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Commander Task Group 7.2

Joint Task Force Seven

Final Report

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OPERATION REDWING

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ENIWETOK ATOLL

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COMMANDER TASK GROUP 7.2

JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

FINAL REPORT

OPERATION REDWING

31 July 1956

Roger M. Lilly
ROGER M. LILLY
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

233492

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COMMANDER TASK GROUP 7.2
Joint Task Force SEVEN
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* = Ref. to Reduction of Mil. Garrison

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HEADQUARTERS TASK GROUP 7.2
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
APO 187, San Francisco, Calif.
31 July 1956

FINAL REPORT - OPERATION REDWING

SECTION I - MISSIONS:

1. Garrison Phase Prior to Build-up; (June 1954 to June 1955):

Upon termination of Operation CASTLE, the Commander Joint Task Force SEVEN published Operation Order 2-54, dated 7 May 1954, to govern an interim period from the conclusion of CASTLE operations to planned Atomic Energy Commission tests scheduled for the spring of 1956, known as Operation REDWING. This order assigned the following missions to CTG 7.2:

a. Upon departure of CJTF SEVEN from the forward area, discharge the responsibilities of CJTF SEVEN as Atoll Commander, ENIWETOK (ATCOM), in accordance with CINCPAC GLOP No. 11-53.

b. Exercise direction of all JTF SEVEN military forces based at ENIWETOK Atoll for movement control, logistic support, general security and other duties of ATCOM.

c. Reestablish the forward area garrison force and provide base facilities (except POL and fire fighting facilities) for tenant units and military personnel therein, with prorated share of KPs provided by each unit. Units will provide barracks orderlies for barracks assigned to the respective organizations and will assist TG 7.2 in such functions as periodic off-loading of cargo vessels and area clean-up details in areas used jointly by all units.

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[redacted]

d. Provide for the security and ground defense of ENIWETOK Atoll within capability of forces assigned.

e. Provide and operate the military communications system.

f. Provide all Radsafe functions for ENIWETOK Island.

2. Build-Up; (July 1955 to 15 April 1956):

The planning phase for Operation REDWING was initiated upon receipt of CJTF SEVEN Planning Directive No. 1-55, dated 10 August 1955. This directive assigned CTG 7.2 the following missions:

a. Continue to discharge the responsibilities of CJTF SEVEN as Atoll Commander ENIWETOK (ATCOM), in accordance with CINCPAC GEOP 11-53, as amended.

b. Provide and operate the overall military communications system for handling long-haul traffic (exclusive of air opertions, weather and internal naval communications).

c. Continue to operate all base facilities at ENIWETOK Island, except those specifically allocated to CTG 7.4 and CTG 7.5 in accordance with existing agreements.

d. Provide in coordination with CTG 7.5 for security of exclusion areas, and security at ports of entry at ENIWETOK AND BIKINI Atolls.

e. Continue to screen messages for ATCOM during the operational period, forwarding only those messages posing vital problems for CJTF SEVEN.

f. Provide support services for Headquarters, JTF SEVEN, as required.

[redacted]

[redacted]

g. Be prepared, in coordination with CTG 7.5 and on order of CJTF SEVEN, to conduct emergency post-shot evacuation of all personnel based on ENIWETOK Island.

3. Operational Phase; (15 April 1956 to 23 July 1956):

The operational phase of REDWING commenced on 15 March 1956, culminating months of preparation and was implemented in accordance with CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 1-56, dated 20 January 1956. Missions promulgated by this publication for CTG 7.2 were as follows:

a. Until relieved by CJTF SEVEN, continue to discharge the responsibilities of Atoll Commander, ENIWETOK (ATCOM), in accordance with CINCPAC GLOP 11-53, as amended, within the capability of available forces.

b. Provide communications and cryptographic facilities for all elements of the task force on ENIWETOK Island, for HQ JTF SEVEN on PARRY Island, to major ships in the Pacific Proving Ground and to off-atoll terminals at OAHU, T.H. and KWAJALEIN, M.I.

c. Continue to operate communication facilities on JAPTAN Island and all base facilities at ENIWETOK Island, except those specifically allocated to CTG 7.4 and CTG 7.5, in accordance with existing agreements.

d. Provide, in coordination with CTG 7.5, for security of exclusion areas and security at ports of entry at ENIWETOK and BIKINI Atolls.

e. Continue to screen messages for ATCOM during the operational period, forwarding only those messages concerning unusual

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problems to CJTF SEVEN.

f. Provide office supplies to Headquarters JTF SEVEN.

g. Be prepared to conduct emergency evacuation of all personnel based on ENIWETOK and JAPTAN Islands.

h. Provide logistical support for 8600 AU Army Security Det.

i. Perform all ground monitoring services associated with ENIWETOK and JAPTAN Islands except in those areas or activities assigned to other task groups.

4. Roll-Up:

CJTF SEVEN Administrative Order No. 1-56, dated 20 January 1956, announced the following general policies to govern disposition of military material on hand in the forward area upon conclusion of Operation REDWING:

a. T/O&E equipment to accompany units upon redeployment.

b. Motor vehicles, trailers, and materials handling equipment requiring overhaul in the twelve months following Operation REDWING will be shipped from the forward area.

c. Serviceable material for which there is no known requirements (excess material) and critical material for which long term tropical storage cannot be provided, will be disposed of per existing instructions of the owning department.

d. Unserviceable material which cannot be repaired in the forward area will be shipped to the appropriate repair facilities of the owning department.

e. To the extent practicable, all other material which

[redacted]

[redacted] tropical storage.

f. Property held on memorandum receipt from forward area accountable officers to be thoroughly cleaned and renovated by the using activity prior to turn-in.

g. Task Force owned property would be stored or disposed of per SOP 65-2, 15 March 1955, HQ JTF SEVEN.

h. In addition, the task group was directed by above cited reference to prepare and submit to CJTF SEVEN a material roll-up plan based upon:

(1) Experience gained during forward area operation.

(2) The feasibility of assembly line techniques in processing of material for storage; accomplishing major portion of material processing prior to redeployment of the using personnel and units; and providing for thorough supervision and inspection of material to insure proper processing prior to shipment or storage.

5. Restablishment of Interim Activities; (24 July 1956 until build-up period is established for Operation HARDTACK):

At the conclusion of Operation REDWING the Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN published Operation Order 2-56 (Interim Phase Operation Order) outlining the following missions for the Commander, Task Group 7.2:

a. Upon closure of JTF SEVEN Headquarters on PARRY Island, discharge the responsibilities as ATCOM in accordance with

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CINCPAC General Emergency Operation Plan No. 11-56, dated 18 April 1956.

b. Provide and operate the military communications system, to include the provision of long range radio service to the AACS.

c. Provide all Radsafe functions for ENIWETOK Island.

d. Be responsible for port operations and related activities.

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erational military unit within the Pacific Proving Ground under

1-TAB A

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[redacted]

control of CJTF SEVEN during the interim period, and as such was the chief coordinator and agent for CJTF SEVEN in the forward area. During the interim period the Navy Boat Pool Detachment remained a unit of JTF SEVEN under control of the Atoll Commander (CTG 7.2). Upon inactivation of TG 7.4, following CASTLE operations, the air force element (4930th SG (T)) remaining at ENIWETOK Island was reassigned for operational control to the Air Force Special Weapons Command (AFSWC) at Kirtland Air Force Base. This complicated, to some extent, the coordination of PPG activities; however the majority of problems involving ATCOM and the 4930th SG (T) as pertained to routine post garrison duties, and CINCPAC GEOP 11-53 Atoll defense plans, were resolved by local agreement.

2. Build-Up:

Task Group 7.2 retained the same organization during the build-up period for operation REDWING as established by CJTF SEVEN on 1 July 1955.[2] The army element was augmented in February and March 1956 by the attachment of Company "C", 505th Military Police Battalion, consisting of 8 officers and 252 enlisted men. The primary mission of this unit was to insure internal security of the PPG and to guard certain established exclusion areas. On 21 January 1956 the 8600 AU, 2nd ASA Detachment, arrived in the forward area and was attached to TG 7.2 for administrative and logistical support. Operational control of this unit was vested in CJTF SEVEN.

The build-up period brought about the reestablishment and activation of other task group elements of the Task Force, and the movement of their advance echelons to the PPG. Harmonious relations

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Roll-up requirements of TG 7.2 did not necessitate re-organization or the establishment of provisional units to accomplish the mission. The organizational structure during build-up and operational phases continued during the roll-up period.

5. Reestablishment of Garrison Forces:

On 23 July 1956, the Task Force Headquarters closed out in the forward area and opened simultaneously in Washington, D.C. At this time, the Commander, Task Group 7.2, assumed additional responsibilities as Atoll Commander, ENIWETOK (ATCOM). (CJTF Message P221925Z) Interim missions outlined in CJTF SEVEN

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[redacted]

Operation Order 2-56, dated 28 July 1956, were implemented [redacted] conclusion of Operation REDWING.

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special emphasis on the publication of new and revised directives for the administrative and operational control of the task group. Stocks of publications and blank forms were increased. The records administration program was reviewed, old files were removed, the files of all sections were placed on disposition schedules, and a Records Holding Area was established. Administrative procedures within the Adjutant Section were reviewed and revised to insure maximum efficiency. After April 1956, this section performed normal adjutant duties. No special problems were encountered.

During this same period the Personnel Section placed special effort upon the procurement and proper assignment of personnel authorized by the operational Table of Distribution which became effective 1 July 1955. A goal was established to reach full operational strength by 1 November.

Beginning in September 1955, plans were made by APO 187 for handling the considerable increase in mail anticipated in the PPG

[redacted]

during the operation. Internal facilities of APO 187 for sorting mail were increased and efforts were made to have additional APO facilities constructed on PARRY Island, ENIWETOK Atoll and ENYU Island, BIKINI

[redacted]

Atoll. APO 187, located on ENIWETOK Island, served all units in the Pacific Proving Ground, including AEC and Holmes and Narver civilian contractors from the beginning of the period of this report until April 1956. Establishment of three additional APOs in April facilitated service and lightened the load of APO 187. APO 435, located on PARRY Island, was manned by Task Group 7.5 personnel but did not provide financial service. APO 436 was established on ENYU Island to provide mail and financial service to all personnel in the BIKINI Area. APO 437 was established on PARRY Island to provide mail and financial service for Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN, Task Group 7.1, and Task Group 7.5 personnel. APO 187 operated similar to a base post office for these additional APOs in that all incoming mail was received by APO 187 and rerouted to the other APOs. No major problems were encountered and this system is recommended for future operations. The volume of mail and financial service handled by the APOs is annexed hereto.[3]

The Special Services Section worked steadily throughout the period from June 1955 to April 1956 readying its facilities for the operational period. The new swimming pool was opened in July 1955 and new volleyball courts were constructed. Special Services facilities were repaired and painted. Because of the shortage of nonappropriated funds beginning in June 1955, little money was available for necessary supplies, extra labor, or new equipment. Effective August 1955, it was directed by Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN that an admission fee be charged for

3 - TAB C

[redacted]

attendance at movies. This action increased the availability of non-appropriated funds but it was still necessary to operate on a small budget. During the operation, ample funds became available from the Central Post Fund and immediate steps were taken to procure much needed supplies and equipment. In addition to the early shortage of nonappropriated funds, the order and shipping time for obtaining supplies and equipment from appropriated funds proved unsatisfactory. In October 1955, based on instructions from the Task Force, requisitions totaling $18,000 of appropriated funds were placed for Special Service supplies and equipment through the Adjutant General, Department of the Army. The bulk of these supplies and equipment ordered for use during fiscal year 1956, were not received during the operation. An adequate Special Service program was carried out only by careful rationing of the 1955 stocks supplemented by purchases from the Central Post Fund. In the future, release of funds to the Task Group with authority to purchase items direct from vendors would be appropriate if order and shipping time cannot be reduced.

In May 1956, USARPAC informed this headquarters that only 16mm cinemascope films would be available after 1 August 1956. Action was taken to modify the screens of the Terrace and Starlite Theaters to accomodate cinemascope and to procure necessary equipment for the projectors.

The Chaplains held services in temporary facilities from January to July 1956. The old chapel was razed on 7 January and construction of the new chapel, on the same ground was not started

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until late March. From January until March 1956 the Chaplains were responsible for all services at both BIKINI and ENIWETOK Atolls. This made it necessary to travel by both air and water since services were held on every island where a construction site was in operation. On 18 March 1956, TG 7.[illegible] Chaplains arrived in this area and assumed the responsibility for religious activities at BIKINI Atoll. This made it possible for the Chaplains on ENIWETOK Atoll to increase their religious activities and to visit the outlying weather stations.

After Headquarters, JTF SEVEN arrived in the forward area and assumed the functions of ATCOM, ENIWETOK, the volume of administration in S1 activities leveled off and remained constant until the end of the operation.

2. Strengths, Records, and Reports:

a. Strength. Personnel strength during most of the period of this report was satisfactory. Statistical data pertaining to assigned and attached strengths is attached.[4] The interim Table of Distribution, which was effective until 1 July 1955, was adequate. The operational Table of Distribution, which was effective 1 July 1955, was generally satisfactory except as follows:

(1) Authorized personnel in many cases did not arrive as scheduled thereby creating a hardship in many sections, especially during the build-up phase preceding the operation. The requisition of enlisted personnel was on a phase-in basis. Requisitions were placed so as to reach operational T/D strength by 30 November 1955. However, this strength was not reached until 30 March 1956.

4 - TAB D

[redacted]

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(2) In numerious instances personnel were not sufficiently qualified in positions for which requisitioned. It is essential in an organization such as this that replacements be qualified for their jobs since inter-organizational transfers are not possible.

(3) The Table of Distribution did not authorize sufficient personnel in all sections. Certain activities, such as the Post Office, Post Exchange and Finance Office, were supplemented with personnel during the height of the operation in order to perform necessary service.

b. Records and Reports. There were no unusual problems encountered in maintaining records or preparing reports.

3. Discipline:

The emphasis placed on maintaining high troop morale, the prompt disciplinary action taken in cases warranting action, and the alertness of the Provost Marshal in crime detection resulted in a high state of troop discipline and morale throughout the period of this report. There were three special courts-martial and six summary courts-martial cases. Delinquency reports received from the Provost Marshal pertaining to other than Task Group 7.2 personnel were sent to the various task groups for appropriate action. The overall incident rate was proportionately low both prior to and during the operation.

4. Morale and Personnel Services:

In view of the isolation of this station, and the absence of dependents and normal off post community activities, a special effort was made to furnish excellent morale and personnel services. The

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Mail service was excellent prior to and during the operation. [redacted]

e. Religious Activities. Religious services for all faiths were provided throughout the Pacific Proving Ground to all personnel. To provide services on the numerious islands, the Chaplains were required to travel extensively by boat and airplane. With the

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arrival of Task Group 7.3 in March, 1956, Navy Chaplains assumed responsibility for conducting religious services at BIKINI.

f. Movies. Two outdoor theaters were available to personnel on ENIWETOK Island. Film procurment permitted the showing of a new movie each night. The Terrace Theater, with a seating capacity of approximately 900, was in operation throughout the interim and operational period. The Starlite Theater, which seats approximately 600, opened in February 1956. An admission fee of $.15 was charged with proceeds going to the Central Post Fund to cover film costs and operating expenses. Films were furnished by the USARPAC Film Exchange and in March 1956 additional arrangements were made for films for the Air Force weather stations.

g. Service Club. The Service Club was well attended during both the interim and operational periods. This club has a game room with pool tables, ping pong tables, shuffle board, TV set and piano. The club building houses a snack bar operated by the Post Exchange, a 10,000 volume library, I&E classrooms, and the offices of the Special Services Officer, I&E Officer, and the American Red Cross Director. The Patio of the club was used for religious services while the new chapel was being built.

h. Television. A television transmitting station was opened on PARRY Island in May 1956. Twelve television receiver sets were purchased from Special Services appropriated funds and distributed to the Service Club and to Army, Navy, and Air Force units.

i. Hobby Shop. The Hobby Shop was utilized by a large number of personnel throughout this period. Services offered included

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reservations usually being made two weeks in advance.

m. Athletics. Participation in athletics is considered a requirement for the health and well being of the permanent party at this isolated station. Two softball fields, two handball courts, one basketball court, and several volleyball courts were utilized to maximum capacity throughout most of this period. Leagues were organized for all sports which increased the interest and participation.

n. USO Shows. Two USO shows were available during this period. One was shown in August 1955 and the other in December 1955 as a part of the Christmas program. The talent in the December show was not of too high caliber and was hardly worth the effort that went into arrangement for the trip.

o. American Red Cross.

The ARC representative made his services available to all military and civilian personnel in the area. The number of cases handled far exceeded those of previous operations. The quality of service furnished was superior and had an important bearing on the

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to a primary MOS. Reclassifications and reassignments were accomplished in those cases where individuals were not qualified.

In March 1955 the tour of duty for Army personnel was changed from 12 to 13 months. Rotation to the ZI was authorized immediately after arrival of replacements in most cases. There were few instances in which personnel were held after completion of 13 months.

Allocations for promotions were received from Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN, in bulk by pay grade on a monthly basis. These allocations were suballoted to detachments on the basis of

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actual and authorized strengths. Promotions to E-6 and E-7 were accomplished by Promotion Board action. Promotions to grades E-3 through E-5 were made based on Section Chief and Detachment Commander recommendations.

