Wersgall that Bikini Island is not resertled, and the action, if any, that government will take should the Bikinians receive radiation doses in excess of federal standards. Bur the Bikinians strongly resist the idea of direct negotiations on resettlement between the American and the Marshal! Islands governments, for they doubr that the government of the Marshall Islands would act in their best interests. When the government came into existence two years ago, the Bikinians voted for the losers. And the Marshallese president, Amata Kabua, is the son of the iroty whose claim to ownership of their atoll the Bikinians have rejected. Ic was the United States. not the Marshall Islands government. that took possession of Bikini Acoll. rendered it uninhabitable, and promised to care for its population until Bikini Island could be resettled. The United States has the wherewithal to provide hous- ing. food support. transportation, monetary compensation. radiological surveillance. medical care. and arrangements for an eventual return to Bikini Island: the government of the Marshall Islands does not. Interposing the Marshall Islands government in the formulation and administration ofa resettleMent program can only cause further bureauCratic snags and squabbles of the kinds that have plagued the Bikinians for 34 years. If the United States is to fulfill its stated obligation to the people of Bikini, Congress must legislare a resettlement program for them under the direct supervision of the U.S. government. The separate agreement referred to in the compact between the United States and Marshall Islands should incorporate this Jegislation directly and stipulate that it pre- empt any other terms of the compact with which it may conflict. Beyond Incompetence The record of U.S. policy toward the that land was either never questioned or dis- missed without concern. The first move of the Bikinians—to Rongerik—was ill conceived and nearly tragic. The second move—to Kili—has caused unwarranted hardship. The conclusions drawn from the 1967 survey were wrong. The 1968 decision to move people back to Bikini was wrong. The AEC focused more on theresettlemenc of Bikini than on the careful assessment of the island’s safecy. and the constanr reassurances that there were no serious radia- tion problems were based on incomplete information. The three-year interagency bickering over paying for the cost of the ~ radiological survey was deplorable. The trauma of August 1978, when Bikinians again were removed from their atoll. might have been avoided if a comprehensive study of the islands had been conducted several years carlicr or if U.S. scientists had been more honest and conscientious in recognizing their ignorance of the real dangers. The Bikinians described themselves at a 1978 congressional hearing as “‘victims of bureaucratic incompetence.’’ But the problem goes beyond incompetence; it is one of indif- ference. The Pacific community is perhaps the only major region of the world today whose foreign policy is entirely pro-American. Furthermore, the western perimeter of American strategic defenses has receded over the past decade from the Asian continent into the Pacific. Yer che United States continues to treat the Pacific islands as its back-yard dumping grounds. disregarding the interests and legitimate nghts of their inhabitants. It is with an eerie sense of déja vu that one reads the State Department testimony of June 1979 regarding potential storage sites in the Pacific basin for spent nuclear fuel. State suggests that the ideal location for storing nuclear waste would be an island ‘‘far from [populous] areas . . . without severe Bikinians over the past 34 years is dismal. The legality of the fundamental decision to appropriate non-U.S. land for military purposes and to remove non-US. citizens from geologic stabiliry . . . with sufficient land area including areas for necessary harbor and airfield facilities.” 96. 97. weather conditions and having long-term