Daily knowledge of activities throughout the Atoll when personnel were traveling by small
boat and helicopter from a number of housing areas and the maintenance of daily current exposure records at five control stations on two atolls with limited transportation and communtcation facilities proved to be the most difficult control problems. In many instances records
were from 24 to 48 hr behind the activities of the individual. When the records were made
current, the individual was listed as an overexposure, and the Control Officer was criticized
for not informing the individual of his current exposure at time of entry. This time delay was
caused by the practice of issuing film badges at Eniwetok and developing the film at Bikini and
by a lack of night transportation in the lagoon.
The practice of entry control by film-badge exposures left much to be desired, but it was
the only method available in the absence of reliable self-~reading dosimetric devices, The
practice of daily issuance and developmentof film badges may have penalized manyindividuals
because of inherent inaccuracies of the film badge in the presence of low-energy radiation and
low dosages.
4.5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
4.5.1
Conclusions
1. The practice of. controlling entry into extensive contaminated areas by means of current
exposure records obtained from film-badge developmentis inadequate.
2, Radiological-safety control groups of TG-7.1 and TG-7.5 should be separate entities.
3. The system of waivers of the maximum permissible exposure is inappropriate to the
situation.
4. The policy of project responsibility for safety practices is the only realistic means by
which an adequate control of radiation exposures can be obtained.
4.5.2 Recommendations
1. A study should be initiated to determine an adequate integrating dose meter that will effectively operate under Pacific Proving Grounds conditions. This meter should contain a current indication of the radiation exposure of the individual and should be readable both by the
individual and the Control Officer.
2. TG-7.5 should establish a separate radiological-safety organization to provide a continuity of service in the test and interim periods.
3. The maximum permissible exposure should be based on a calender quarter and not on
an arbitrary 13-week period. The system of waivers should be abandoned, and all individuals
exceeding the maximum permissible exposure should be listed as overexposures since a
thorough preliminary planning of the safety aspects of recovery and construction will minimize
the requirements of waivers, Every effort should be made to avoid the establishmentof limits
other than the specified 3.9 r per quarter.
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