanders’ choice were the island's coconut proves
and that it was outside the jurisdiction of any paramount chief.
The paramount chief was displeased with the results as the future
of his relationship to the people was uncertain and had not been
considered (Mason 1954:355).
The governor deferred any official action until he onee again
examined the possibility of restoring the people to Bikini. When
he assured himself chat the evidence was conclusive that they could
not return, he recommended their resettlement on Kili. ‘Vhis rec
ommendation was approved by both che High Commissioner and
the Secretary of the Navy by mid-August.
Summary and Analysis
For the American administration, the initial relocations of
the Bikinians resulted in unanticipated and unwanted consequen-
ces. Because of the Americans’ own inexpericnce in Micronesia,
priomty over the military and scientific concems
of the Uirite
over the relocated people, there is little, if any,
tacbtoatron thee
decision mitkers wn the higher echelons of goverment tn
far ode.
(vane Warsdorgetons, Ic, pave mare than Passiop weeoat
ion Co thi
plight of the sural connpbunity.
Indeed, cltective action to alle va
ate Comelinons at Rongerik occurred onty after it was eviden
t chat
the rescttheuent lad totally failed and the actons of
the Uae d
States in the ishinds had become subject co the pressures
of worhd
opinion and possible censure from the United Nations.
For the Bikinians, the period of their Rongerk and Kwaja
loin relocanons was one of preat uncertainty and anaiety. Then
linvited expostie co the world beyond the boundaries of
then own
community tnade them ill-prepared to cope with che circum
stances
they encountered. None of their leaders had any apprec
iable os
perience in dealing with outsiders, and their chief and Mapistrate
was neither experienced nor secure in his status as head
of che
community.
Both factors partially accounted for an absence ot
decisive and effective leadership during that pero.
Vhe Bikinians? refusal co accept fully che posstbiliry cha
then telocation was more than a Cemporary measure was
dermed
from then mability to believe or to aljust cmouonally to
che
face thac Wikini could be lost co them forever. They were,
how
ever, well aware chae cheir hope of returning co Bikini or
theit
future elsewhere rested in the hands of the Americans. Their
ownperception of events during the period confirmed their cas
lier impressions of the scope of American power and material
wealth, and caused many of them to conclude chat it would be
advantageous to have the United States becomea surrogate fos
their paramount chief.
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