Reenlistment was accomplished by placing enlisted men on temporary duty with the Personnel Center, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Authority for discharge and reenlistment was obtained from The Adjutant General in each case.

[redacted]

SECTION IV - SECURITY:

1. Mission:

The missions assigned to the S-2 Section remained constant throughout the period of this report but the priorities given to each mission varied according to the requirements peculiar to the interim, build-up or operational period. These missions were to:

a. Advise the Commander on all security and counterintelligence matters.

b. prepare, coordinate and supervise plans for security training of the task group.

c. Supervise the implementation of security directives of CINCPAC, Joint Task Force SEVEN, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

d. Assure compliance with Department of the Army regulations pertaining to all aspects of security.

e. Exercise responsibility for the coordination of the Provost Marshal activities pertaining to security.

2. Intelligence Activities:

The minimum security clearance for all persons assigned to Task Group 7.2 is SECRET. The minimum and higher individual clearance requirements were determined in accordance with CJTF SEVEN directives and the individual access needs. Upon arrival of an individual assigned to Task Group 7.2 a review was made of his Military 201 File for purpose of determining his clearance status. If requirements were not met, requests for investigations were initiated as necessary. In the processing of National Agency Checks required for SECRET clearance, the TG 7.2 S2 acts as Control Office. Requests for Background

forwarded to the major continental army commands who acted as control offices for such investigations. Interim and final clearance certificates (DA Form 873) were issued for all military clearances granted in accordance with AR 604-5.[5]

Authority for the Commander, Task Group 7.2 to grant final cryptologic clearances was obtained from CJTF SEVEN upon receipt of CJTF SEVEN SOP 205-3, dated 10 November 1955. Prior to receipt of this authority, all cryptologic clearances were granted by CJTF SEVEN. This new procedure eliminated a great deal of paper transactions and inherent delay. The same SOP set forth procedures for the initiation and processing of requests for "Certification for Access to Restricted Data" to CJTF SEVEN, a procedural step utilized frequently in the clearing of selected TG 7.2 officers as Sample Return Officers.

Maintenance of individual investigative files within the S2 section proved a great help in early requisitioning for and issue of REDWING badges, processing and recording of clearances, and the processing of those who failed to meet of otherwise jeopardized their standing in respect to clearance requirements.

Weekly air sweeps, and periodic ground sweeps when LCMs and DUKWs were available were made of ENIWETOK Atoll during the interim

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and build-up period. Patrols of this sort were devised to keep CTG 7.2 informed of the situation and to better inform him in planning the defense of the Atoll. These patrols were discontinued during the operational period when TG 7.3 became responsible for security surveillance of the Proving Ground.

5 - TAB E

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3. Counter Intelligence:

The services of Sub-Detachment "C", 902nd CIC Detachment, under the operational control of CJTF SEVEN, were made available to Task Group 7.2 for the implementation of the counterintelligence mission. Five men of the CIC Detachment were located on ENIWETOK Island and operated under the staff supervision of the S2.

During the operation, the CIC Team materially assisted the security and intelligence effort by recommending and conducting preliminary investigations of individuals whose activities were of counterintelligence interest and by delivering security indoctrination briefings to incoming personnel and conducting baggage searches for contraband items. They were also helpful in conducting security surveys, investigation of security violations and in the preparation and dissemination of security posters; all of which materially aided in strengthening the security position of this task group.

4. Security:

a. Travel Control. Entry and reentry into the PPG was governed by CINCPAC Letter Serial 020, dated 1 April 1952. All personnel entering this area were required to meet the minimum security requirements established by CINCPAC. The responsibility of determining that all such persons are good security risks rests with the individual's command that publishes his orders. A Provost Marshal travel control team met all surface ships and aircraft. All incoming personnel received a briefing on the security requirements within the PPG and their baggage was searched to prevent introduction of contraband items 6.

6 - TAB F

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In many cases individuals arrived in the forward area without this command having received a clearance message in accordance with CINCPAC's directives. Since ATCOM is not authorized by CINCPAC to initiate such clearances, this necessitated action on the part of ATCOM to obtain the message required. Even though a statement is usually contained in the individual's travel orders stating that the provisions of CINCPAC Serial 020 have been complied with and that the individual has been cleared for entry into ENIWETOK, a copy of the clearance message is the only evidence of proper clearance that ATCOM is authorized to accept. In all cases clearance messages were eventually obtained; however, at times ATCOM was required to deal with the headquarters that initiated travel orders and in some cases it was found that these headquarters did not possess a copy of CINCPAC Letter Serial 020. This necessitated a series of messages before a proper clearance could be obtained thereby creating an unnecessary burden on communication facilities and a lengthy time lapse which could have been eliminated if ATCOM had been permitted to grant such clearance based on a review of subject's 201 file and a proper statement in the individual's travel orders.

During the operation Task Group 7.3 assumed the responsibility for clearing all vessels under their operational control into the PPG. All problems created by the transfer of responsibility were effectively resolved by close coordination and mutual assistance among the security officers of each Task Group.

Inter-island and inter-atoll travel as well as departures from the PPG were governed by the SOP's published by CJTF SEVEN.

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Unlisted men took an open book type test upon reading the indoctrination.

All personnel departing from the forward area were re-

7 - TAB G

[redacted]

quired to attend a departure briefing. This briefing was intended to serve as a reminder to departing personnel that their security responsibilities would remain the same as if they were still here and that the danger of committing a security violation would increase upon their departure from the area.

Security films were shown at various times during the operation. These films were short in nature and were utilized as security reminders. They were shown at all theatres operated by Task Group 7.2 before the main feature. Sixty-nine (69) showings were made, each to an average audience of 457 personnel.

Security posters were displayed on all bulletin boards and in all recreational, billet, and office areas. Publications in the form of SOP's, Security Memorandums, and reminders in the Daily Bulletin were published as needed. Official AEC-DOD press releases were reproduced and distributed to each member of the Task Group, as they were received from JTF SEVEN.

c. Security Logs. A Chronological Log of Security Measures within Task Group 7.2 was implemented on 4 November 1955, in accordance with letter J-2/380.01, Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN. This log contained such security actions or events such as indoctrinations, lectures, meeting of aircraft, boarding of ships, showings of security films, dissemination of security reminders and the implementation of new security policies or measures. Similar Logs were maintained by each detachment from 1 April 1956 throughout the Operation.

SECTION V - OPERATIONS:

1. General:

a. Mission:

The mission of the S-3 section was to plan, coordinate, and supervise functions pertaining to organization, training and operations of the task group. Staff supervision was exercised over the historian, and over troop information and education activities, including Armed Forces Radio Station WXLE.

b. Garrison Phase:

At the conclusion of Operation CASTLE all elements of the task group remaining in the Pacific Proving Ground entered into the garrison phase of the interim period assuming normal base functions necessary for the efficient operation of the installation on ENIWETOK Island. This period encompassed the roll-up phase following the CASTLE operation, and as a prelude to succeeding operations in the Pacific, offered an opportunity for officers of the task group to study, evaluate and establish preparatory plans for REDWING. Elements of the task group continued to support the Atomic Energy Commission during the interim period.

The S-3 section evolved plans during the interim garrison phase for the protection of personnel and equipment in event of natural disasters, initiated the organization and training of a combat company in support of CINCPAC GEOP 11-53 defense requirements, provided technical coverage in radiological safety for task group personnel, and continued to guide policy matters of the Information and Education center on ENIWETOK Island. A limited troop training

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cate details of assigned missions, and to acquaint other groups of the task force with requirements of the Army element for operation REDWING, the Commander Task Group 7.2 promulgated two detailed publications; Administrative Order 1-56, and Operational Order 1-56. Both directives extensively set forth detailed methods of accomplishing assigned army missions during build-up and operational periods, and within know precepts of post-shot requirements by Joint Task Force SEVEN, established policies for the roll-up period.

At inception of Operation REDWING the need existed within the task group for a slight modification in organizational structure, and after considerable coordination, the newly accepted reorganization was published in September 1955, and ordered into effect. Personnel positions and allocations established by Department of the Army Tables of Distribution 71-7126 were not ex-

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this period were limited to an improvised pistol range, and one well constructed permanent type skeet range. In September 1955 rain and high tides caused the collapse of target "A" frames and

8 - TABS A and B

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throughout the entire operational period. This order was supplemented prior to each shot by an Appendix (Shot Check List), and an Annex (Pre-Shot Order), to insure inclusion of current instructions from JTF SEVEN.

REDWING SHOTS

LACROSSE: (Initial ENIWETOK Atoll Shot)

A ground shot detonated on the island of RUNIT (YVONNE), ENIWETOK Atoll, at 0625½M, 5 May 1956. All TG 7.2 personnel were required to assemble on the lagoon side of the island to witness the shot and receive safety instructions announced over the public address system. The shot was clearly visible from this vantage

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point. No damage was inflicted on personnel or equipment.

CHEROKEE: (Initial BIKINI Atoll Shot)

An airdrop on the island of NAMU (CHARLIE) at BIKINI Atoll, detonated at 0551M, 21 May 1956. Personnel were mustered, but not required to assemble. Light from the shot was clearly visible and the explosion heard approximately seventeen minutes after the initial flash of light. TG 7.2 personnel at BIKINI were mustered and evacuated to the USNS AINSWORTH prior to the shot.

Fifteen (15) other shots were detonated between 28 May and 22 July, consisting of barge, ground, tower and air drop events, on both atolls. All shots at BIKINI were larger yield shots and necessitated pre-shot evacuation of the entire BIKINI Atoll. Evacuation of the ENIWETOK area, with exception of those islands in the danger zone, was not necessary even when high yield fusion type weapons were locally detonated. However, TG 7.2 personnel were assembled for control and safety purposes during all shots on ENIWETOK Atoll that had an expected yield above that of a nominal type weapon.

2. Plans:

a. Defense:

The defense and general security of the Pacific Proving Ground during this period was a responsibility delegated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, who in turn, to accomplish this mission, assigned specific tasks to the Atoll Commander, ENIWETOK. These missions were set forth in CINCPAC General Emergency Operation Plan No. 11-53.

The Commander Task Group 7.2 during periods of absence

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of the Commander Joint Task Force SEVEN from the forward area functioned as Atoll Commander, ENIWETOK. As such, he was responsible for the planning, execution and coordination of all defense efforts of military units stationed within the Pacific Proving Ground.

During the interim and build-up periods the defense plans of the CTG 7.2 as ATCOM, ENIWETOK, were based upon the concept that only the island of ENIWETOK could be adequately and effectively be defended. Elements of the task force located on other islands of ENIWETOK Atoll and at BIKINI Atoll were instructed to prepare plans to defend themselves within their capabilities, prepare demolitions to destroy critical equipment, and stand by for emergency evacuation in event of attack by a hostile force. All military units located on ENIWETOK Island were directed to prepare local defense plans within assigned areas. Weapons and ammunitions were allocated based upon an overall coordinated fire plan. Emergency rations and portable water distillation units were readied and maintained on a stand-by basis.

Detailed defense plans were maintained for Task Group 7.2 as an element of the Atoll Command, ENIWETOK, for both interim and operational periods. A mobile composite combat group was maintained in the Task Group consisting of a headquarters unit, three infantry rifle companies, a military police platoon, and a twenty-five bed hospital unit.[9] The mission of the task group was to defend assigned ground areas of ENIWETOK-BIKINI Atolls as directed

9 - TAB H

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tion with other elements of the task force, for the expeditious removal of all personnel from these two island sites on order of the Commander Joint Task Force SEVEN. Reentry of individuals and units

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these units and activities were prepared at all times for informal visits by the Task Group Commander.

In the latter part of September 1955 all members of the Military Police Detachment completed the required annual qualification in arms with the .45 caliber pistol. Familiarzation firing

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with the .45 caliber submachine gun, M3, was also conducted for these persons at this time.

Beginning in November 1955 and lasting through December 1955 the command, in conjunction with the American Red Cross, sponsored a course in Senior Life Saving. Sixteen (16) individuals became accredited Red Cross Senior Life Savers upon completion of this instruction. The large number of water sports enjoyed at this station present a continous demand for qualified life guards.

SECTION VI - LOGISTICS:

1. General:

The S-4 exercised staff supervision for the planning and co-ordination of activities pertaining to procurement, supply, hospitalization and evacuation, transportation, and services, including maintenance and repair of supplies and equipment, and construction of facilities and installations.

With the conclusion of Operation CASTLE the Logistics Section was concerned primarily with the roll-up of supplies and equipment which had accumulated during CASTLE. To this extent, all excess stocks were determined, and disposition instructions requested from the Chiefs of Technical Services. Emphasis was placed on in-storage maintenance and renovation of equipment.

With the advent of the build-up phase, logistical planning was pointed toward requisitioning supplies and equipment which would be required for Operation REDWING. A list of all major items of equipment for Operation RELWING was forwarded to JTF SEVEN during February 1955. This planning was co-ordinated with other task groups, since this command was responsible for the supply of all elements of Joint Task Force SEVEN for certain supplies and equipment.

On 1 April 1956, CTG 7.2 published Administrative Order 1-56, which implemented CJTF SEVEN Administrative Order 1-56. This order outlined the logistical and administrative function of TG 7.2 during the build up, operation, and roll up of REDWING.

Concurrently with the planning discussed in the preceding

paragraphs, a Roll-up Plan for supplies and equipment had been drafted, approved by CJTF SEVEN and published.

During September 1955, a list of FY 57 construction projects, in addition to those contained in the Long Range Construction Program, was prepared and submitted to the Deputy Test Director SFOO, AEC. Insasmuch as the additional construction was not included in the AEC's proposed FY 57 budget, these additional construction projects were forwarded to Headquarters Joint Task Force SEVEN for review and preparation of funding arrangements. A reply was received from Headquarters Joint Task Force SEVEN during November advising of tentative approval of certain FY 57 construction projects and that further details would be available at the forthcoming joint construction conference to be held in the PPG in the Spring.

During March 1956, a conference was held with representatives of TG 7.4, TG 7.2, AEC and H&N present to discuss the FY 57 and 58 construction program. General topics were the long range plan and changes submitted by CTG 7.2 on the FY 57 construction program and the FY 58 program. During May 1956, a conference was held on FY 59 & 60 construction projects for ENIWETOK, PARRY and JAPTAN Islands.

Roll-up of supplies and equipment began during the latter part of Operation REDWING. This activity was progressing smoothly at the end of the operation with no major problems encountered.

2. Depot Supply:

a. Mission: Depot Supply Office, operating from

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consolidated Property Account AP 330, was charged with the responsibility of furnishing the task force in the Pacific Proving Ground with Army equipment and common supplies (except POL and subsistence).

b. General:

In order to fulfill the overall Depot mission, items were generally maintained at a 180 day level which included a 120 day order and shipping time, plus 30 day supply and 30 day reserve on hand. Normal requirements were requisitioned through Oversea Supply Agency, Fort Mason, California, with emergency requirements requisitioned on Hawaiian Army Base Command. Major items were requisitioned by or through CJTF SEVEN since many of the requirements of other task groups were not known.

The build-up for Operation REDWING commenced in May 1955 with an initial computation of stock levels for supplies to be furnished by the respective Technical Service. Final levels were set for 4,000 personnel with a 10% overage factor to allow for contingencies; interim period requirements were based on a population of 1,000.

Supplies and equipment from the United States were forwarded to the Naval Supply Center, Oakland, California for surface transportation. Air shipments were sent through Travis Air Force Base. All lift shipments were coordinated by JTF SEVEN Liaison Office, Oakland, California, and requests to expedite were directed to that office. Tonnages are appended.[10]

c. Highlights and Problem Areas:

(1) Spare Parts: Since spare parts stock levels are

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dependent upon the type, make, quantity and model of the equipment or vehicles involved, they could not be computed similarly to normal housekeeping and office supplies. During the build-up phase, Signal Corps major items were requisitioned by J-4, JTF SEVEN upon advice from the various task groups. Although Task Group 7.2 was advised of all such requisitions, the makes and models were often left to the discretion of the Chief Signal Officer, Department of The Army or Bureau of Ships, Department of the Navy. To counteract an imminent shortage of running spares, many of the items were provided with six months spare parts. However, spares for Ordnance vehicles were not so provided and the total number of vehicles to be in use was not finalized until January 1956. The make and serial number of commercial vehicles was not known until the arrival of advance documents. There was a resultant shortage of some spare parts. This situation could have been alleviated if equipment and vehicles were furnished with spare parts kits based on lists prepared by the Offices of the Chief of the respective Technical Services determined by type of usage and climatic conditions in the Pacific Proving Ground and if assemblies and sub-assemblies were maintained and stocked by TG 7.2 based on the density of the equipment or vehicle population.

(2) Consumer Funding: During October 1955, Task Group 7.2 commenced requisitioning under the Consumer Funding Program. However, since all Army units, world-wide, were placed on a consumer funding basis as of 1 July 1955, the requisitions in the pipeline were delayed as much as six months beyond the normal 120

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day order and shipping time due to the implementation of this new system. Since the stock fund was credited and Consumer Fund debited during FY 1956 at the CONUS Depot level, the actual pipeline of outstanding obligations extended beyond 1 July 1955.

(3) Common Army Supplies: CJTF SEVEN Operations Order 1-56 charged TG 7.2 with the responsibility of furnishing common Army supplies and spare parts to other task groups. Types of equipment in the hands of other task groups not part of the Task Group 7.2 account were not known and lists of requirements to be furnished by other groups were often late in arriving or did not arrive at all. The net result was that the spare parts were depleted in support equipment which was not known to exist during the initial planning.

