TOP SECRET His second point, continued Secretary Dulles, was that this whole modernization plan was a package deal involving a reduction in the force levels of the ROK forces. Secretary Dulles insisted that the United States was not in a position to sustain the costs of supporting the present level of the South Korean forces to the tune of over $700 million a year. Congress was going to insist on a very sharp cut in our military assistance and defense If we continue to try to support the support programs world-wide. present high levels of the indigenous forces in Korea, we will find ourselves obliged to make drastic reductions in our militery aid programs in other parts of the world. Yet, there was so far no evidence whatsoever that we were going to succeed in getting South Korea to agree to a cut in ROK force levels. President Rhee was, as usual, being stubborn andtoughin these negotiations. :¢2::1:1::: ee meen ere n mn ene seme ener tere ree eee meer oe neen ema me wee sane ee een DIDLIDIDIIIDDD EEE EEE pny Mr. Cutler indicated his agreement with the Secretary of State's position, and said that that was why the Planning Board had drafted subparagraph 9-c in its present form. He then suggested that General Lemitzer speak to the Council regarding his recent negotiations with President Rhee. General Lemnitzer indicated that President Rhee had been tae’ weeTe 7 REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT, D. EISENROWER LIBRARY > very pleased indeed with our decision to suspend Article 13(D) of the Armistice Agreement and to proceed to modernize U. 8. forces in Korea. However, President Rhee indicated that he wanted more information on the precise character of the modernization of forces which we contemplated and, particularly, what we had in mind with respect to the modernization of the ROK Army. General Len- nitzer and Ambassador Dowling, following their instructions from Washington, had explained as best they could what we had in mind . by way of modernization, :::::0:: DDD. IST IIDDPITIIIDIIII nn eee : tenes ere a -9- TOP SECRET te te ett