CHAPTER Il, SECTION 6 formed as nearly as possible with the methods established by the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, U. S. Department of Commerce. The markings on all cargo, packinglists, and all documents pertaining to shipment were in accordance with existing governmental directives., OVERSEAS TRANSPORTATION. Scheduling of all shipments began upon the receipt of requisitions. All requisitions were first screened in the office of the Chief of Operations where the urgency of the items and the method of transportation were determined. Purchase orders were then written with delivery at the shipping point as determined by the Material Control Section of the Operations Division. Material scheduled for transshipment to the Proving Ground via water was delivered to the Naval Supply Center in Oakland where it was manifested and held for loading aboard cargo vessels. Task Force SEVEN standard procedures required that the estimated quantities of cargo destined for Jobsite be firmly established four months in advance; space was allocated aboard these vessels accordingly. Shipping schedules in the early part of the Operation were based on providing needed surface transport with one cargo vessel approximately once each month. Due to the need for accelerated shipping that developed during the period of peak construction activity, schedules were re- vised to provide for sailings approximately once each three weeks. Contractor’s representatives were stationed at NSC to check and supervise incoming cargo and to coordinate outgoing cargo with a JTF-7 Transportation Liaison Officer. The space provided and the frequency of shipments were generally adequate to meet the needs of the Jobsite. However, certain unanticipated difficulties developed which caused serious disruptions in the orderly progress of construction. The loading and departure time of vessels . were subject to unannounced changes and there were instances where urgently needed cargo was deferred to later carriers. Some of this cargo had to be diverted to air transportation. The amount of cargo shipped monthly by surface vessel is shown in Chart 3-3. Subsequent to mid-1954, shipment of refrigerated cargo was made via commercial carrier to Honolulu and from there the cargo was transshipped in Naval vessels to the Proving Ground. So long as the schedules of the commercial carriers were coordinated with the schedules of the Naval vessels, transportation in this manner was satisfactory. The purchase and delivery of fresh produce was generally timed with loading schedules to provide for a minimum number of days out-of-the garden, but the schedules of the commercial carriers Page 3-28 were subject to sudden and unannounced changes; these changes were usually made after perishable products were enroute to loading points. Where the schedules were delayed, the changes increased the out-of-the garden period and called for additional storage and handling. In some cases, schedules were advanced, which called for expediting packing and movement to the loading port. These changes (in the commercial carrier schedules) were also reflected in the transhipment point in Honolulu. Incoming reefers missed outgoing reefers and additional handling and cold storage were required. In many cases, perishable subsistance had to be hauled from the downtown docks in Honolulu to Pearl Harbor. To overcome some of the difficulties encountered, a procedure of “sight buying’ of perishable products was established. This provided for quality produce at a minimum of cost; it also per- mitted obtaining produce in a minimum of time after harvest. Food losses due to spoilage were kept at a minimum because of this “sight buying” procedure. Overseas air transportation was provided through the MATS system, with the on-continent terminal located at Travis Air Base. With the need for accelerated delivery of materials in the latter months of the Operation, a considerable amount of cargo had to be diverted from surface to air transportation. Only those items of such urgency that to hold them for surface transportation would seriously affect construction schedules were shipped by air. Initially, requirements for air transportation were estimated four months in advance of needs as required by Task Force operating procedures; as the amount of cargo that became critical kept increasing, estimates for space had to be changed te a month-to-month basis. The demands on MATSfrom all agencies became heavy and were subject to radical variations. As a result, Contractor's cargo could not be lifted in accordance with allocations fo the months of September, October, and Novem. ber 1955, and backlogs of urgently-needed cargo developed. In late December the condition worsened, and an investigation was made a to the availability of commercial charter plane as an emergency means of reducing backlogs. This was found feasible, but since the MATS facilities were thereafter augmented rapid) charter planes were not needed. Monthly au cargo shipments are shown in Chart 3-4. Of approximately 550 tons airlifted from 1 Ju 1954 through 30 May 1956, 318 tons we moved during the months of February, March, and April of 1956.