.
ae Doe nd
t
Mr. Cutler also, on behalf of the majority of the Planning
Board, empbasized their view that if the bracketed portions were deleted there would be no policy guidance for the period mentioned. In
short, the Planning Boerd, in the bracketed sections, was seeking @
eriterion for the development of a Military Assistance Program for
France.
In order to facilitate a decision on these split views,
Mr. Cutler asked Secretary Dulles to speek. Turning to the President,
Secretary Dulles stated that the detailed program included in the bracketed portions of paragraph 41, while admirable enough in the context in which it was epproeched, was, in point of fact, too narrow. In the
light of the over-all view of the French problem, we cannot deal with
France on so narrow a basis. The French situation was both very diffi-
cult and very important.
i ‘|
er ee er eee nee eee eee eh wee en ewe ener ene sn ee
:-.@eevenar
tit
ee eee eee
Ciitsieteseeseeee ee eseliils becee
eeeaes sees cece we ce tre ne ccc ecnvcctceceal
wresees bart een w ewe ence see een ewes eee c eter ene erennnencnenececceseell.
eesa
Peensnae
.
ee
ee
@euseevkeeresevreetreeueeeen
'
ett
stese
*
Docc cee c ence ccc ence cece e cence nese Etter tess ese ees sree sete
seen cee seen Pa
een aee@uwae
2h
ee ee ee ere ne ee owen
oe
+
cee
In the Secretary's opinion,
therefore, "we needed great flexibility ‘in dealing with the French situstion, and ve could not efford to look at Frence only from the point
of view of U. S. fiscal and ullitary requirements. The stakes were
just teo great to permit this.
On the other hend, continued Secretary Dulles, the matters
dezilt with in the bracketed portions of paragrarh 41 could al of them
come up for careful consideretion at the appropriste time--for example,
in the course of our normel budgetary process and at the time of the
NATO annual review. This being so, he doubted the velne of the rigid
guidance set forth in the bracketed sections of paragraph 41.
eee
ee
oft
eae
ec
ee
see
eeaeaeeoe
erreanes
pee
eee
e.rea
hepereee
eee
eee
ee
ane
eee
PIDDDLILEDDLDDDDU EEE iii] Tous “he “woul ‘récémmena,
elong with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the subraragrenhs of parecreph 41 be omitted.
Tne fact that these BUUT2ZTecTepas were not en-
shrined in an HSo policy perer vould rot mean thet they conld not be
considered in the course of cur ennusl budgetary review, the NATO annu2l review, and similer ststed intervals. In short, parasreph 41 es
a whole wes too rigid. IIIIIIIIIIISTILLILILiliriininiehiiroiiiitin
ese
eet wea enn
Ce ey eve
wee m esc ceantriceteascnccecsecen
SEIDEL EEE DES Pe Spe
ee nee Hee meee reece eter
e ere teehee enc etna eta ne enenenenrencee leit:
crthes
ee ee
ay sen eee e eer enane .
~,*
renner
.
eee
.
ee
re
mee
epee
eos
e8e@
se
pnage
*
Seat eeae weer we eae aes ene
es
ee
@
eee
:|
nans
~~
~
Tota
Ce ee et i a
Mr. Cutler then asked General Twining if he wished to add _.
enything to the written views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General
Twining replied that the Joint Chiefs had felt that in a policy paper
of this nature there was no need to be so specific as the language of
~3-
- ‘TOP SECRET
REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT, D
{
-
~
rd
>
ra
EWROWER LIBRARY i
oe
,
?
hsmaori RRR A EN A AlinNCamo
nt ene Stheee
ne eT Ree ese ve ee
_l
Papers, 1953-Sl:
(Ann Whitran file)
isenhower!