(4) TOO requisitions: Major items of equipment and supplies, based on requirements submitted to CJTF SEVEN by the various Task Groups and forwarded to the Chiefs of the Technical Services (Army) or Bureau of Ships (Navy) for supply action were known as TOO requisitions. The resultant items were furnished either on a loan basis or permanent issue. A majority of the items were chargeable to the Depot Stock Record Account including the responsibility for return of the "loan basis" equipment at the completion of the operation. A series of letters covering all "loan basis" items to be returned was received which permitted a system to be set up in advance of the "roll-up" to assure early and orderly return of the equipment to the originating source. This included information on those TOO requisitions whch were not the accounting responsibility

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than 6 months and no later than 3 months prior to the start of an

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technical service property from 1 September 1955 to 31 January 1956. As a result, excess supplies and equipment valued at approximately $800,000.00 were returned to the CONUS or transferred to the Property Disposal Officer.

(6) Interchanging of Supplies and Equipment: This interchange was encouraged throughout the buildup and operational period to preclude requisitioning supplies which were immediately available from a local source. Task Group 7.2 provided a considerable amount of supplies to the AEC Contractor and Task Group 7.4 on a reimbursable or loan basis even though in some cases it brought

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furnished on a "per vehicle" basis.

(8) Military Police Augmentation: The equipment, clothing and supplies for the 8 officer and 252 enlisted men augmentation were issued through the Task Group 7.2 Military Police Detachment. However the predetermined requirements, except medical items, were classed as major items and were ordered by CJTF SEVEN on TOC Requisitions. The list of requirements were prepared by the TG 7.2 Military Police Detachment. This method of supply for an augmentation unit was ineffectual since supplies, in many cases, arrived late. Such items as AN/VRC-18 radios for ¼-ton trucks, engineer reproduction sets, tool sets and others arrived well past the middle of the operation and in some cases did not arrive at all.

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early agreement should be made with HABCOM to include the method of delivery by vendor to the government.

(10) Mortuary Facilities: Temporary mortuary facilities were provided consisting of a small building equipped with a two cadaver

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fluctuating levels for some Engineer items and the submission of emergency requisitions to replenish stocks.

(b) Heavy Equipment: Cranes, tractors and similar items have been on hand for some period of time and were effectively used by Task Group 7.2 to perform its mission. Many items, however, are reaching an obsolescent stage and will require replacement prior to another operational period.

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equally as efficient and materially aided in the medical supply service furnished by TG 7.2 to the Task Force.

4. Ordnance Supply:

Vehicles arrived sporadically between May 1955 and April 1956 with the bulk of the vehicles (approximately 290) arriving in late February, March and April 1956. Since the advance parties for the various task groups arrived in January 1956 some required vehicles were not present, although they were at the Naval Supply Center, Oakland, California awaiting lift. Follow up action was taken by CJTF SEVEN to expedite shipments.

5. Quartermaster Supply:

(a) Beds and Bedding: While preparing to house 4,000 persons, consideration was given to those items which had been in the warehouses under long term storage and those items in the hands of permanent party personnel. As a result of screening stocks and material on memorandum receipt to the detachments, medical personnel declared more than 700 mattresses and 1200 pillows unsanitary. These were replaced and requisitions submitted

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was to be manned jointly by a repairman from Task Group 7.2 and Task Group 7.4. The arrangement proved to be highly satisfactory and was a definite asset in keeping office machines in working condition. There were sufficient quantities of machines on hand for the needs of the task force throughout the operation.

(c) Class X Clothing:[12] The standard uniform for military troops of all shore based task force units was Class X Khaki Trousers (cut down to shorts) and shirts (cut down to short sleeves). To provide sufficient clothing for all task force personnel, permanent and TDY, CJTF SEVEN submitted a TOO Requisition to the OQMG in September, 1955. Consumer Funding was then in effect and prevented issuance of the items on a gratuitous basis causing OQMG to cancel the requisition and to instruct Task Group 7.2 to request the items, using Individual Clothing Funds, and to place them in the Clothing Sales Store for resale to individuals.

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Because of the temporary usage of the clothing and the possibility that an inequitable situation would arise, a request was made for authority to purchase the items as organizational clothing for return by the individuals to his organization upon his departure. This recommendation was approved. The only source for Class X Khaki in

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the CONUS was the residue from surplus ROK Army stocks which was predominantly small sizes. The OQMG stipulated that this clothing could be provided only in assorted sizes. Local culling revealed that approximately 7,000 of each 10,00 uniforms were not usable; this deficiency was greater with trousers than with shirts. Clothing was cut and sewn at the rate of 200 garments per day. It is believed imperative that upon depletion of existing stocks, the newly approved summer uniforms (Army and Air Force short sleeve and short trouser) must be made available for sale in the QM Sales Store and that personnel assigned to this station, either PCS or TDY, must be instructed to bring this uniform with him.

(d) Service shoes: A supply of service shoes for the task force was requisitioned from the OQMG, but since the item was no longer an item of issue and CONUS stocks were exhausted, the requisition was cancelled. Sufficient stocks were on hand for Rad-Safe purposes with some additional quantities remaining for general issue. The additional quantities, however, were not sufficient for all task force personnel due mainly to a poor size assortment. Shoes were furnished to permanent party personnel and Hq JTF-SEVEN Forward, on an "until stock was exhausted" basis. No

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The equipment was barely sufficient for the buildup and subsequent

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(7) Transportation Supply: Supplies for this service, like Chemical, is limited in scope within the FPG. Such items as barges and low-bed trailers were received and issued without incident.

e. Personnel and Administration:

(1) Strength: Although the operational T/D authorized 59 EM and 3 officers for Depot Supply the gradual buildup from the interim T/D was exceedingly slow. As late as March 1956, the Depot Supply Office was under strength by 13 EM. Coupled with normal fatigue and kitchen police details, the Depot Supply Office operated with no more than 2/3 of the personnel authorized by the operational T/D. This hampered the efficiency of the depot and created backlogs which were overcome only by working after normal duty hours.

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(1) In order to provide for an orderly and timely return of supplies and equipment a roll up plan was published early in the operational period and forwarded to all units concerned. Depot implementation included the posting of disposition instructions for all loan basis items to stock record cards which allowed immediate release of the item upon receipt from the using unit. A request for disposition of a list of anticipated excesses in all Technical Services was forwarded to CJTF SEVEN which would allow shipment of those items at the same time as loan basis items being returned. Early in the operational period the Depot received disposition instructions for serviceable and economically repairable vehicles wherein it was indicated that most such vehicles would go to the Mt Ranier Ordnance Depot with some vehicles going to Pueblo Ordnance Depot. A request was made to the Chief of Ordnance

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Department of The Army, which would permit a transfer of vehicles determined to be uneconomically repairable directly to Property Disposal Officer. This would preclude reporting the items for disposition and thereby eliminate a 45-60 day delay in final action taken. This authority was received 29 June 1956.

(2) The initial stages of "rollup" commenced in early June with the turn-in of excesses by the Military Police Augmentation unit. The initial turn-ins consisted of beds, bedding and a small number of vehicles. It is anticipated that such items will continue to be turned in as personnel depart from the Pacific Proving Ground. Preparation and return of items to CONUS is progressing satisfactorily.

3. Ordnance:

a. Mission: The Ordnance Section is responsible for field maintenance and technical inspections of all Army owned Ordnance materiel and vehicles, Engineer heavy equipment, and materials handling equipment in the Pacific Proving Ground.

b. General:

During the first two months of 1955 the AEC civilian contractor assumed the maintenance responsibility for Army and Air Force owned emergency power generators located on ENIWETOK Island. Spare parts continued to be supplied by Task Group 7.2.

During May and June the first shipment of vehicles for Operation REDWING were received. The de-processing and in-storage maintenance of these vehicles created a large additional work load for the Ordnance section during the six or seven month before they

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were issued.

Following the annual 100% technical inspection of vehicles assigned to Task Group 7.2, and 4930 Spt Gp (T) in September 1955, approximately 33% of all types of automotive vehicles were evacuated to the Ordnance Field Maintenance Shop for major body repair, and to correct mechanical deficiencies. This repair program was completed on 17 January 1956. Increased efforts by the ENIWETOK Motor Pool to enforce driver maintenance, and to increase the efficiency of 2nd Echelon maintenance resulted in reducing the number of jobs performed on vehicles in February 1956.

By 1 April 1956, the Ordnance Field Maintenance Shop supported 682 items of vehicular equipment most of which was processed for issue during the build-up period.

During the months of April, May and June 1956, a 100% Technical Inspection was accomplished on vehicles in the Pacific Proving Ground assigned to Task Group 7.1. The inspection was accomplished by mobile teams furnished from the Ordnance Field Maintenance Shop without depriving individuals the use of the vehicles during normal working hours. Results of this inspection indicated a definite lack of driver maintenance and vehicle abuse.

The annual technical inspection of small arms of Task Group 7.2 was accomplished during May. Results were excellent.

Vehicle roll-up started in late June 1956 when a few vehicles no longer needed by Task Group 7.1 were inspected and turned in to the Depot. Arrangements were made to process all vehicles

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of Task Group 7.1, except those located on ENIWETOK Island, on PARRY Island. This saved transporting them to ENIWETOK Island for processing and subsequent return to PARRY Island for loading aboard ships.

During July, approximately 1/3 of the vehicles assigned to Task Group 7.1 were turned-in for classification. At the same time, vehicle processing for shipment was started on PARRY Island by Task Group 7.2 Ordnance teams. It is estimated that all vehicles assigned to Task Group 7.1 will be turned-in to the Depot by 15 August. These vehicles will have been spot-sanded, and painted by Task Group 7.5 prior to turn-in. These vehicles will be completely Type I processed for return to CONUS, in accordance with Department of The Army Supply Bulletin 9-4, by 31 August 1956. Vehicles in excess of Interim Period requirements assigned to Task Groups 7.2 and 7.4, will be inspected, classified, and Type I processed on ENIWETOK Island by 15 September 1956.

As processing is completed, vehicles are released to the Depot for shipment. Those vehicles exceeding repair limitation costs authorized by SR 735-130-5, and directives of the Chief of Ordnance, were released to the Depot for disposition in accordance with instructions from the Chief of Ordnance.

Inspection personnel were furnished the Depot Supply Officer, and repairs rendered on the turn-in of all weapons.

During the three periods (interim, build-up and operation) under consideration, an average of 182 jobs were accomplished each month. The work load dropped as low as 100 jobs per month

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during the operational period, while build-up and roll-up period loads jumped to well over 300 jobs per month. An average of 18% of all vehicles supported were deadlined for field maintenance during the three periods. The above was accomplished with an average strength of 48 maintenance personnel. Corrosion, due to the extreme climatic condition of heat, moisture, and high salt content in water and sand, offered the greatest problem to the preventive maintenance program. This program was below prescribed standards throughout the operational period. Lack of operator maintenance and scheduled preventive maintenance checks were the dominant factors in the high percentage of deadlines during the operation.

4. Engineer:

a. Mission: The Engineer Section was responsible for the maintenance, repairs and construction of facilities on ENIWETOK Island not the responsibility of the AEC contractor.

b. Major Construction:

The FY 56 major construction program involved construction, modification and replacement of warehouses, service installations and morale facilities in anticipation of the large influx of personnel and the increased scale of activities which would be necessary during Operation REDWING. A construction schedule was established in September of 1955 which would insure availability of all of these facilities by mid-May 1956.[13] This schedule provided for completion of 14 out of a total of 19

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projects by the end of February so that the facilities would be available by the beginning of the personnel build-up for the operation. Two other major projects were later added to this program; a 9600 cubic-foot bank of additional refrigeration units which was completed by mid-March and two buildings for TG 7.1 (#686 and #687) which were ready for occupancy by the beginning of April.

This construction program was to be accomplished by Holmes and Narver, Inc, acting as Architect-Engineer and Construction Contractor for the Atomic Energy Commision. The contractor fell behind the September schedules and continued behind throughout the 1956 fiscal year. By the end of February only 5 projects had been completed, 4 of which were warehouses. As a result, some of the service and morale activities did not have adequate facilities. By 1 May 1956, when the build-up was complete, eight important projects were still unfinished. The earlier construction program seemed hampered by a lack of coordination between the "on spot" personnel, AEC and Headquarters JTF SEVEN. This was greatly aleviated late in the build-up period when JTF SEVEN acquired a Staff Engineer who commendably monitored and expedited the construction activity.

The requirements of the operational months of May and June were met by the utilization of temporary facilities. Chapel services had to be held in an unsatisfactory location and the crash fire trucks had to operate out of temporary facilities which were not located for maximum efficiency. Construction placed

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initiated rose correspondingly.[14] Some examples of the types of projects involved are:

(1) Construction of a beverage warehouse.

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Atoll Commander with a means of accomplishing small projects. By January of 1956 it was apparent that this amount would be insufficient to meet the requirements of the remainder of the fiscal year. An additional allocation was made in the amount of $30,000 from AEC funds and, in addition, $25,000 was transferred to AEC from JTF SEVEN funds. Shortly after the arrival of JTF headquarters at the Pacific Proving Ground, this $25,000 was earmarked for their minor construction requirements on PARRY Island. The experience with this fund indicated that money alloted during a build-up or operational year must be greater than that alloted during an interim year. //

15 - TAB N

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ing of the entire island in a single day. During the latter part of the operation a concerted effort was made to eliminate the major breeding source on the island—the presence of wet garbage in the trash placed in the dump area.

Increased shipping during the build-up and operational periods undoubtedly introduced some additional rats to the island. Normal reproduction increased the rat population to such an extent

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was too dangerous for normal use) were employed as posions. In addition, rat traps were issued to units on request. In late May, Warfarin was procured and put into use as the principal rat poison. At the same time, an additional man and vehicle were assigned insect and rodent control duties, primarily for the purpose of placing bait feeders and keeping traps set. These two measures brought the rodent problem under control in approximately three weeks.

Fresh water was distilled by the AEC contractor in a permanent distillation plant which had an average daily capacity of approximately 165,000 gallons. Salt and brackish water were used wherever possible for fire protection and industrial usage. The laundry, however, was operated with fresh water throughout the operation although preparations were made to utilize some brackish water for this purpose should the need arise. Consumption of fresh water rose from an average low of approximately 62,000 gallons per day in August of 1955 to a high of approximately 163,000 gallons per day in May 1956.[16]

Electric power was also provided by the contractor, principally from the main power plant on PARRY Island. Additional power was provided from a smaller power plant on ENIWETOK Island

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[redacted]

responsibility of the contractor. These emergency facilities were adquate for the few short-term power failures that arose, however there were no generators provided for the mess hall which resulted in some food spoilage and necessitated the serving of cold meals during a power outage.

5. Medical:

a. Mission: The 7126th AU Dispensary provided medical care for service personnel and AEC contractor employees on the island of ENIWETOK. From time to time, personnel from other sites reported for emergency surgery. Further, this dispensary acted as a clearing station for evacuation of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Military Sea Transport Service patients.

b. General:

(1) Hospital Facilities: The physical plant consisted of a thirty bed hospital, equipped as an evacuation hospital, housed in permanent Pacific-type buildings. Adjacent to the hospital were two barracks, utilized by corpsmen as living quarters but earmarked for emergency expansion of the hospital.

(2) Personnel: The interim TD called for two doctors, two dentists, and seventeen enlisted men. The operational TD called

April, 1956, two medical officers and two dental officers attended a Symposium on Trauma at Tripler. When necessary, enlisted medical corps personnel received additional training to fit them for their tasks.

(3) Health:

(a) Deaths: Three deaths by drowing occurred during the operation - one on ENIWETOK, and two on PARRY Island. The dispensary facilities were used to prepare the bodies for the mortuary. There were no deaths of patients under treatment.

(b) Types of Cases: Most of the patients on sick call had minor skin infections, muscle sprains, and emotional problems and situational maladjustments. Elective surgery, such as repair of hernias and pilonidal cysts, was accomplished when it was felt that the procedure was indicated and less time would be lost by keeping the patient here. Frequent indications for emergency surgery arose such as acute appendicitis.

(c) Problems Inherent to Nuclear Devices: No cases of known or suspected exposure to radiation were seen. At the time of the first detonation on 5 May 56, a group of airmen in the Sea Air Rescue Group had their eyes partially exposed to the flash. They were examined by the doctors here, and by the ophthomologists in the scientific group on two occasions. Minimal

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retinal edema was observed on these patients, but no serious or permanent damage was found.

(d) Air Force Medical Care: The Army provided medical support to the operation with the Air Force furnishing additional medical personnel. An Air Force Flight Surgeon and several corpsmen were present during the latter part of the build-up and during the operation. The Flight Surgeon was provided with an office near the airstrip and held sick call for flight personnel.

(4) Medical Supply: Normal requisitions were filled in 120 days, but emergency needs were met in as little as five days. The high humidity and rainfall caused frequent breakdown of equipment. Electronic equipment, such as X-ray apparatus, electrocardiograph machine, and diathermy required constant attention.

(5) Air Evacuation: Types of patients evacuated consisted of neuro-psychiatric cases, fractures, epilepsy, diabetics, post-operative, elective surgery, and cardiac cases. The patients were evacuated to Tripler Army Hospital, usually via regular MATS flights. Trained corpsmen accompanied the patients when needed, and a medical officer was sent when a doctor's attendance was required. Arrangements to have the Air Evacuation Squadron at Hawaii evacuate these patients were time-consuming and proved unsatisfactory.

