By May 1978, a high percentage of the Marshallese body levels were above the maximum permissible dose and the Bikinians were evacuated again. Conard and representatives of other U.S. government agencies. in apologizing for the complications (left) People walking om the coecrete dome covering an atomic bomb crater op Roait Island, Enewetak atoll. (below) Nuciear cleas up on Reait Island. (left) U.S. Army personae is fal protective gear. (right) Army persoane! mixing platoaiem-costaminzated soil with cement to form the massive concrete dome. Robert Conard of Brookhaven National Laboratory——which has coordinated the Marshall Islands medical program since 1954— estimated the health msks of the ex- posure: **Assuming that they [143 people] had all been there since 1970 and received the average estimated inte- grated total dose of 2.6 rems for the period, based on known radiationinduced risk data, one would expect only about 0.005 total cases of leukemia to develop in that population as a result of their radiation ex- posure. The need for further medical eXaminations is not indicated based on possible radiation effects associated with such low doses."*'* But Dr. Konrad Kotrady, a former Brookhaven resident physician in the Marshalls. strongly disagreed with this philosophy: ‘The people fail to understand how scientists can say they do not know all the possible late effects the radiation can cause. . . and then tell the people a medical program is un- necessary. If in 40 or 50 years medical problems do occur as a result of the exposure, it would be better if a well designed medical program was already in progress to detect the problems.’’'S December 1980 which occurred, frequently say that radiation measurement techniques then were not as sophisticated as those available today: that the surveys of Bikini were far less extensive than those subsequently carned out at Enewetak atoll.'® The facts. however, suggest otherwise. In 1972-1973, the United States conducted an ‘‘exhaustive radiological survey of Enewetak,’’ which included both ground and aerial surveys of the islands. according to the Department of Energy. It was not done at Bikini, however. In fact, it wasn't until the Bikinians filed a federal law suit in 1975, asking for a thorough radiological survey of Bikini and the northern Marshall Islands, that the government agreed to do it. But because of three years of bureaucratic infighting among the Departments of Energy. State and Interior, the radiological survey was not conducted until after the evacu- “ation of Bikini in late 1978. The United sophisticated States did techniques have for measuring radiation at the outset of the Bikini resettlement; it chose to employ them only at Enewetak. U.S. policies with respect to pro- tecting the health of the Marshallese have been totally inconsistent. For example, in 1946, prior to the first nuclear test series. Operation Crossroads, the people from islands within a radius of 300 miles of Bikini— including the Rongelap—were evacuated as a safety precaution.'’ The yield of these bombs was approximately 20 kilotons. But in 1954, there was no official warning of the Bravo test, much less an evacuation of the populations. Yet Bravo was the largest U.S. hydrogen bomb tested—-more than IS megatons. More than 200 Marshallese on The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 27