rather than standardized usage 10SSO TOO requisition items proved to be the most troublesome with 13- . respeot to early receipt as well as appropriate inventory. I.k. Local purchase effected tiro~h HABG2N p~ved difficult and awkward in view of existi~= .HABCDi~ requirements, 15’. The reduction of Signal personnel to a skeleton force during the period between CASTLE and FJ31MMG resulted in inefficient operations and the deteriorationof eqtipment and facilities throWh the neglect of maintenance. It also made the build-up for REDMLNG more difficult because of the lack of a sound nucleus. 26. The organizational aspects of the present Joint Communica~ tion Facility have no official status. Tho~h operations during REDUINGproceeded smoothly this could lead to operational difficultics in the future, particularly in the event of personality mnfl.icts. REDWING communications operations didproducc s~me problems in antrol$ administration and IoSistics* 1?. The concept of handling classified traffic in clear text form in the tape relay center, requiring the use of on-line enc~~a radic channels and the special ap.moval of tion equipment mall landline circuits, was cf very little benefit operationally and did n:t justify the tremendous expense and the danger to security introduced by this fcrm of operation. Also$ the use of three separate rcuting indicator systems for the Joint Relay Center led to a great anmunt of confusion in the handling of traffic. 18. The operation of the JTF-7 Headquarters communication oonter by personnel of N 7.2 proved undesirable inasmuch as a headquarters \ 126 - —. a. -- ~– - -- — - - - - .- --- -- ‘