CHAPTER VII, SECTION 1 gated to the Holmes & Narver Director of Industrial Relations. The personnel were arranged in muster groups consisting of a group leader and a unit of men selected to board the same ship from the same location at the same time. Each group varying in size, contained men who could be released from work at the same time, and each group was assigned a time for assembly and muster at embarkation points. In addition to the group leader’s identificaion and muster of his men, each person was checked off on two successive master lists. All men with continuin shore duty were constantly accounted for, an their necessary movements were known. The evacuation was accomplished on schedule and at departure time no person was unaccounted for either by absence or by error in record. The sequence utilized in reporting and accounting for all personnel was as follows: 1. Individual personnel reported to group leader. "2. Group leader reported to site muster officers. 3. Muster officers reported to: a. TQM for verification of muster with ship’s passenger lists. b. Personnel officer for his certification to JFT Headquarters thatall personnel were accounted for. The above procedure was used for each test. Actual evacuation of personnel for the Nectar event at Eniwetok was not required; however, plans-were made for emergency evacuation of Eniwetok Atoll had the occasion for this arisen. These plans contemplated an accurate and detailed account of all personnel on the day prior \ to Nectar, called N minus one, and included \ steps for emergency air transportation to Hono‘. lulu of all personnel who had cumulative radiation exposure of 2500 mr or more. All other personnel were scheduled to be taken to sea on vessels which were anchored in the harbor, and marine craft had been designated to ferry the personnel from pre-designated staging areas to the ships. / /j / | Prior to the first evacuation from Bikini Atoll, considerable thought was given to the capability for continued operation from afloat in the event of unacceptable contamination at the various sites. Plans were made for the use of an LST or LCU as a tender with improvised shops, the construction of a decontamination station on a barge, the support of two Scientific Groups off site Fox with LCUs as houseboats, decontamination of equipment and areas as would be required, and methods and procedures to enable the men to accomplish work ashore while they were being quartered and messed afloat. Re-entry plans were formulated which covered steps to be taken in case of postponement and full reoccupation of the various sites. Page 7-2 These plans designated key persons by name with assigned tasks as first re-entry . personnel, and these men were scheduled for evacuation in the USS Bairoko; from this vessel they could be flown by helicopter to critical sites. Jeeps were parked at the helicopter mats on Tare, Charlie, Fox and Nan to provide tre transportation needs for the re-entry personnel, and tank trucks loaded with diesel and gas were located at these sites for refueling vital equipment in case of extended postponement. Priority of debarkation of all other personnel was established so as to provide for the most expeditious restoration of camp andotherfacilities. Following the Bravo detonation, though contamination was excessive, it was necessary to land re-entry personnel as early as possible to secure or service operating equipment and to collect scientific data. The useful service period of each man was brief. For example, one man who was required to service the DO-500 power plant on Dog was landed by helicopter at approximately H plus 10 hours; he remained in the area less than two minutes during which time he accumulated 2400 mr of radiation. _Due to weather and sea conditions prevailing during the entire test period at Bikini, it was impractical to tow LCMs or LCUs to sea. The LSD Belle Grove could carry 19 LCMs, and accordingly 15 Navy LCMs and four H&N LCMs were taken to sea aboard this vessel. The U.S. Navy Helicopter Barge and Navy Repair Barge were towed to sea, but all other hght craft were anchored or moored to buoys off site Nan. All DUKWswere beached at either Nan or Tare and covered with tarpaulins, The craft remaining in Bikini Lagoon were badly contaminated after Bravo and the first order of work on return after the test was the decontamination of these craft. The 19 LCMs that were taken to sea in the LSD were not contaminated; these were extensively used while other craft were being cleared of radioactive contamination. A decontamination group was put ashore at Tare to reduce the contamination of the dock area, plus the equipment necessary to continue operations at that site. The fitting out of a de- contamination station on a 500-ton barge was rushed at Elmer and this barge was towed to Bikini where it was generally kept tied alongside the USNS Ainsworth (see Figure 7-1). The entry of all men to all sites at Bikini was under strict Rad-Safe control and procedures. Due to waters at throughout the boating the high winds and resulting rough Bikini Lagoon, which prevailed practically the entire test period, conditions were poor. There were times when the transfer of personnel from a boat to a vessel or to the decontamination barge was extremely hazardous. Fortunately, no seri- ous personnel accidents ensued from these con- ditions, and as transfer of personnel at sea was