of time, which most recently has been taken to be one quarter of a year, or 13 weeks. By such
reasoning the permissible limit for test operations has been set at 3.9 r of gamma exposure in
13 weeks.
Although it may be stated with considerable certainty that no significant injury is going to
result to any individual participating in test operations at the levels mentioned and although it
is true that the same thing would probably apply if the limits were set two or three times as
high, it nevertheless is true that there is no threshold to significant injury in this field, and
the legal position of the Atomic Energy Commissionis jeopardized if there is deliberate departure from what may be considered a reasonable interpretation of the accepted permissible
limit.
Provision is made in Task Force operation plans to allow the permissible limits to be ex-
ceeded when the Commanderfinds that the requirements for the successful completion of the
operation require a departure from standards of safety that are accepted in normal operation.
Such a decision is thus one of command responsibility, and the figure given is in the nature of an
upper limit for such a departure and does not constitute a restatement of what is to be considered safe and acceptable practice.
Unfortunately this is a philosophy that the military services find difficult to accept in view
of the normal hazards of a test operation at the Pacific Proving Grounds. The military project
requirements to work in contaminated areas and with contaminated equipmentsoon led to block
requests for an authorized exposure of 7.9 r per operation. The grant of waiver of the maximum permissible exposure early in the test series created a loss of confidence in the established limit of 3.9 r and was soon reflected in the actions of the nonmilitary task groups. When
it became apparent that a waiver of the maximum permissible exposure could be obtained upon
application, the practices of conservation of exposure and wide utilization of recovery and
contractor personnel became nonexistent. In many cases waivers were requested after over-
exposure, and in many cases approved waivers were neverutilized. Although 10.8 per cent of
TG-17.1 exceeded the maximum permissible exposure, only 33 per cent of the overexposures
were covered by waivers. Twenty-two per cent of the waivers granted were not utilized. Although 14.2 per cent of TG-7.5 exceeded the maximum permissible exposure, less than 3 per
cent of the overexposures were covered by waivers.
CTG-7.1 soon realized the deteriorating situation and expressed the policy that any individual exceeding 6.0 r would be relieved of duty and returned to the United States. This policy
was of great assistance to the Control Group in the minimization of personnel exposures, Those
exposures in excess of 6.0 r were accrued accidentally by individuals stationed at Rongerik
Atoll at the time of the (4@9VO Tall-out or by membersof Project 6.4, Proof Testing of Atomic
Warfare Counter Measures, a project directing two liberty ships through the radioactive fallout.
Three military members of Project 6.6, Effects on the Ionosphere, were associated with
the Air Weather Service Detachment at Rongerik at the time of theo | fall-out. Film
badges that were left in tents revealed readings of 95 r total dose, but an investigation indicated that the actual exposure was more nearly 40 r. These exposures were unanticipated and
could only have been avoided if evacuation capability had been present.
Several members of Project 6.4 received exposures of between 6 and 12 r as a result of
continued activity aboard the contaminated drone ships. This hazard was anticipated and ac-
cepted as an occupational hazard by members of the project in view of the military importance
of the information to be gathered.
Differences in control philosophy provided seeds of contention in relations of the Rad-Safe
Unit and TG-7.1 and TG-7.5. The scientific personnel considered unit and project leaders as
being responsible for the radiological safety of personnel, whereas contractor personnel considered the Rad-Safe Unit as being responsible for the radiological safety of personnel and felt
that the unit was providing more support to the scientific programs than to the salvage and
construction programs. This second consideration is not feasible under large-scale operations
since the Control Officer is not in a position to supervise civilian employees. His control of
exposures can only be a reflection of the acceptance of the radiological-safety philosophy by
supervisory personnel during their organization and performance of work assignments.
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