With a memorandum dated 3 October 1979, DNA expanded the NIPR effort to include U.S. service personnel who had participated in the postwar occupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Vice Admiral Monroe noted that the original NTPR charter had not included these personnel because the effort had been "limited to test participants" and the “wartime bombings were not tests." Neverthe- less, he added, they had "the same need for DOD research and assistance" as did the former test participants. "Unless otherwise directed," he concluded, the NTPR program "is being expanded to include those U.S. servicemen who might have been exposed to low-level ionizing radiation as a result of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings" (9). Vice Admiral Monroe was "so confident this step was right," he later explained, that he did not preface his statement to his superiors with "I recommend" (10). The central management decisions emergent from the memoranda cited above and the other documents drafted in the early months of the NTPR effort were: e To undertake the NTPR program as a major, multiyear, multimilliondollar effort @ To organize the NTPR program with DNA exercising centralized guidance and the military services having responsibility for the execution of service research and followup with their own service personnel e To pursue the NTPR program as a scientific and historical inquiry, producing factual results without regard to preconceptions or political acceptability e To remain alert to any possible new requirement or any additional action that might seem needed and to modify the NTPR program accordingly. The last-mentioned decision resulted in a program that has evolved to meet the needs of the time (10). 1.3 SCOPE OF THE NTPR PROGRAM. During the first 8 years of the program, the specific tasks of the NTPR have become more detailed and numerous. The 28 January 1978 memorandum cited