health and lifestyle factors.

The same questionnaire would also be sent toa

similar number of veterans who had no history of such participation.

Results

from the two groups, adjusted for age, occupation, smoking habits, and other
influences, would be compared.
The second phase would include medical and physiological examinations of
an unspecified number of veterans and the collection of data regarding

possible congenital or genetic abnormalities in their children.

The method-

ology for the analysis of this information was not addressed.
The VA plan was first reviewed by a panel of Government scientists,
headed by Dr. Glyn Caldwell, who had authored the SMOKY study at CDC.

The

Caldwell review was then submitted to the Committee on Interagency Radiation
Research and Policy Coordination (CIRRPC).

Both the Caldwell committee and

CIRRPC concluded that the VA plan did not describe a feasible study since it
would be impossible to detect the small excess of disease expected in a group
of approximately 200,000 personnel exposed to the reported low levels of
radiation.
The VA plan and the Caldwell/CIRRPC review were submitted to the Director
of OTA for review in January 1985.

OTA examined these documents and conducted

its own independent review of the feasibility of the epidemiological study.
The independent OTA study analyzed two strategies for assessing the health of
these veterans.

The first was similar to that proposed by the VA, that is to

study approximately 200,000 participants in the nuclear tests.

(The

Hiroshima/Nagasaki occupation troops were excluded since the doses were so low
that their inclusion would weaken rather than strengthen the power of the
study.)

The second strategy was to study approximately 1,400 veterans with

measured or estimated doses greater than 5.0 rem.

The power of each strategy

to detect the expected excess of radiogenic cancers was calculated based on
the radiation dose information available.

These calculations were repeated

for doses several times higher to account for possible understatement of
reported dose.
The OTA concluded, as had the Caldwell committee and CIRRPC, that such
"global" studies concerning the health of nuclear test veterans are not

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