(6) Sanitation: Flies were present on the island but produced no great sanitary problems. Two outbreaks of food poisoning occurred. One in April 1956 involving 50 to 60 individuals, 30 of whom were hospitalized for part of one day. This was traced to improper processing of frozen milk. In May 1956, 14 AEC

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contractor employees were treated for food poisoning which was traced to box lunches prepared on HARRY Island. None of these patients were hospitalized.

(7) Statistics: The total sick call by months from January 1955 to the end of the operation, according to branch of service, is attached.[17]

6. Dental Section:

a. Mission: The mission of the Dental Section was the prevention and treatment of dental diseases, injuries, and deficiencies among members of the task force on ENIWETOK and JAPTAN Islands. In addition, emergency treatment was provided any member of the task force.

b. General: The general class of dental patient arriving in this command was similar to that in CONUS as borne out by the number of Class III, IV, and V patients in the general classification. In spite of the fact that the dental staff was comprised of four officers the work load was heavy. Task Group 7.4 assigned one dental officer and one airman dental assistant to the dispensary in January 1956. At no time, however, was it necessary to schedule patients further ahead than four weeks in spite of a doctor-patient ratio in excess of 1-900 and the generally poor dental health of new arrivals in the command. Dental service activities in chart form are attached hereto.[18]

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ishable subsistence was purchased locally from vendors in Honolulu, Hawaii. Since that time $30,379.95 of perishables were received from Hawaii.

During the interim, build-up and operational periods covered by this report, $60,608.49 of subsistence supplies were sold to authorized organizations located on ENIWETOK Island. $27,868.82 of subsistence items were issued to the Mess Officer to be used for

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In-Flight meals for personnel departing this station. Subsistence received during the entire period amounted to $1,621,316.02 and produced an average month end inventory of $171,350.75.[21]

During the height of operation REDWING thirty-six (36) permanent refrigerated boxes with an approximate total storage capacity of 35,700 cubic feet and eleven (11) reefer trailers with a total approximate storage capacity of 5,500 cubic feet were utilized. The reefer trailers were incapable of maintaining optimum storage conditions over extended periods of time. Additional reefer space should be installed before the next operation.

8. Laundry:

a. Mission: The mission of the Quartermaster Laundry was to provide laundry service for all military personnel and other authorized individuals at the Pacific Proving Ground. An additional laundry responsibility was the provision of facilities for the decontamination of clothing and other items submitted by Task Group 7.4 during the operational period.

b. General: Thirty (30) men were required to operate the laundry during the interim period as opposed to sixty-three (63) during Operation REDWING. Inexperienced men and the constant turnover of key personnel were the main problems encountered by the laundry. During the build-up and operational periods, a nine (9) hour night shift was added to accomplish the mission successfully. Eight (8) laundry personnel were schooled and adequately trained in decontamination procedures and in the operation of the

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creased productivity and insured straight-line flow of work.[22] One laundry van was used to carry out the decontamination mission and was located on the western end of the island adjacent to the

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9. Post Exchange:

a. Mission: To make merchandise not otherwise furnished by the Government available to authorized personnel and activities at prices consistent with reasonable profits. The Post Exchange is a revenue producing activity financed for the support of Military welfare and recreational programs in accordance with the provisions of AR 210-50.

b. General:

Shortage of trained personnel and the rapid turnover of personnel were the main problems encountered in operating the Exchange during the operational period. An average of twenty-eight (28) enlisted men regularly assigned and approximately sixty (60) part time employees were required to carry out the assigned mission.

In addition to the Main Store, the Exchange operated a Snack Bar, Swimmers Tavern, and an officers' and enlisted mens' barber shop.

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Merchandise was secured from various vendors in Honolulu, T.H., the Far East and through the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, New York. Major emphasis was placed on "Soldier Essential" type merchandise in accordance with the Army and Air Force Exchange Service operating manual; however, various gift and oriental type merchandise was also stocked. Stock levels were increased approximately three hundred percent for the operational period to meet the increased demand. "Pipeline" and delivery problems were encountered due to the infrequency of supply ships; however, delivery was supplemented by use of APO parcel Post System to avoid out-of-stock conditions.

A listing of sales, net profits and dividends to the Central Post Fund is appended hereto.[23]

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SECTION VII - COMMUNICATIONS:

1. General

a. Following the roll-up of Operation CASTLE, communication activity decreased to a low level; a reflection of the general inactivity in the Pacific Proving Ground. Through attrition and lack of replacements, personnel strength of the Signal Detachment fell to about forty-five, only slightly more than half that authorized by the interim table of distribution. This condition continued until the start of the build-up for Operation REDWING.

b. Principally because of the personnel shortage, communication operations were quite inefficient. Maintenance of installed equipment was inadequate, resulting in serious deterioration. Other equipment which had been returned to local stock following CASTLE and which was need of overhaul had to be left in its condition of unknown serviceability. During the period of minimum personnel, communication center operations were reduced to sixteen hours per day.

c. Army and Air Force communication operations remained independent during the interim period. The 1253d AACS Squadron maintained radio receiver station and teletype center in Building 89, wherein were operated a radio-teletype multiplex circuit to KWAJALEIN, a weather intercept receiving teletype from GUAM, and a point-to-point airways CW and voice circuit working with KWAJALEIN and BIKINI. TG 7.2 maintained a receiver station in Building 85, wherein were operated a radioteletype circuit to Hawaii and the Harbor Common CW and voice circuits. The TG 7.2 Comm Center, which provided teletype relay service to AACS and to PARRY Island, was located in the Headquarters,

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Building 15. All HF (high frequency) transmitters, both Army and Air Force, were located in building 4; however, the personnel at this station were not integrated into a joint organization but operated as independent groups.

d. Based on projected requirements for REDWING and the desire of the AEC to have radiotelephone service to Honolulu available during the build-up period, a single sideband radio system was installed in December 1954. The installation was made by an enlisted representative of the Signal Corps Plant Engineering Agency. It consisted of a T-409 Transmitter located in building 4, an R-369 Receiver, AN/FTA-7 Radiotelephone Control Terminal and AN/FTA-6 Volume Regulator, located in building 85, and an AN/FCC-3 Telegraph Carrier Terminal located in building 15. A hasty installation was made, inasmuch as it was known that the equipment would have to be moved at a later date. This contributed to a rather poor grade of service experienced with the equipment until after the installation was revised the following year.

e. In the spring of 1955, personnel replacements began to arrive as the first phase of the REDWING build-up began. The increased strength, although still less than interim authorization, permitted the initiation of an equipment rehabilitation program. A large quantity of equipment was withdrawn from storage, inspected, and rehabilitated or disposed of. At about the same time, plans for expansion of the communication facilities in preparation for REDWING began to materialize.

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lation from transmitters and sources of electrical noise. Also, adequate space for efficient antenna systems was available. This move would make available an area on ENIWETOK Island, i.e., the old TG 7.2 receiver station and antenna field, which was needed for other construction. Holmes & Narver began construction of the new receiver station and camp facilities on JAPTAN Island in May 1955, almost one year before the start of Operation REDWING.

b. An additional feature of the JAPTAN station construction plan was the inclusion of a LORAN monitoring receiver station. This was intended to eliminate the possibility of serious interference to the LORAN system caused by HF transmitters on ENIWETOK Island, as was experienced during CASTLE. Strong local signals in the 2 megacycle region had been found to interfere with the LORAN station by preventing the observation of the synchronism of its slave stations, which is essential to proper operation. A remote monitoring installation would avoid this difficulty and permit the use of frequencies in the 2 megacycle range for communications.

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c. Also planned were the construction of an expanded tape relay center and a completely new facilities control center, both to be in building 15, ENIWETOK Island; the rehabilitation of the HF transmitter station, building 4, ENIWETOK Island; and the establishment of a terminal communication center for Headquarters, JTF SEVEN on PARRY Island, to be operated by TG 7.2 as in the past.

d. An installation team provided by the Signal Corps Plant Engineering Agency arrived in late July, somewhat prematurely inasmuch as neither final plans nor project material were available. Furthermore, modifications to building 15 required to house the tape relay center and facilities control center had not been started. This was because of delay in providing firm requirements and funding authority to the contractor. Building construction was started in August, and although some confusion resulted, it was found feasible to begin the installation of the communications equipment while the construction was still in progress. As a result, the installation was activated on a limited scale in November 1955, using the old receivers in building 85 and building 89 for the Army and Air Force circuits, respectively.

e. At the same time, work was progressing on the receiver station at JAPTAN. Here, some delay was experienced in the erection of antenna towers by the contractor as well as in the installation of power and other utilities; however, sufficient progress had been made by December 1955 to permit activation of the station. Following completion of the receiver station, the installation team was moved to the transmitter site. Here, initially, the installation of additional

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equipment and erection of new antennas proceeded rapidly. Progress then slowed as the contractor (who was to provide antenna-support construction work) encountered a shortage of personnel, equipment and supplies because of a large number of last-minute scientific construction projects. The major portion of the work was completed by March 1956, but completion of all antenna work was not accomplished until April 1956.

3. Joint Communication Operations

a. As facilities and personnel became available, new circuits and channels provided for in the JTF SEVEN communications plan were activated. Minor difficulties were experienced in establishing coordination with the distant stations involved. However, in almost every case, a short shake-down period sufficied to obtain efficient operation. Certain difficulties persisted without abatement, as described later in this report.

b. Although CJTF SEVEN had not implemented earlier plans to provide an integrated Joint Communication Organization, it became evident at an early date that some such arrangement was essential. CJTF SEVEN had given CTG 7.2 "operational control" of the joint communication facilities and had stated that CTG 7.4 would assist in their operation; however, the command and administrative arrangements necessary to implement this concept were not prescribed. Consequently, it was necessary to establish an operating arrangement on an informal basis. This was accomplished by agreement between the Signal Officer, TG 7.2, and the Commanding Officer, 1253D AACS Squadron. The agreement

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provided, generally, that TG 7.2 would provide all management and officer supervision in the joint activities, but that all senior NCO positions such as trick chiefs, team chiefs and section chiefs would be filled by the best qualified men available regardless of branch of service. Personnel, administrative and supply matters remained independent for lack of an integrated organization. This arrangement, although not ideal, did permit coordinated and reasonably efficient operation. That this was possible is a credit to the individual spirit of cooperation of all concerned.

c. The assignment of senior NCO positions was made without reference to branch of service; however, the number chosen from each service was very nearly proportionate to the degree of service participation in the joint activity. The NCOIC of the joint relay center remained an Army man throughout the operational period, as did the NCOIC of the joint receiver station. The NCOIC of the facilities control center was an Air Force man, and the NCOIC of the transmitter station changed from Army to Air Force and back to Army as the overall personnel situation fluctuated. It should be noted that, without exception, the Air Force NCO's in charge of sections worked under the supervision of Army officers without any question of authority, and similary, Army enlisted men worked under Air Force NCO's without friction. The major difficulties experienced because of the dual organization were matters of supply and administration, including some trouble in coordinating duty schedules with organizational fatigue or other details. It must not be forgotten, however, that the success of the arrangement was wholly dependent upon individual

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primary facility for this system used the 1-270 500 watt single side-band transmitter, AN/FRR-40 receiver, modified CF-1 carrier equipment as channel shifters and restorers, and AN/FCC-3 telegraph carrier. It had been intended to operate this system on frequencies in the 2 to 3 megacycle range, with vertical antennas, in order to gain the advantages of ground wave propagation; however, high noise and interference levels on the USS ESTES and the interference of the 2 to 3 megacycle

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two vertical radiating towers excited in phase on a frequency in the 2 to 3 megacycle range, backed up by a two-wire terminated sloping dipole normally operated in the 3 to 4 megacycle range, raised the efficiency of this system to an acceptable level.

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T-368 transmitters could have done the same job as 25 transmitters of the T-4 and 96-D types. Similarly, the AN/FRT-15 transmitters which were used on certain circuits had greater capability than was required. This type transmitter has provision for remote frequency selection. It also includes a modulator for AM voice operation. On the multiplex, radio-teletype and facsimile circuits to which 5 out of 8 of these were assigned, these features were not required. The use of BC-339 transmitters modified for operation down to 2 megacycles would have been more economical for these circuits.

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(4) Use of inefficient transmitting antennas. In order to avoid changing antennas when frequencies were changed and also to obtain omni-directional radiation for certain ship-shore and air-ground circuits, a Navy-designed two-wire terminated sloping folded dipole was used. Fourteen of these were erected. The design is admittedly a compromise, sacrificing radiation efficiency to obtain a non-resonant characteristic. For certain circuits this antenna worked acceptably; however, for those where the omni-directional feature was not required and where the number of choices of frequency for a given circuit was small, the erection of resonant doublets would have been more satisfactory because of greater efficiency. This would of course have required a means of antenna switching at the transmitters. For the circuits where omni-directional radiation was required, vertical antennas would have been superior. These could have been in the form of wires suspended from catenary strand for the higher frequencies, and top-loaded towers or "T" or "L" types for the lower frequencies. Regardless of the type used, greater separation should have been maintained between antennas in order to avoid interference due to intermodulation, which was a serious problem in some instances. With horizontal or sloping antennas of the type used, spacing is restricted by the limited area available for the antenna field. Greater use of vertical radiators would alleviate this problem.

(5) Single Sideband System to Hawaii. Although operation of this system was generally satisfactory, improved service would be obtained on the high-grade voice channel by the use of space diversity reception. This would require an additional rhombic antenna and

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an additional R-369 or an AN/FRR-41 receiver. The quality of the voice channel was also degraded by the unserviceable condition of the AN/FTA-6 and AN/FTA-7 equipments (WECo B-1 Vogad and C-3) Radiotelephone Control Terminal), which are essential for commercial-grade service on a system of this type. This equipment was finally made serviceable in June 1956. Difficulty was also experienced because of poor transmission on the landline connection at Hawaii between the Schofield Barracks switchborad, which terminated the radio circuit, and the commercial exchange. Some improvement of this link was obtained by request to the Signal Officer, USARPAC, but more improvement could be had by reterminating the radio circuit at a more central point such as Fort Shafter. This would entail the use of a four-wire repeatered circuit, facilities for which were not available at the time.

(6) Air Conditioning of Stations. Past experience indicated that communication-electronic equipment in an uncontrolled environment deteriorates rapidly in this climate due to the effects of moisture. Therefore, plans for the relay center and facilities control complex specified complete enclosure, insulation and air conditioning. Because of a design error on the part of the contractor, the air conditioning installation was of inadequate capacity, leading to temperatures in the neighborhood of 100 degrees until an additional unit was provided. Air conditioning for the receiver and transmitter station was not planned, but its lack was strongly evident. In addition to the deterioration of equipment caused by high humidity, ambient temperatures became so high that personnel efficiency was ma materially reduced.

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(7) SAMSON Operation. The TT-160 synchronous mixer, used with TT-21 special transmitter-distributors in the PYTHON system, is referred to by the abbreviation SAMSON (synchronous and mixing on line). This system was used on teletype trunks between the Joint Relay Center and the Hawaiian ACAN Station, Hickam AACS Station, USS ESTES and KWAJALEIN AACS Station. All except the KWAJALEIN circuit were on AN/FCC-3 telegraph carrier channels. This was on a channel of AN/FGC-5 multiplex. All were terminated in AN/FGC-38 teletype equipment in the relay center. No particular difficulties were encountered on the AN/FCC-3 channels, other than an initial delay in obtaining the technical information required for installation. The multiplex channel introduced the problem of converting a sending channel of AN/FGC-38 to AN/FGC-39. This entailed a change of transmitter gears and coding cams to obtain a speed of 390 operations per minute with a 7.0 unit code. The same change was required on a test transmitter-distributor used in system set-up. Necessary parts to modify the AN/FGC-38 transmitters were finally obtained. For the test TD, only speed-change gears could be obtained; no parts for converting from 7.42 unit to 7.0 unit code were obtainable. This caused some difficulty in that adjustment of the system using the test TD was overly critical and not entirely compatible with the traffic TD. In general, SAMSON operation was reasonably satisfactory, but it was established that the basic criticality of the multiplex system combined with the sensitivity of the SAMSON system produced a channel which required the constant attention of highly skilled personnel for successful operation.

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(8) Radio Link Carrier System between Receiver Station and Facilities Control. This system used AN/TRC-24 radio equipment, operating in the high end of the "C" range at about 350 megacycles. Carrier equipment was AN/TCC-7, with AN/FCC-3 superimposed for teletype channels. No difficulty was experienced in securing satisfactory operation; however, is it believed that a fixed-plant type microwave installation would have been preferable. Three features of the AN/FRC-23 Microwave Equipment would have been valuable in this application, as follows:

a Twenty-four channel capacity. At the peak of this operation more than twelve channels were required, necessitating the use of two AN/TRC-24 and AN/TCC-7 systems.

b Automatic transfer to spare equipment in the event of failure. Although few failures were experienced with the AN/TRC-24 equipment, the failures which did occur resulted in outages while spare equipment was put in service, often at extremely inconvienient times.

c Broadband channel capability. Because the channels of the AN/TCC-7 will not pass the 6000 cycle band of the single sideband channel group, channel restoring equipment (CF-1 carrier terminals) was required at the receiver site. This complicated the system line-up procedure. If 6000 cycle channels had been available, the CF-1 at the Facilities Control terminal could have performed both the shifting and restoring functions, thus saving equipment and eliminating a potential source of trouble.

