CHAPTER Ill, SECTION 6 SECTION 6 SECURITY GENERAL Atomic Energy Commission, Los Angeles Secur- The security requirements for OPERATION CASTLE were essentially the same as those established for OPERATIONS GREENHOUSE and IVY. The Contractor’s Security Liaison with governmental agencies, both local and national, resulted in the execution of a tighter security program than would other- Department was responsible for formulating policies and implementing procedures on a company-wide basis to insure compliance with ex- isting Atomic Energy Commission security directives, and for safeguarding the mission of the Proving Ground by educating employees in security consciousness. Reporting to the General Manager, the Holmes & Narver Chief Security Officer was responsibile for all phases of the security program, both in the Home Office and at Jobsite, and was aided in carrying out this responsibility by an Assistant Security Officer. A full-time Holmes & Narver Security Officer, reporting functionally to the Project Manager, and technically to the Chief Security Officer, was assigned to the Pacific Proving Ground and was responsibile for the security of all Holmes & Narveractivities at the forward area. The Chief Security Officer, however, was responsible for selecting qualified Security personnel, properly indoctrinating them, and providing complete and comprehensive material relative to Security procedures and processes. As the Operation progressed, two Assistant Security Officers were assigned to the Jobsite Security Officer; one at Bikini Atoll and one at Eniwetok Atoll. The Honolulu Office Manager was selected as the Security Representative for Hawaiian Island activities. Although he reported to the Chief of Operations, technical guidance in security matters was provided by the Security Officer and his staff. All personnel clearances were processed and all identification media were produced in the Home Office Security Department. Every ap- ity Branch, for security clearances. wise have been possible. Information secured from these various sources proved to be of spe- cial value in the personnel security program. The favorable security record maintained by contractual people during the Operation was at- tributable in large measure to the expeditious processing and broad cooperation afforded to Holmes & Narver by the Los Angeles Security Branch of the Atomic Energy Commission. Operational security arrangements in existence prior to the commencement of OPERATION CASTLE provided that AEC’s Los Angeles Security Branch undertake the responsibility of processing all Holmes & Narver employment applicants under the personnel clearance program. The Los Angeles AEC Security Branch also provided the Eniwetok Field Office with security surveys of the various facilities and premises of the Holmes & Narver Home Office. PERSONNEL SECURITY Because security is one of the most impor- tant considerations in conducting an Operation, every effort was made to employ only those individuals who could be trusted not to disclose classified information to unauthorized persons. To accomplish this, each applicant was processed in accordance with AEC standards. There were two basic types of clearances: the “P” Approval, which authorized access up to and including Secret-Defense Information, NonRestricted Data; and the “Q’ Clearance, which authorized access to information classified Restricted Data, as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The “P’”’ Approval was predicated upon the results of a name and fingerprint check of the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other national agencies, as applicable. The “Q” Clearance was granted upon the results of an exhaustive background investigation plicant processed was photographed and fingerprinted. The Security Department prepared all identification forms, cards, and badges as well as requests to the Port Control Director, Long Beach Naval Station, for the issuance of Gov- which was conducted by either the FBI or the Civil Service Commission. Department, was used as a basis for obtaining so urgently needed that the Operation would ernment travel orders. Pre-employment information, provided by the Industrial Relations a limited non-governmental background inves- tigation. In addition, Security was responsible for maintaining, coding, and disseminating all derogatory information received, and for pre- paring all papers which accompanied the Per- sonnel Security Questionaires submitted to the Page 3-32 There were a few deviations from basic clearance mechanics. Wherelittle, if any, access to classified information would be had by a potential employee, and where his services were suffer without them, provisions were made to grant the applicant either a Local “P” Approval or a “Q” Emergency Clearance. The Local “P”’ Approval was based on the results of a name check of local law enforcement and Federal Agencies and could be obtained only if the appli-