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(9) Frequencies for Hawaii Radio Systems. During the interim and the early part of the build-up period, operation of the single-sideband system was hampered by lack of suitable frequencies. During the early morning hours, none of the assigned frequencies were usable. This condition was alleviated later in the period when the annual change in propagation factors made the assigned frequencies usable. At the same time, an ample complement of frequencies was available for the single-channel radioteletype circuits to Hawaii, none of which were authorized for single sideband use. Therefore, it was not possible to utilize the conventional method of operation wherein a single channel radioteletype signal is used as a pilot for the single sideband circuit in order to make advance determinations of frequency usability in connection with the frequency-change schedule. Authorization of one group of frequencies for both single sideband and radioteletype service would have improved operations in this respect.

(10) Transmitter Frequency Control. Because the JTF SEVEN Frequency Plan was not issued until quite late, it was not possible to initiate timely crystal procurement. Therefore, several important nets were without crystals as the operational date approached. Exciter units C-39/TRA-7 were used to provide frequency control for transmitters in these nets, with complete success.

f. Joint Relay Center operations were complicated by the use of three different routing indicators, each of which was used in working with one of the three major relay centers to which connected. Thus, in working with RUHP, the relay center used routing

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indicator RUHPJ. In working with RJHP the routing indicator RJHPBH was used, while in working with RJHK the indicator was RJHKN. Tributaries serving Air Force activities had routing indicators derived from RJHKN, while tributaries serving Army, Navy and AEC activities used routing indicators derived from RUHPJ. This situation immensely complicated the problem of training operators, and contributed directly to a number of instances of misdirected, delayed, duplicated or undelivered messages. The arrangement described above was said to be necessary in order to operate within the Air Force network using predetermined routing, and to permit access to the on-line facilities of the SAC Command net. It was found that the supposed advantages of this system did not exist. A simpler and much superior system would have evolved from the use of a single-service routing indicator, preferably Army since the majority of operational traffic used Army routing. All tributaries including Air Force should have been given routing indicators derived from the same base. Designation of the relay center as an interservice transfer point would then have allowed complete freedom in the routing of traffic over the facilities of either service.

g. The SAMSON network proved to be a disapointment. Direct on-line handling was possible to a large number of addresses; however, little traffic developed for these points. As a consequence, traffic records for the month of May 1956 showed that only 1% of all traffic handled over the five SAMSON channels was "on-line" classified. The only advantage gained was traffic analysis protection. This gain was offset as the task force administrative traffic, extremely heavy in volume and following the

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number requiring off-line encryption would not have presented a significant workload. In view of these factors, the advantages of the transmission of classified matter in the clear over landlines are minor and are insignificant compared to the hazards involved. It should be noted that the hazards are not due to any threat of intercept, but to the possibility of compromise through operator error in the relay center. This method of operation definitely falls under the classification of a "practice dangerious to security".

i. The JTF SEVEN Communication Center in the headquarters building on PARRY Island was operated without major problems other than organizational and personnel. From these viewpoints, much

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ways circuit to KWAJALEIN at that location; on the other hand, this circuit could not be moved away from that location. The Harbor Common circuit was retained in the Joint Communication Center area for two reasons: first, the traffic handled was primarily of interest to the Transportation Officer of TG 7.2, and second, it was felt desirable to retain the capability of reenforcing the Facilities Control operation with CW operators by having the two operations in the same area. Local action was taken to combine the Radiological Monitor Island Net operating position with the Weather Nets operating positions instead of maintaining separate operations as had been

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consequence, coordination of details was incomplete. The contractor, who was to provide camp facilities, was not given firm requirements with the result that no provisions were made for power, for antenna supports or for transportation of the equipment to the islands,. Also, equipment requirements were placed at a late date, with the result that final establishment of the stations was barely accomplished by the date required. The operating teams provided by the Southeastern Signal School At Fort Gordon, Georgia, on a tem-

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1. An active Methods and Results section was utilized to accumulate complete traffic engineering data as well as to make immediate corrections to faulty operating procedures. Detailed traffic engineering reports were submitted in accordance with AR 105-43. Several general observations may be made, as follows. First, the administrative traffic load of the Joint Task Force and its elements fluctuated with the hours of the day and the days of

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the week in the manner typical of communication centers serving large administrative headquarters. The relatively small number of high-precedence operational messages pertaining directly to test activities did not noticably alter this pattern. Secondly, it was found that the best speed of service on high precedence operational traffic was obtained by routing via Army channels. Air Force channels normally carry a high volume of AIROP (Air Operational) traffic; this carries a precedence of operational immediate but also has special routing indicators which entitle it to precedence over all other operational traffic on Air Force Channels. Therefore, JTF SEVEN traffic suffered by competition with AIROP traffic when routed via Air Force channels. Army channels, on the other hand, normally carry an extremely small percentage of operational immediate traffic so that JTF SEVEN traffic of this precedence could be given expedited handling. A summary of traffic statistics is inclosed.[25]

m. Two detachments with communications-electronics type missions were attached to TG 7.2 for administration and logistical support while remaining under the operational control of CJTF SEVEN. One of these was the Army Security Agency monitoring detachment. The other was a small group from the Army Pictorical Center, which provided a television weather-briefing system between ENIWETOK and PARRY Islands.

4. Local Administrative Communications

a. The terminal communication center serving TG 7.2 operated as a part of the Joint Communications Center complex. It could obviously have been in another location, but was retained in

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lrties. It was very difficult to determine locally what the

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requirements for each new building would be. As a consequence, last minute installation of branch cables and terminals was required in many instances. Special requirements of the Air Force elements for intercommunication systems and so-called "hot lines", created a particular problem in this respect. All essential services were provided, but because of extremely short dealines the installations were necessarily hasty and not in accordance with recognized standards of workmanship or approved practices. Existing cable (some of which had been in place for several years) was found to be installed in unmarked and unmapped locations. Unarmored cable was buried without mechanical protection and at shallow depths. As a consequence, an extremely large number of cases of cable damage were caused by construction work. Attempts were made to impress upon personnel of the contractor and the several military organizations that clearance must be obtained from the Signal Office before attempting any excavation; however, little success was had with this approach, largely due to the rapid turnover of personnel and the consequent difficulty of keeping newcomers informed.

d. Pertinent statistical information on telephone plant operation and maintenance is appended hereto.[26]

5. Maintenance, Supply and Services:

a. The Signal Repair Shop was responsible for 3d and higher echelon maintenance of all Army-furnished Signal-type equipment in the PPG, whether in the hands of units or in depot stock. The shop also performed 2d echelon maintenance of such equipment

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capability. These functions were discharged in routine fashion. The only serious difficulties encountered were the extremely long time required to obtain repair parts from CONUS, and the high rate of equipment deterioration due to unfavorable climatic condition. The parts supply problem was complicated by the fact that limited storage space in the Supply Depot precluded stockage of seldom-used parts for all of the wide variety of end items used in the Joint Task Force. Statistical data on shop workload are inclosed.[27]

b. No satisfactory remedy for deterioration due to climatic conditions was found, although careful attention to lower-echelon maintenance did lengthen the service life of equipment in some cases. Many items which had been in use during CASTLE and had been kept on hand in "dehumidified storage" were found to be in generally poor condition. It was impossible to determine whether this condition had existed prior to or as a result of their having been in storage; however, it was apparent that items which have been in service under uncontrolled environmental conditions during an operation and are not required for interim period use should not be retained in storage for the next operation. Very few items which had been held over in this manner were usable for REDWING.

c. Signal supply was the responsibility of the general depot; however, since there was no Signal Corps officer on the staff of the Depot Supply Officer, the Signal Officer provided

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which had been issued to them during CASTLE would automatically be made available for REDWING. Both of these attitudes are obviously fallacious. Good management dictates that all equipment in use during an operation and not required for the interim period be returned to CONUS, and that all stockage for a subsequent operation be based on firm requirements submitted by elements of the task force.

d. A larger supply problem existed within the TG 7.2 Signal activity itself, inasmuch as the quantity of Signal equipment used in the fixed communication activities represented the major portion of the total Depot Signal stocks. The maintenance of the memorandum receipt account for this property, and the obtaining of expendable supplies and repair parts from the Depot, presented a considerable workload for which no personnel was authorized. It was necessary to divert one officer and one NCO from the duties for which they had been assigned in order to give proper attention to this problem.

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e. Miscellaneous Signal-type services were performed in accordance with custom. These included maintenance of the AFRTS broadcasting station , the AAFMPS projection equipment, the chapel organ and several public address systems. Photographic service was not a part of the Signal mission, as such service was provided by the Air Force. The Table of Distribution for TG 7.2 authorized two photographers; these were placed on duty in the Air Force photo lab. There was no real requirement for this, as the small administrative photographic needs of TG 7.2 could have been filled by the Air Force or the contractor.

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SECTION VIII --RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY:

1. General.

JTF SEVEN Interim Period Operation Order charged the CTG 7.2 with providing Radsafe functions on ENIWETOK Island. Radsafe planning, nebulous in nature early in the reporting period, became more effective in the latter part of August 1955 when all elements of the task force were directed to determine their requirements for radsafe clothing and radiac equipment. Prior to this time, Task Group 7.2 formulated plans, including the organizational set-up, necessary for the accomplishment of its assigned radiological safety mission.[28] Level, scope, and the extent of training to be conducted were determined with the resultant program formalized as Radiological Safety Operation Plan 1-56.

2. Training.

The training phase was conducted in three levels; the training of instructors, monitor training and general indoctrination. Those personnel selected for instructor training also served as unit Radsafe Officers and NCO's.

The first level conducted was the instructor training. One officer and one first three grader from Headquarters, Service and Transportation Detachments were selected to attend the two-week Atomic Defense Course conducted at the Fleet Training Center, Pearl Harbor, T.H. Although these persons were sent for the most part during October 1955, an effort was made to insure a maximum utilization of this training by restricting selection to persons with rota-

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tion dates on or after 15 June 1956. In spite of this restriction, some loss of these trained personnel did occur sooner than was desirable, indicating that future operational planning should consider training instructor personnel no earlier than four months prior to the commencement of the operational phase. The course conducted at the Fleet Training Center did not completely fulfill TG 7.2 requirements as it was not designed for training instructors but rather for shipboard monitors. Supplemental instruction on the conduct of surveys, operation of and minor adjustments of equipment, and the like, corrected the course deficiencies. With the exception of the early training resulting in early losses, the instructor level of training was quite adequate.

The second or monitor level of training began in March 1956. Six primary monitor teams of three men each, backed up by four reserve teams, were required for the accomplishment of the monitoring mission. Two alternate monitors for each of the ten teams were also trained. This training consisted of 18 hours of classroom work and a 6 hour field exercise. The program of instruction suffered somewhat from instrument deficiencies resulting from the initial inexperience on the part of maintenance personnel, and the adverse climatic effects. As a result the AN/PDR-T-1-B ion chamber survey meters had to be abandoned and AN/PDR-27's substituted therefore. The training of the monitors was completed by additional periods of two-hour per week sessions in the field performing practice surveys on a unit level. These drills proved to be an excellent measure for improving the monitors' over-all efficiency.

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3. Operations.

Radiological safety operations fell into two distinct and separate functions; the administration of the film badge services for the task group, and shot-related activities. The latter activities consisted of items such as the preparation and issuance of special safety instructions, and post-shot surveys for fall-out contamination.

The first issue of film badges was received on 12 April 1956. This bulk issue was distributed to the units by the Task

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ception of certain off-island groups, all personnel present for

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duty were equipped by 23 April 1956. The original set of records, forms, and instructions on issue and turn-in procedures, were distributed along with the badges. This was the first operation during which all personnel in the forward area were equipped with film badges. All personnel received a general mission badge, exchanged each six weeks, and those few persons that were required to move into contaminated or danger areas received a special mission "one-shot" badge. Record files pertaining to issued badges were maintained at all times within the TG 7.2 Radsafe Section.

The shot-related activities included the preparation and issuance of special safety instructions. These were issued prior to each shot and contained information pertaining directly to that particular event for which issued. The time, date, location, and general direction of the detonation site with respect to areas inhabited by personnel of the task group were provided so that the shot day schedules could be properly interpreted, and safety measures implimented at the appropriated times. BIKINI instructions were listed separately from ENIWETOK instructions in order that safety measures at one atoll would not interfere with and hamper activities at the other atoll.

Another shot-related activity, radsafe surveying, was performed by the trained monitor teams. Each team consisted of three members; an instrument man, a recorder, and a communications man. Radsafe surveys were of two types; a detailed survey adapted to surveying generally low level areas, and a "predetermined point" survey best employed in evaluating the situation in areas of known

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fall-out.

Shot related activities of the task group varied with the location and type of detonation. Procedures used during the first seven shots of the operation are as follows:

LACROSSE EVENT (ENIWETOK): Special instructions for LACROSSE event (5 May) were issued on 27 April 1956. To insure the safety of personnel at ENIWETOK all personnel not performing specific duties at shot time were assembled. The flash-blindness hazard was considered a definite possibility so all personnel not equipped with high density goggles faced away from the zero point and closed their eyes prior to detonation time. Two routine surveys resulted in negative reports on all assigned areas except in the vicinity of the ENIWETOK Island sample recovery area where radiation danger zones had already been established.

CHEROKEE EVENT (BIKINI): Task force personnel in the BIKINI area were evacuated aboard ships prior to CHEROKEE event (21 May 1956). Nevertheless the same flash-blindness precautions were included in the instructions for personnel in the BIKINI area. No precautions of this sort were necessary for ENIWETOK. In addition, no post-shot surveys in the ENIWETOK area were required.

ZUNI EVENT (BIKINI): The pre-shot instructions and precautions for ZUNI event (28 May 1956) were essentially the same as those for CHEROKEE. Low level fallout on ENIWETOK Island was detected at H plus 9½ hours, and a survey commenced about H plus 10 hours. Fallout intensities ranged from 0.15 to 0.30 mr/hr.

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By H plus 11 hours the fallout had reached its peak. The monitor teams of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment were able to move into action within 12 minutes after the detachment was first notified to perform a survey. Further monitoring was conducted during the days preceding ERIE event. In one or two isolated places intensities in excess of 1 mr/hr were discovered. Such spots were places where dust and dirt tend to concentrate.

YUMA EVENT (ENIWETOK): Personnel in the ENIWETOK area who desired to view YUMA event (28 May 1956) assembled in the same general locations as for LACROSSE event. The flash-blindness hazard was greatly reduced by atmospheric conditions limiting the visibility and by the increased distance of the zero point from observation positions. No post-shot radsafe monitoring was required.

ERIE EVENT (ENIWETOK): The precautions taken for ERIE event (31 May 1956) closely parallelled those for YUMA, except that added emphasis was placed on the flash hazard due to the proximity of the detonation site and the excellent visibility conditions.

SEMINOLE EVENT (ENIWETOK): This shot took place on 6 June 1956. The safety precautions taken parallelled those for YUMA.

FLATHEAD EVENT: The FLATHEAD shot took place at BIKINI on 12 June 1956. No special safety measures were required in the ENIWETOK area.

The procedures used during the first seven shots, as noted above, are indicative of procedures used throughout the entire operation.

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established primarily for the dissemination of world news, major sporting news, and announcements deemed proper and of general interest.

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activity included coordination of inter-island and inter-atoll air transportation for TG 7.2 personnel and personnel of other task groups arriving in the PPG via MATS.

During the build-up and operational periods the number of scheduled and special aircraft increased to the extent that it was necessary to augment the personnel in the Air Section and to extend

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the working hours to cover night and week-end duty operation. One enlisted man was placed on part time duty at the MATS terminal for liaison purposes.

The Transportation Officer was responsible for coordination of flights from the Naval Station, KWAJALEIN, in support of weather and other project construction. Requests for these flights were submitted to JTF SEVEN, Washington, D.C., for consideration and presentation to the Naval Station, KWAJALEIN. After approval, the schedule of the flights were coordinated directly with the Naval Station. These support flights were discontinued upon arrival of the SA-16 aircraft of the Sea Air Rescue Element (Prov) on 15 March 1956. Support of the TARAWA project was provided by the 4930th Support Group with C-47 aircraft since there is a landing strip on that atoll. It is believed that in the future it would be more practical to have amphibious type aircraft based permanently on ENIWETOK thereby eliminating the time lost in travel between ENIWETOK and KWAJALEIN prior to boarding the special type craft needed to travel to weather and project construction stations.

3. Post Motor Pool: 31

The Post Motor Pool provided motor transportation and first and second echelon maintenance service for army owned vehicles to support TG 7.1, TG 7.2, TG 7.4 and the TG 7.3 Boat Pool on ENIWETOK Island. The Post Motor Pool also maintained special purpose vehicles to include DUKWS, Signal vehicles, Engineer and Ordnance equipment and Quartermaster materials handling equipment.

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The number of vehicles required increased from 183 during the interim period to 275 during the operational period. The number of personnel assigned to the Transportation Detachment to operate the Motor Pool varied from 2 officers and 63 enlisted personnel during the interim period to 3 officers and 116 enlisted personnel during the operational period.

The Motor Officer tested and licensed drivers for all type vehicles in Task Groups 7.2, 7.4, and the 7.3 Boat Pool. During the operational period however, with the great increase in personnel in the temporary duty units, valid and current licenses issued by Army and Air Force motor pools in CONUS were recognized.

The Island Bus System, during the interim period, consisted of two 37 passenger busses running on 15 minute schedules between the personnel pier and MATS terminal. During the operational period it consisted of four 37 passenger buses, and several 2½ ton trucks as well as two low bed trailers coverted to personnel carriers. The trucks and trailers were used during the morning, noon, and evening rush periods with the regular buses carrying the normal traffic during the day. Two of the buses were used during the operational period as special transportation for VIP and Official Observer personnel.

By verbal agreement between AEC, TG 7.1, and TG 7.2, the Motor Pool was given the responsibility for performing 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance on approximately 30 TG 7.1 vehilces based on ENIWETOK Island during the operational period. The AEC civilian contractor performed maintenance on approximately the same number of TG 7.2

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vehicles assigned to military police units on other islands at ENIWETOK and BIKINI Atolls.

There were 26 pieces of Quartermaster materials handling equipment assigned to the Motor Pool to include 17 Clark models, 5 Yale & Town models (3 experimental types) and 4 Hysters. Most of the MHE has been in the Command since January 1953. The lack of hard surface for operating MHE, the increased rate of deterioration such as rust and corrosion resulting from salt water, intense heat, and coral sand or dust, and the parts replacement problem as a result of non-standard equipment, increased the maintenance requirement and deadline time. Consideration should be given to the replacement of old equipment and standardization of all Quartermaster MHE. Standardization would tend to eliminate some of the parts replacement problem and reduce maintenance workload and deadline time.

During the operational period the motor pool was handicapped by inadequate shop buildings, wash racks, lubrication racks, and parking space. A new shop building is in the 1957-1958 construction program. The wash rack located near building 679 in the Air Force area was not satisfactory as the pumping unit was obsolete and frequently out of commission. A request was made to the Post Engineer during April 1956 for a survey to be made to determine if brackish water was available in the motor pool area and if a new wash rack could be constructed from 1956 miscellaneous funds. The survey was satisfactory and the well should be drilled and wash rack constructed during August 1956.

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ports, processing of household goods and baggage applications and maintenance of records in connection with custom clearances.

The Stevedoring Section, consisting of 2 officers and 26 enlisted men from the Transportation Detachment, was responsible for the operation of the main cargo pier on ENIWETOK Island which included receipt and discharge of cargo for all task groups and agencies on ENIWETOK Island from barges, LSM's, LCM's, and other small craft; sorting, checking, and forwarding import supplies; receiving and

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the PPG during the interim and build-up periods for the purpose of coordinating all logistical support requirements for MSTS ships calling at or assigned to the PPG, to include personnel actions, supply, laundry, maintenance, medical and island transportation.

Coordination was effected with TG 7.5 concerning Atoll and island surveys at TARAWA, RONGERIK, UJELANG, WOTHO, UTERIK, and KAPINGAMARANGI to determine landing areas for LST's, LCU's and the use of the LSD in

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the movement of supplies and equipment in the construction of weather and scientific stations.

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police matters; to prepare plans and policies for all military police operations, criminal investigation activities and travel control functions within the command and ensure compliance therewith. Major functions include:

a. Directing and administering the conduct of military police and criminal investigation operations.

b. Providing for the security of areas and activities as

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c. Coordinating and supervising the physical control of travel and access to certain areas within the Pacific Proving Ground, to include arrivals and departures.

d. Establishing liaison and coordinating with other law enforcement agencies to include the AEC Security Representative.

e. Supervising the enforcement of military law, orders, regulations, and specifically TG 7.2 Garrison Regulations.

f. Maintaining pertinent PM records and reports.

2. Organization Developments:

To fulfill its mission during the operational phase the PM Section needed additional personnel. The AEC Security Representative submitted tentative requirements for 252 EM and 8 Officers, to Headquarters, JTF SEVEN. The requirement was approved and eventual action secured the augmentation of military police from the 505th MP Bn, Presidio of San Francisco. On 3 March, the 505th MP Battalion Commander and his Company "C" commander visited

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the Pacific Proving Ground for orientation and liaison with this headquarters. This aided in clarification of the special type of training required, living conditions, badge system and general administration and logistical support the unit could expect upon its arrival at this station. Radiological safety was also discussed and it was determined that the Radsafe Training Program for the MPs would be conducted by Task Group 7.2.

Proper execution of the mission assigned to the Provost Marshal's Section necessitated the formulation of Standing Operating Procedures pertaining to military police activities covering the control of passengers arriving and departing from MATS Terminal, ENIWETOK security patrols, firearms and ammunition, incidents, contact reports, and general security measures. It was found that these procedures were not only a vital reference for later operations but proved to be an invaluable means of indoctrinating and orienting permanently assigned and TDY personnel. They were further used as a guide in establishing military police operations on seven (7) off-island sites.

The Military Police Detachment of 2 Officers and 38 EM was augmentated by 8 Officers and 252 EM on TDY status from the 505th MP Bn. Personnel utilized at each site is appended.[33]

The majority of personnel utilized to establish "upper island" police detachments were those assigned on TDY from the 505th MP Bn. An additional port of entry at BIKINI was manned by military police from the permanent detachment. Seventeen (17) TDY military

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(12) days which made a complete rehabilitation of the vehicles necessary before they could be returned to depot stock.

A military police radio net was organized at the seven (7) operating military police detachments to insure contact with each guard post and motor patrol. Thirty (30) radio sets, AN/VRC-18 were utilized for this purpose. A base station was installed at each site requiring an antenna pole of 35 to 40 feet in height with a locally manufactured ground level plane antenna secured to each pole. The setting of the poles was accomplished by the AEC civilian contractor.

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ton (10) EM arrived by ship at the PPG accompaning AEC security cargo. They became the nucleus of the PARRY Island Detachment and divided their time between guarding security cargo and improving housing and living conditions. On 11 and 13 March 1956, the advance party of two (2) officers and thirty (30) EM arrived by air. The remaining personnel arrived aboard the USNS AINSWORTH on 19 March 1956.

During March and April 1956, military police detachments were activated on PARRY, RUNIT, ENYU, ROJOA, TEITEIRIPUCCHI, ROMU-RIKKU and ENIMAN Islands respectively. All detachments operated directly under the control of the Provost Marshal at ENIWETOK Island. Detachment Comanders were authorized direct liaison with AEC Security Representatives. Special Orders for the various posts and patrols were received and mimeographed by the Office of the Provost Marshal. Recommended changes and amendments to Special Orders were forwarded to the Provost Marshal by the Officer in Charge of the Military Police Detachment concerned.

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Military Police escorted nine groupments of security cargo from ENIWETOK Island to appropriate areas on PARRY Island. Further escort was accomplished within ENIWETOK and BIKINI Atolls, with movements between Atolls being coordinated with the Marine Detachment from the USS CURTISS.

An additional Port of Entry was established at BIKINI to enable ships and aircraft to go direct to ENYU Island, BIKINI Atoll,

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offenses and incidents during the operational period.[34]

34 - TAB EE

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Group as well as furnishing the currency requirements for the non-appropriated funds, PX sales store and the consolidated mess (including Air Force flight lunches). This complexity of dealing with all of the Military Services, Department of Defense civilians, Public Health Service, Etc., not only made it necessary that individuals with a wide scope of knowledge be assigned to this activity, but caused increased work in basic procedures in order to accomplish the diversified missions.

a. Pay Section: 35

The average number of pay records maintained was 3,400 as follows:

Army	1,350	records
Air Force	1,800	"
Navy	200	"
Marines	50	"

Transfers in and out averaged in excess of 1,750 per month. This was an unusual number in comparison to the total of pay records maintained but is attributed to the 12 months tour of PCS personnel and the large number of TDY personnel assigned during the operation. This office normally received little if any advance

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paid. Rates of pay for civilians paid through this office varied considerably.

c. Accounting Section:

Cash was accepted in exchange for Treasury Checks and regular check disbursements were made. Approximately 600 checks per month were written. An unexpected difficulty occurred when the Treasury Department designated 1 August 1956 as the date for conversion to a buff colored card check and limited the supply of Treasury

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"A" Agents. This made it necessary for the finance officer to pay these additional personnel. It would be desirable in future operations for Class "A" Agents to be appointed to pay individuals of the various Task Groups in accordance with current regulations.

d. Performance Standards: Performance standards were not available prior to the operation and the high level of activity during the operation precluded the installation of a method of exact time keeping. However, the normal duty hours would have allowed 1360 man hours per week for the office. The time lost for other military duty averaged 149 hours per week. An additional 120 hours a week to cover breaks, sick call, etc., resulted in a total of 269 hours chargable to non-productive time. This amounted to about 20% of the normal

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work week for the office, and due to the heavy work load experienced during this operation it was necessary to work an average of 225 hours overtime per week. This amounted to a firm requirement of about 15 hours overtime per man per week. A standard of ten (10) travel vouchers processed per man hour was established. The requirements for accounting and check writing were handled by the Chief Clerk, the Finance Officer, and one other man assigned this duty.

2. Comptroller:

The Comptroller was responsible for budgeting, accounting, and auditing of funds and expenditures. He acted as advisor on all matters with respect to the employment of financial and material resources; budgeting, accounting, and auditing; control of expenditures, whether financed by appropriated or non-appropriated funds; and status of appropriated funds available.

Consumer funding, which became effective 1 July 1955 and which implemented the purchase of supplies from the Army Stock Fund brought appropriated funds down to this command through command channels by specific allotments. This required the financial administration and control of funds for supplies which prior to 1 July 1955 were issued on a "no-cost to station" basis. This additional work load coupled with the limited staffing for the Comptroller Office did not allow for the accomplishment of certain management functions normally associated with Comptroller Offices; ie, analysis of organization procedures, and performance evaluation.

a. Audit Section:

The non-appropriated funds subject to audit by this

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tive periods shown. Expenditures greatly decreased during the period of 1 July 1955 through 31 December 1955 and then increased during the period 1 January 1956 through 30 June 1956 in an abnormal and misleading manner.[37] This is attributed to the fact that the Comptroller's Office was without proper guidance during the period of December 1955 through the first half of April 1956 due to the absence of a Comptroller physically assigned to do this job. Secondly, billings were slow in arriving at this station due to the long delays in processing requisitions at CONUS Depots. These two factors combined created a practically insurmountable work load until the newly assigned Comptroller arrived in April 1956 and was able to overcome

37 - TAB II

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this abnormal situation. Billings effected remain very constant at all times.

c. Administration: Administrative requirements for both the fiscal and audit sections of the Comptroller's Office were accomplished within those sections, each section being independent of the other. The Fiscal functions were concerned with appropriated funds and the audit section was concerned with non-appropriated funds. If integrated accounting becomes necessary, it would be helpful to physically locate the Comptroller's Office and the Finance Office together. This would allow for the correlation of work in both offices in the processing of financial documents in an "assembly line" fashion and would limit duplication of effort, simplify procedures, and eliminate movement of documents between offices.

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SECTION XIII - HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT:

1. Billeting:

During the period January 1955 to June 1955, eleven additional Pacific type buildings to house personnel were constructed and occupied. Planning billeting requirements for Operation REDWING began in June 1955. Billeting requirements increased steadily between September 1955 and April 1956 with the build up of the permanent garrison population to meet operational requirements. Starting in January 1956, tent frames were repaired, electricity connected, walks built, tents drawn and erected in all tent areas in preparation to receive units for the operation. Criteria for operational billeting was as follows: 10 per tent; and 8 per large room or 4 per small room in the Pacific type buildings. In February 1956, units started moving into previously allocated billeting areas. The billeting requirements rose from approximately 1550 in February to approximately 3500 by 30 April and remained steady thru May 1956.

Planning was started in May 1956 for the reduction of billeting requirements for the post operational period. During July the first significiant numbers of personnel left the island. Consistent with the reduction of the population, personnel permanently garrisoned on ENIWETOK Island were moved into permanent type buildings with much more liberal allocation of space. Further, as tent areas were emptied, the tents were removed and stored. The electricity and other utilities were disconnected. Practically all tent frames used during the operation will have to be rebuilt to accomodate the new issue squad tent; all old issue tents now in use

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within the PPG have deteriorated to the extent that very few should be available for use during the next operation.

2. Messing:

Mess personnel, Army and Air Force, varied from a high of 148 starting in March 1954, gradually declining to 40 by September 1955. During the period March 1954 to September 1955, several labor saving devices were installed in the mess; i.e, bread slicing machine, electric meat saws and an additonal deep fat frier.

In September 1955, the build up of population became more firm to the mess officer and plans had to be revised. By February 1956, 1550 people were being served each day. During this period, planning and preparation for Operation REDWING was conducted in anticipation of feeding 3600 people. Additional mess equipment was drawn. Equipment was moved as necessary in order to convert three serving lines to six. Furniture was rearranged to gain additional seating space thereby giving a total seating capacity of 800. Mess personnel were added as needed until a total of 33 Air Force and 65 Army cooks and 84 KP's were required daily during the month of May 1956. Personnel eating in the mess increased from 1550 in February 1956 to approximately 3500 in May 1956. The in-flight lunch section prepared 15,000 lunches during May 1956.

As the island population started to decrease in late July, the KP and mess personnel were reduced accordingly. Plans have been made to turn in excess equipment as it becomes available and to reduce the number of serving lines as soon as possible.

Discipline among the personnel working in the kitchen

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became a problem during the operational period. There appeared to be a great deal of interservice friction between the Army kitchen personnel and the Air Force kitchen police. This feeling was traced to the system used by the Air Force element of assigning permanent KPs and the resultant morale loss suffered by those so assigned who had to spend several months on this unfavorable detail.

A further mess problem was the heavy breakage of utensils and the loss of small items, particularly silverware. Over $2,000.00 loss was realized during the quarter year covering the peak of the operation. It was readily apparent that personnel of all units eating at ENIWETOK were taking small items (silverware, cups, etc) for their personal barracks use in complete disregard for the property responsibility of others.

3. Officer Clubs:

Monthly sales at the Main Club remained steady throughout the interim period at an average of $1,600.00 through September 1955 at which time a slight increase occurred which through January 1956 saw a monthly average in sales of $3,000.00. This rose in February to $4,200.00. In March 1956 the Beach Club was opened. Peak sales during Operation REDWING were reached during May 1956; a total of $9,800.00 of which $6,700.00 was bar sales at the Main Club; $1,450.00 bar sales at the Beach Club; and $1,650.00 food sales at the Main Club. The bulk liquor sales high was $10,000.00 in July 1956.

During the months of May, June and July 1956, messing facilities were provided at the Main Club for Official Observer Groups, averaging 25 persons each. During the period when Official

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Observers were present the Club was unable to provide any food service to regular members.

Personnel employed by the clubs rose from 11 during January 1956 to 39 during the period March through June 1956. Membership in the clubs during the peak perios was approximately 650. Activity will decrease sharply during August neccesitating closing of the Beach Club early in the month.

4. Enlisted Clubs:

Monthly sales during the interim averaged $8,000.00 until October 1955. Thereafter sales rose to $10,000.00 and climbed steadily reaching a peak of $19,800.00 during March 1956. This declined slightly to $18,000.00 during April and May 1956.

Personnel employed by the clubs increased from 22 in January 1956 to a high of 56 during March through June 1956.

Personnel served by these clubs during the peak of Operation REDWING was approximately 2800.

5. Official Observers:

During Operation REDWING an official observer program was instituted by CJTF-SEVEN who sent invitational orders to individuals to permit them to enter the PPG to observe the detonation of devices. Seven groups of observers were invited. All were transported on Special Air Mission (SAM) flights. Only six actually arrived at the PPG and the last group which consisted of some British and Canadian Observers departed on 22 July 1956.

Task Group 7.2 served as the actual host organization to

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these groups. As such, the task group provided transportation on ENIWETOK Island as well as billeting, bar, messing, recreation, laundry and other facilities. To properly accomodate these visitors certain planning factors had to be accomplished and the TG 7.2 Headquarters Commandant was designated as the TG 7.2 Escort Officer. Two buses and four jeeps were reserved for official observer use. Three BOQ buildings were painted, renovated and equipped with new furniture. The buildings, in addition to the VIP quarters (building 676) were designated as official observer billets with a total capacity of 62. A bar was built in the lounge of building 676; the bar tender was furnished by the Officer's Club. A portion of the ENIWETOK Officer's Mess was used to establish an official observers mess. Khaki shorts, short sleeved shirts, and ponchos were drawn to be issued to the observers on a loan basis. Facilities of the Laundry, Post Exchange, Officer's Club, etc, were extended to these visitors.

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SECTION XIV - CONCLUSIONS:

1. All missions assigned to Task Group 7.2 while preparing for and during Operation REDWING were accomplished in a highly successful manner.

2. A personnel shortage existed in some sections during the build-up phase because of the late arrival of enlisted replacements. This problem was further aggravated as many of the replacements were not adequately trained in their MOS.

3. The procedure for requisitioning Special Service supplies and equipment through normal Special Service supply channels did not prove to be adequate in furnishing equipment for the operational period.

4. Current procedures followed in obtaining a clearance in accordance with CINCPAC 020 for those persons who arrived in the Pacific Proving Ground without a clearance message having been received by ATCOM, were both costly and time consuming.

5. The security mission as assigned was very successfully and accurately accomplished with the augmentation group of military police and CIC agents.

6. Government material, especially vehicles, in the hands of all task groups did not have the proper preventive maintenance care throughout the operation. An excessive number of vehicles was operated throughout the operation in comparison to the number of maintenance personnel and trained drivers necessary to service them.

7. Large scale construction of base facilities was programmed for completion during the build-up and operational phases. In many

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cases the work was not completed as scheduled thereby restricting maximum planned efficiency of the eventual facility user as well as preventing contractor personnel from devoting needed time to every day maintenance and utility operations.

8. Early construction programs were hampered by a lack of coordination between "on spot" personnel, AEC and Hq JTF SEVEN. This was greatly alleviated late in the build-up period when JTF SEVEN acquired a Staff Engineer who commendably monitored and expedited construction activity.

9. The FY56 ATCOM Miscellaneous Construction Fund, based on experience factors gained during an "interim" year, proved insufficient to meet the needs encountered in a build-up and operational year.

10. Facility maintenance and minor construction, to some degree, was performed by TG 7.2 without proper personnel, equipment and material. This channeled time and materials away from tasks implied in assigned missions and also proved uneconomical over civilian contractor accomplishment in view of the limited contribution the small Army section was able to make.

11. During power failures the number of emergency generators available on ENIWETOK was not sufficient to prevent a certain loss of food or to allow proper functioning of the consolidated mess.

12. The spare parts problem, especially with respect to vehicles, was met throughout the operation, however, stock levels were frequently maintained through the use of emergency requisitions only. A principle factor involved was the climatic ingress on spare parts

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rather than standardized usage loss.

13. TOO requisition items proved to be the most troublesome with respect to early receipt as well as appropriate inventory.

14. Local purchase effected through HABCOM proved difficult and awkward in view of existing HABCOM requirements.

15. The reduction of Signal personnel to a skeleton force during the period between CASTLE and REDWING resulted in inefficient operations and the deterioration of equipment and facilities through the neglect of maintenance. It also made the build-up for REDWING more difficult because of the lack of a sound nucleus.

16. The organizational aspects of the present Joint Communication Facility have no official status. Though operations during REDWING proceeded smoothly this could lead to operational difficulties in the future, particularly in the event of personality conflicts. REDWING communications operations did produce some problems in control, administration and logistics.

17. The concept of handling classified traffic in clear text form in the tape relay center, requiring the use of on-line encryption equipment on all radio channels and the special approval of landline circuits, was of very little benefit operationally and did not justify the tremendous expense and the danger to security introduced by this form of operation. Also, the use of three separate routing indicator systems for the Joint Relay Center led to a great amount of confusion in the handling of traffic.

18. The operation of the JTF-7 Headquarters communication center by personnel of TG 7.2 proved undesirable inasmuch as a headquarters

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the Air Force and part by the Army led to a real difficulty in coordinating maintenance support and replacement factors.

21. Considerable and expensive time was lost during the interim and build-up stages by personnel travel to and from weather island sites via KWAJALEIN where the only available amphibious type aircraft were based.

22. The TG 7.2 Transportation Officer as Deputy Port Commander acted as the MSTS representative for ships entering the ENIWETOK Port. The authority for actions taken, however, were not defined in available directives.

23. Data on landing areas and other survey type information relative certain other atolls and islands scheduled for use as scientific and weather stations was not available. Such surveys had to be made during the extreme last portion of the build-up period, in coordination with TG 7.5, in a rather hasty and thereby possibly inexact manner.

24. Port operation responsibility was assumed by CTG 7.3 during

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the operational period. Little or no bilateral planning and coordinating activity was accomplished with CTG 7.2 which led to a certain amount of confusion in the initial stage of responsibility turnover.

25. The consolidated mess functioned well in consideration of available facilities but was not able to handle efficiently the peak load of 3600 with its present maximum seating capacity of 800.

26. All personnel on ENIWETOK Island were adequately billeted though inaccurate pre-planning figures were submitted and a great deal of subsequent space shifting was necessary after all personnel arrived. One task group requested, and received, officer space into which they placed enlisted personnel. Another task group required much more space than requested.

27. Interservice friction among Air Force and Army mess personnel produced recurrent disciplinary problems. This was traced to the Air Force system of assigning permanent KP's whose efficiency, morale and good humor dissolved somewhat after spending several months on this unfavorable detail.

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SECTION XV - RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that:

1. Replacements sent to the PPG be thoroughly screened in all aspects prior to placement on orders. This is especially necessary with respect to prior training within the planned job assignment of the individual. Further, that all requests for enlargement of current T/Ds be given consideration in view of the operating problem areas developed during this operation and as pointed out in this report.

2. The task group be provided with funds for the direct purchase of Special Service supplies and equipment during future operational periods.

3. ATCOM, ENIWETOK, be given the authority to initiate CINCPAC Serial 020 clearance messages to CINCPAC upon a review of the individual's 201 file and the statement contained in the individual's travel order that he had been determined to be a good security risk and has been cleared for entry into PPG by the headquarters which issued the travel order.

4. CIC and military police augmentation in future operations be managed as was during this operation.

5. Responsibilities for vehicle operator maintenance and other preventative maintenance checks be clearly defined within all task groups and that all echelons of the task force support this problem area.

6. Large scale construction of facilities be programmed for non-operational periods.

7. A Staff Engineer be permanently assigned to Headquarters,

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that minor construction now accomplished by TG 7.2, be performed by contract.

10. A comprehensive study be made of the overall need for emergency use of electric power and that the contracting agency furnishing electric power be able to meet all emergency needs of the task group.

11. Equipment and vehicles be furnished with spare parts kits based on lists prepared by the offices of the respective technical services, not completely in accord with SNL catalogs 7, 8, and 9, but as determined by type of usage and climatic conditions in the PPG.

12. Task groups be required to submit semi-monthly status reports on TOO requisitions and inventories and that JTF SEVEN take complete and vigorous follow-up action on all such type transactions.

13. Responsibility for the local purchase of authorized supplies and equipment be clearly defined in future Administrative and Operation Orders and that an early agreement be made with HABCOM to include the method of delivery by its vendor to the government.

14. Interim period manning for the signal section be author-

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than on-line encryption equipment on radio channels and the special approved land-line circuits, and that a single routing indicator be assigned to the Joint Relay Center instead of three separate routing indicator systems.

17. A team be organized and trained in CONUS by JTF SEVEN and moved to the site as a unit for the next operation to operate the task force headquarters communication center.

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requirements of communication-electronic equipment, including spare parts and supplies, and the local supply point stock Signal items only in support of the permanent tele-communciations installations.

19. All equipment used in the joint facilities be made the logistical responsibility of a single service.

20. Consideration be given to the assignment of amphibious type aircraft to the PPG, particularly during the build-up period.

21. The responsibility of the TG 7.2 Transportation Officer as the MSTS representative during the interim period be more clearly defined.

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22. Outer island surveys to determine landing areas for LSTs and other type craft be initiated during the interim period on islands and atolls outside the PPG which are expected to be utilized in the following operational period.

23. A more clearly defined operational port operations responsibility be established between TG 7.2 and other task groups at the time of advance element arrival within the PPG.

24. Consolidated mess facilities be expanded prior to the next operation.

25. Billeting conferences held at task force level be attended by the billeting officer of TG 7.2 and that all task groups thoroughly review their billeting requirements before submission.

26. Personnel to perform unfavorable duties such as kitchen police be assigned on a duty roster basis, rather than on a permanent basis, by all services supporting such projects.

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HEADQUARTERS
Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D.C.

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 8

29 June 1955

Section I

Rescission

General Orders 7, Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN, 1955, pertaining to the inactivation and activation of units of the 7126th Army Unit, Eniwetok Atoll, Marshall Islands, Joint Task Force SEVEN, is rescinded.

Section II

Reorganization of 7126th Army Unit

1. Effective 1 July 1955 the following detachments of the 7126th Army Unit (Task Group 7.2), Joint Task Force SEVEN, Eniwetok, Marshall Islands, are discontinued:

a. Signal Detachment (Table of Distribution No. 71-7126-3).
b. Port Detachment (Table of Distribution No. 71-7126-5).
c. Truck Detachment (Table of Distribution No. 71-7126-6).

2. Effective 1 July 1955 the 7126th Army Unit is reorganized at Eniwetok, Marshall Islands, without change of station and will consist of the following detachments.

a. REORGANIZED:

(1) Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment (Table of Distribution No. 71-7126-1)

COL E-7	LT COL E-6	MAJ E-5	CAPT E-4	LT E-3	WO E-2		TOTALS
1	4	9	10	9	6	OFF	39
17	25	70	178	45	13	ENL	348

(2) Service Detachment (Table of Distribution No. 71-7126-2)

COL E-7	LT COL E-6	MAJ E-5	CAPT E-4	LT E-3	WO E-2		TOTALS
0	0	2	8	5	0	OFF	15
12	10	23	82	74	34	ENL	235

TAB A

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3. All officer and enlisted personnel currently assigned to those detachments discontinued concurrently with this reorganization will be reassigned to appropriate detachments of the 7126th Army Unit. No change of station or travel involved. Effective date of change of strength accounting 1 July 1955.

4. Equipment rendered excess will be disposed of in accordance with current procedures.

5. Records of deactivated detachments will be disposed of in accordance with applicable provisions of SR 345-200-Series.

6. Copies of all orders issued will be distributed in accordance with the provisions of Army Regulations 310-110A and 310-110B.

7. Authority: FM 110-5, Joint Action Armed Forces.

BY COMMAND OF REAR ADMIRAL MOMSEN:

OFFICIAL:

W. H. ASHFORD Jr.
Captain, U. S. Navy
Chief of Staff

/s/James R. Landress
JAMES R. LANDRESS
Captain, U.S. Army
Asst Adj Gen

A TRUE COPY:

JAMES R. WALDIE
Major Infantry


TASK GROUP 7.2
COMMANDER
EXECUTIVE OFF
DEP PORT COMDR
HQ COMDT
COMPT
S-1
S-2
S-3
S-4
S-5
ADJ
PERS
POSTAL
SP SER
CH
PM
I&E
DEPOT
ORD
ENG
MED
PX
TRANS
SIG
FIN
HQ DET
MP DET
TRANS DET
SVC DET
Staff Supervision

TAB B

POSTAL OPERATIONS

Month	Total Financial Service (Money Orders, Stamps, Etc)	Volume of Mail Handled
Jul 1955	$ 49,870.35	32,161 lbs
Aug 1955	98,999.26	34,602 lbs
Sep 1955	85,971.65	38,081 lbs
Oct 1955	87,433.12	57,382 lbs
Nov 1955	95,988.10	58,959 lbs
Dec 1955	95,454.30	76,617 lbs
Jan 1956	101,050.19	61,080 lbs
Feb 1956	89,965.78	68,063 lbs
Mar 1956	128,043.95	98,193 lbs
Apr 1956	212,918.93	138,744 lbs
May 1956	352,221.76	148,919 lbs
Jun 1956	368,360.72	136,283 lbs
Jul 1956	307,789.50	98,380 lbs

TAB C

[redacted]

30 Nov 55	63	768	60	640	1	17
31 Dec 55	63	768	64	671	1	20
31 Jan 56	63	768	66	697	3	21
29 Feb 56	63	768	65	759	3	44
31 Mar 56	63	768	67	769	6	40
30 Apr 56	63	768	70	784	3	36
31 May 56	63	768	66	806	3	38
30 Jun 56	63	768	66	791	1	34
31 Jul 56	63	768	71	719	2	23

6) 405 | 4628 — 6) 118 : 215

68 — 771 — 39

68 — 42

839 — 81

839

920

TAB D

[redacted]

CLEARANCES AND PERSONNEL INVESTIGATIONS

	1955				1956						
	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL
National Agency Checks Initiated	5	1	2	2	2	7	1	0	3	5	3
Interim Secret Clearances Granted	38	88	33	57	33	71	40	48	11	15	17
Final Secret Clearances Granted	53	53	26	57	42	51	60	78	55	90	13
Background Investigations Initiated	1	3	0	4	0	1	2	2	1	0	0
Interim Top Secret Clearances Granted	0	0	0	2	0	3	3	3	0	0	0
Final Top Secret Clearances Granted	6	5	0	5	6	12	11	13	11	5	3
Interim Cryptologic Clearances Granted	7	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0
Final Cryptologic Clearances Granted	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	2	0
Restricted Data Certifications Requested	0	8	4	5	0	42	20	4	15	1	2
Restricted Data Certifications Granted	0	3	7	0	43	43	5	4	19	1	0
Restricted Data Certifications Terminated	5	6	7	2	3	0	1	0	45	21	146

TAB E

INCOMING PERSONNEL, SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT PROCESSED

	1955				1956						
	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul
Personnel TG 7.1	4	23	9	1	46	83	374	445	263	327	88
TG 7.2	110	118	102	176	163	178	265	226	122	163	128
TG 7.3	66	34	37	33	34	98	122	143	141	82	74
TG 7.4	106	160	131	221	236	624	822	325	263	249	81
TG 7.5	199	358	341	289	483	425	345	197	109	106	85
TOTAL	485	693	620	720	962	1491	1928	1316	898	932	507
AIRCRAFT	35	42	33	29	47	58	127	135	153	131	136
SHIPS	5	6	7	4	6	9	14	15	*	*	1

* SHIPS BOARDED BY TG 7.3 SECURITY PERSONNEL

CONTRABAND VIOLATIONS

	1955				1956						
	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL
TG 7.1	0	0	0	0	3	2	15	11	6	2	0
TG 7.2	3	5	2	4	2	3	4	2	0	2	2
TG 7.3	0	0	4	2	6	1	2	11	8	0	3
TG 7.4	4	6	6	12	12	9	11	6	2	2	4
TG 7.5	5	3	6	9	5	3	1	3	0	1	0
TOTAL	12	14	18	27	28	18	33	33	16	7	9

TAB F

PPG BADGES AND TEMPORARY LIMITED AREA PERMITS

	1955				1956						
	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul
Badges Requested From AEC	26	71	69	25	73	100	608	14	52	42	24
Badges Received From AEC	70	63	106	47	56	153	828	71	63	43	29
Badges Returned to AEC	81	64	69	33	41	35	182	209	68	96	0
Permits Issued by S2	137	168	174	150	124	100	264	129	184	153	156
Permits Voided by S2	7	14	16	13	12	13	12	9	9	7	16
Permits Returned to S2	200	200	150	199	201	100	597	300	158	196	160

TAB G

Armament

Gun, Ma
Gun, Ma
Mortar,
Rifle,
Rifle,
Gun, Ma

HQ

TC
HQ S

RIFLE

WPNS

TAB H

INCOMING GENERAL CARGO
CONSIGNED TO DEPOT SUPPLY OFFICE, TG 7.2

MONTH	TONNAGE*
July 1955	246
August	160
September	241
October	336.5
November	217
December	162
January 1956	236.5
February	203
March	457
April	352
May	172
June	124.5
July	246.8
TOTAL	3184.3

*Measured in Long Tons (2,240 lbs)

TAB I

JOINT ARMY-AIR FORCE OFFICE MACHINE REPAIR
SHOP WORKLOAD (ACTIVATED 1 NOVEMBER 1955)

MONTH	NUMBER AND TYPE OF MACHINE REPAIRED ON WORK ORDERS		NUMBER OF SERVICE CALLS	TOTAL SERVICE CALLS AND WORK ORDERS
NOV 1955	TYPEWRITERS	21	10	39
	ADDING MACHINE	7		
	STENCIL CUTTER	1		
DEC 1955	TYPEWRITERS	19	12	36
	ADDING MACHINE	4		
	STENCIL CUTTER	1		
JAN 1956	TYPEWRITERS	38	*250	296
	ADDING MACHINE	3		
	DUPLICATOR	4		
	STENCIL CUTTER	1		
FEB 1956	TYPEWRITER	22	14	39
	ADDING MACHINE	3		
MAR 1956	TYPEWRITER	50	6	62
	ADDING MACHINE	4		
	DUPLICATOR	1		
	NUMBERING MACHINE	1		
APR 1956	TYPEWRITER	73	8	85
	ADDING MACHINE	3		
	DUPLICATOR	1		
MAY 1956	TYPEWRITER	81	7	102
	ADDING MACHINE	11		
	DUPLICATOR	2		
	LAUNDRY MARKER	1		
JUN 1956	TYPEWRITER	44	9	59
	ADDING MACHINE	6		

TAB J

MONTH	NUMBER AND TYPE OF MACHINE REPAIRED ON WORK ORDERS		NUMBER OF SERVICE CALLS	TOTAL SERVICE CALLS AND WORK ORDERS
JUL 1956	TYPEWRITER	164	6	192
	CALCULATING MACHINE	4	0	
	ADDING MACHINE	4	0	
	DUPLICATOR	6	2	

GRAND TOTAL OF ITEMS WORKED ON 910.

* ALL MACHINES ON ENIWETOK INSPECTED AND SERVICED BY ROVING SERVICE TEAM DURING JANUARY 1956. TOTAL NUMBER OF MACHINES INSPECTED 235.

TAB J

TAB K

CLASS "X" KHAKI CLOTHING PROCESSED AND ISSUED DURING FISCAL YEAR 1956

	SHIRTS			TROUSERS		
MONTH	QTY PROCESSED CUT AND SEWN	QTY RCVD	QTY ISSUED	QTY PROCESSED CUT AND SEWN	QTY RCVD	QTY ISSUED
JUL 55	1278	---	1197	4944	---	1561
AUG 55	---	---	447	---	---	683
SEP 55	3601	---	1500	1385	---	1496
OCT 55	1406	342	1740	3690	---	3798
NOV 55	4347	142	966	---	---	898
DEC 55	2592	148	829	1747	---	916
JAN 56	1750	---	2011	2841	---	2298
FEB 56	6103	168	4484	---	---	4456
MAR 56	1108	2960	5674	6840	3423	4645
APR 56	3008	990	1247	1311	3128	1471
MAY 56	---	10,078	267	3072	10,121	666
JUN 56	300	270	634	868	367	2162
JUL 56	501	---	360	103	---	295
TOTAL	25,994	15,098	21,356	26,801	17,039	25,345

ON HAND AS OF 30 JULY 1955 - 8,523 (Trousers)
30 JULY 1955 - 15,923 (Shirts)

ON HAND AS OF 30 JULY 1956 - 5,245 (Trousers)
30 JULY 1956 - 12,485 (Shirts)

[redacted]



TAB L

ENGINEER SECTION W/O's PROCESSED
(Sign Painting not included)



1955-1956

TAB M


AEC W/O's PROCESSED
40
30
20
10
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
1955 - 1956
NUMBER

WATER CONSUMPTION



TAB O

TOTAL SICK CALL BY MONTH

	Army	Navy-Marine	Air Force	Civilian	Total
1955 Jan	256	4	109	26	395
Feb	278	10	147	8	443
Mar	265	16	186	23	490
Apr	210	14	136	34	394
May	264	24	122	30	440
Jun	320	33	224	15	592
Jul	162	11	132	10	315
Aug	222	17	162	13	414
Sep	217	18	118	26	369
Oct	422	16	330	51	829
Nov	484	13	308	103	908
Dec	356	16	339	82	793
1956 Jan	401	17	312	103	833
Feb	524	43	501	161	1,229
Mar	445	28	673	125	1,271
Apr	537	48	840	179	1,604
May	594	49	1,078	279	2,000
Jun	540	53	739	169	1,501
Jul	378	20	766	114	1,278

ADMISSIONS

Jan 55-- Jul 56	234	33	208	19	494

TAB P

DENTAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES
1955-1956



TAB - Q

[redacted]

BREAKDOWN OF RATIONS BY DEPARTMENT

	ARMY	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	NAVY
June - 1954	26,196	11,597	1,367	240
July	20,488	8,436	1,378	198
August	18,781	7,999	907	213
September	18,645	7,289	883	183
October	42,071	40,777	250	8,894
November	18,225	7,882	903	210
December	18,186	8,131	1,016	217
January 1955	17,170	8,423	924	233
February	18,713	7,220	1,018	224
March	16,247	8,003	1,327	248
April	16,683	7,464	1,138	240
May	17,916	7,688	1,148	248
June	16,558	6,975	1,127	240
July	17,237	7,847	1,118	248
August	18,421	8,393	1,038	248
September	18,383	9,866	811	240
October	21,371	11,127	854	248
November	23,452	11,274	1,034	240
December	24,270	14,506	1,272	252
January	23,914	16,334	1,392	310
February 1956	28,838	19,464	1,058	290
March	43,515	34,477	882	276
April	53,095	48,155	944	242
May	55,081	51,178	1,034	279
June	55,303	44,902	1,030	270
July	44,833	38,556	832	279
TOTAL	693,592	453,963	26,685	15,010

TAB R

[redacted]

[redacted]

COMMISSARY ACTIVITIES

(Number of Rations Issued and Cash Value Thereof)

Month	Year	Number of Rations	Money Value
June	1954	39,400	$ 53,281.80
July		30,500	37,245.96
August		27,900	40,596.84
September		27,000	39,065.63
October		91,992	132,533.13
November		27,220	38,303.49
December		27,550	38,392.38
January	1955	26,750	36,432.31
February		27,175	32,418.41
March		25,825	33,114.73
April		25,525	32,938.02
May		27,000	35,163.17
June		24,900	32,927.95
July		26,450	35,213.61
August		28,100	35,584.61
September		29,300	37,380.49
October		33,600	42,609.69
November		36,000	43,835.57
December		40,300	48,666.74
January	1956	41,950	48,981.38
February		49,650	54,974.83
March		79,150	90,038.31
April		102,436	114,964.85
May		107,572	122,663.57
June		101,505	120,520.52
July		95,931	115,884.64
	TOTAL	1,200,681	$1,493,732.63
	AVERAGE	46,180	$57,412.79

TAB S

[redacted]

[redacted]

COMMISSARY ACTIVITIES

(Table of subsistence received and ending inventory)

		SUBSISTENCE RECEIVED	ENDING INVENTORY
June	1954	$ 56,944.08	$ 188,608.56
July		38,503.62	189,361.15
August		66,413.91	211,660.44
September		26,791.68	194,375.79
October		104,151.20	242,889.31
November		30,084.15	167,312.29
December		32,831.83	154,460.32
January	1955	74,117.72	188,292.30
February		13,037.37	165,398.74
March		5,117.84	129,278.60
April		50,038.43	144,805.08
May		21,398.13	130,253.52
June		46,136.71	142,383.77
July		36,560.08	140,040.59
August		27,764.99	131,097.16
September		39,953.73	127,556.37
October		19,909.60	98,395.66
November		46,576.76	96,545.66
December		61,057.79	103,287.27
January	1956	111,546.56	160,358.72
February		110,182.43	212,487.11
March		46,210.51	141,294.18
April		252,536.02	281,717.80
May		96,224.73	243,206.25
June		174,963.09	267,948.81
July		32,261.06*	275,280.00*
		$1,621,316.02*	$4,528,295.45*
	AVERAGE	$ 62,358.34	$ 171,350.75

*Estimated

[redacted]

TAB T

[redacted]

LAUNDRY PROCESSED

1954	Individual Bundles	Total Pieces
April	5,302	124,719
May	5,035	127,581
June	3,973	92,550
July	2,508	67,833
August	2,978	73,271
September	2,545	61,072
October	2,422	56,080
November	2,716	66,445
December	2,272	57,718
1955		
January	2,381	59,063
February	2,175	56,458
March	2,501	63,355
April	2,330	57,117
May	2,568	59,427
June	2,391	60,012
July	2,367	62,985
August	2,861	70,181
September	2,417	62,757
October	2,719	71,464
November	2,697	75,732
December	2,856	75,618
1956		
January	3,165	90,872
February	3,707	120,022
March	4,954	148,595
April	6,049	164,419
May	6,948	193,593
June	6,852	182,661
July	5,623	160,142

Total number of decontaiminated items processed during Operation REDWING: 6120

TAB U

[redacted]

[redacted]

July 1955	$58,243.54	$5,992.97	$3,690.00
August 1955	51,707.18	7,667.08	3,548.28
Sept. 1955	50,465.66	5,850.39	1,540.50
Oct. 1955	57,610.31	7,184.95	1,654.50
Nov. 1955	70,659.09	9,387.29	1,825.50
Dec. 1955	72,573.12	8,673.20	1,858.50
Jan. 1956	67,577.60	6,604.56	2,022.00
Feb. 1956	70,340.29	10,453.79	2,118.00
Mar. 1956	102,959.64	8,494.49	2,565.00
April 1956	154,136.21	9,272.54	3,813.00
May 1956	198,154.54	17,252.16	4,569.00
June 1956	202,048.23	12,860.56	4,390.50
July 1956	172,742.64	*14,705.20	3,592.50

* Estimate

TAB V

5 RUHPJ-RUHP SAMSON "B"

6 Not used

(b) Telephone

1 Order Wire

[redacted]

(1) Equipment

(a) Transmitters - 2 ea BC-339 and O-5/FR

(b) Receivers - 2 ea AN/FRR-39 & AN/FGC-1

(2) Channels - Two, single-channel radioteletype, used to replace SSB channels 1 and 2 in the event of equipment or propagation failure.

[redacted]

TAB W

[redacted]

c. KWAJALEIN-Multiplex (J-400)

(1) Equipment

(a) Transmitter - 2 ea AN/FRT-15 (1 in use; 1 spare)

(b) Receivers

1 2 ea R-274C (SP-600) with AN/URA-8

2 1 ea AN/FRR-39 with AN/URA-8

(c) Multiplex - 2 ea AN/FGC-1 (1 in use; 1 spare)

(2) Channels

(a) Order Wire

(b) RUHPJ-RJHK SAMSON

(c) AIROP

(d) Not used

d. USS ESTES Primary (J-204)

(1) Equipment

(a) Transmitter - T-276/UR

(b) Receiver - AN/FRR-40

(c) Terminal - 2 ea CF-1, AN/FCC-3

(2) Channels

(a) Teletype

1 RUHPJ-RUHPJF SAMSON

2 JTF-7 Weather Central - Aerological Office

3 RUHPJ-RUHPJF "B" (No SAMSON)

4 Air Operation Center-Combat Information Center

5 Other channels not used

(b) Telephone

[redacted]

[redacted]

1. Weather Reconnaissance Aircraft [redacted]

(1) Transmitters - 4 ea 96-D (one for each assigned frequency, maximum of two of the four in use at any one time)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(2) Receivers - R-274C(SP-600) at Joint Weather Central, PARRY Island

k. Radiological Monitoring Station Islands, CW (J-225)

(1) Transmitters - 2 ea T-4 (one for each assigned frequency, only one in use at any one time.

(2) Receivers - R-274C(SP-600) at Joint Weather Central, PARRY Island

l. Aircraft Control, Voice (J-441)

(1) Transmitters - 3 ea 96-D (one for each assigned frequency, maximum of two in use at any one time)

(2) Receivers - R-274C(SP-600) at Air Operation Center

m. Harbor Common, Voice and CW (J-206)

(1) Transmitters - 2 ea T-4 (one for each channel)

(2) Receivers - 2 ea R-390

n. Weather Broadcast Receivers

(1) Teletype

(a) Equipment - 4 sets of AN/FRR-39 and AN/FGC-1

(b) Channels - Guam, Pearl Harbor, Canberra, Tokyo

(2) Facsimile

(a) Equipment - 2 sets of 2 ea R-390 in diversity

(b) Channels - Tokyo, Pearl Harbor

(3) CW

(a) Equipment - R-274C(SP-600) at Joint Weather Central

(b) Channels - Fiji Islands

II. Landline Circuits

a. JTF-7 Communication Center - 2 full duplex

[redacted]

b. JTF-7 Weather Central - 1 full duplex

c. TG 7.4 Communication Center - 1 full duplex

d. TG 7.5 Communication Center - 1 full duplex

e. Airbase Operations - 1 half duplex

f. TG 7.2 Communication Center - 1 full duplex

g. Joint Crypto Center - 1 full duplex

[redacted]

TELEPHONE PLANT WORK

ITEM	JUL 55	AUG 55	SEP 55	OCT 55	NOV 55	DEC 55
Stations Installed	5	7	4	8	11	11
Extensions Instld.	2	2	3	2	5	9
Daily Calls	2900	4100	5000	4500	4200	6000
Routine Troubles	34	45	54	51	52	43
Major Troubles,ie., Cut Cables etc.	3	2	7	1	3	3
Total Personnel Assigned	8	9	11	11	10	9

SIGNAL FIELD MAINTENANCE

Items Repaired	62	76	83	97	67	32
Total Personnel Assigned	8	9	9	9	9	10

RADIO SECTION ORGANIZAT

No of Pers Asgd by Sec and Svc						
Transmitters				AF 8 A 7	AF 6 A 6	AF A
Receivers	AF 0 A 5	AF 0 A 7	AF 0 A 11	AF 0 A 12	AF 0 A 11	AF A
Manual Op Operations						
Facilities Control					AF 3 A 2	AF A
No. of Radio Circuits					4	
No. of Msgs Handled by Manual Radio						

TAB X

TAB X

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

ITEM	JUL 55	AUG 55	SEP 55	OCT 55	NOV 55	DEC 55	JAN 56	FEB 56	MAR 56	APR 56	MAY 56
No. of Msgs Relayed						9234	25247	32097	40189	55971	6265
No. of Originating Classified Msgs.	296	388	549	732	569	629	375	300	731	865	728
No. of Originating Unclassified Msgs.						584	613	918	1493	1134	1371
Total No. of High Precedence Msgs						1936	2948	2561	3213	4377	6489
No. Personnel Asgd Terminal	11	10	10	11	11	14	13	12	12	12	12
No. Personnel Asgd Crypto by Service	AF 0 A 17	AF 0 A 19	AF 2 A 18	AF 3 A 20	AF 1 A 22	AF 2 A 23	AF 7 A 23	AF 5 A 26	AF 9 A 21	AF 5 A 4	AF [illegible] A [illegible]
No of Personnel Asgd Relay by Svc	AF 0 A 24	AF 0 A 25	AF 0 A 23	AF 0 A 26	AF 3 A 28	AF 3 A 17	AF 4 A 23	AF 4 A 24	AF10 A 20	AF10 A 25	AF12 A 29
Total Msgs Terminating in Terminal						676	739	839	1747	1644	1709
Total Msgs Terminating in Crypto	306	370	437	603	479	507	659	768	738	662	512
No. of Orig. Unclass & Class. Msgs(JTF7)									4508	869	916
Total Term. Msgs (JTF7)									857	2745	4501
No. of Personnel Asgd									27	27	2

TG 7.2 RADSAFE ORGANIZATION



TAB Y

- - - - - UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF TG 7.2 RADSAFE OFFICER

INFORMATION AND EDUCATION ACTIVITIES



TAB Z

[redacted]

AIR TRANSPORTATION

	ENIWETOK INTER-ISLAND ACTIVITY		BIKINI INTER-ISLAND ACTIVITY		ENIWETOK-BIKINI & RETURN		ENIWETOK WEATHER ISLANDS & RETURN	
	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO
JUN 55	511	0.6	453	2.9	456	21.5	59	8.6
JUL	693	0.5	993	2.3	459	20.6	43	11.5
AUG	1832	2.4	506	2.0	666	28.2	65	0.5
SEP	972	1.7	987	6.7	470	25.5	3	0.7
OCT	1217	2.4	805	5.6	619	27.9	4	2.3
NOV	1060	1.0	811	6.4	668	25.1	15	1.5
DEC	1168	0.7	767	4.4	695	36.6	18	7.3
JAN 56	1553	1.5	1765	1.9	767	35.7	33	3.3
FEB	2135	4.5	1281	1.4	863	47.6	9	0.5
MAR	3634	4.2	324	0.4	1468	75.4	34	2.1
APR	4706	3.8	4964	3.2	2014	123.8	316	27.4
MAY	5852	2.6	432	0.1	2309	140.7	607	38.9
JUN	6887	80.2	0	0	1691	79.0	570	50.3
TOTAL	32220	106.1	14088	37.3	13145	687.6	1776	154.9

Cargo is listed in Short Tons

TAB AA1

[redacted]

[redacted]

RECAPITULATION OF PASSENGERS, CARGO AND MAIL ARRIVING THIS STATION DURING THE PERIOD LISTED

	PASSENGERS	CARGO	MAIL
OCT 55	622	49.6	12.1
NOV	557	45.3	22.1
DEC	579	49.4	30.0
JAN 56	850	170.4	19.8
FEB	1174	289.1	16.4
MAR	1535	142.0	31.6
APR	1162	389.8	45.2
MAY	641	310.8	44.9
JUN	646	160.2	33.8
JUL	693	159.5	41.4
TOTAL	8459	1766.1	297.3

RECAPITULATION OF PASSENGERS, CARGO AND MAIL DEPARTED THIS STATION DURING THE PERIOD LISTED

	PASSENGERS	CARGO	MAIL
OCT 55	325	15.6	16.1
NOV	353	13.6	14.6
DEC	435	7.7	12.6
JAN 56	320	6.2	13.8
FEB	387	21.5	14.5
MAR	436	34.5	21.0
APR	757	80.1	30.7
MAY	1012	90.5	35.5
JUN	1261	126.0	43.0
JUL	2109	109.9	42.3
TOTAL	7395	505.6	244.1

Cargo and Mail listed in Short Tons

[redacted]

TG 7.1	US PAX	CARGO	H PA
OCT	2	0	6
NOV	3	0	13
DEC	0	0	6
JAN	0	0	5
FEB	0	.8	5
MAR	2	0	12
APR	5	.5	43
MAY	96	3.0	175
JUN	204	5.5	315
JUL	317	6.5	451
TOTAL	629	16.3	1031

PASSEN

TAB AA 3

TG 7.2 PA

OCT	5
NOV	5
DEC	4
JAN	3
FEB	6
MAR	6
APR	5
MAY	7
JUN	13
JUL	14
TOTAL	73

Cargo and Mail

PASSENGERS, CARGO AND MAIL LOADE

HONO				GUAM		
MAIL	PAX	CARGO	MAIL	PAX	CARGO	M
0	36	0.7	16.0	0	0	0
0	12	0.2	14.5	0	0	0
0	31	1.2	12.5	0	0	0
0	28	0.7	13.7	0	0	0
0	12	0.3	14.4	0	0	0
0	45	0.5	20.5	1	0	0
0	33	0.5	30.2	0	1.0	0
0	29	1.0	35.0	0	0	0
0	33	5.0	42.5	0	0	0
0	42	1.0	42.8	0	0	0
0	301	11.1	242.1	1	1.0	0

sted in Short Tons

TAB AA3

[redacted]

TAB AA3

PASSENGERS AND CARGO LOADED THIS STATION FOR DESTINATIONS

US		HONO		GUAM		KWAJ		JAPAN		M
PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO	PAX
6	0	8	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
4	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0
5	0	2	0	0	0	11	0	0	0	0
37	0	3	0	0	0	11	0	0	0	0
4	0	2	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0
3	0	5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
17	0	11	0.5	0	0	10	0.5	1	0	0
24	0.5	15	0.5	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
38	0	17	0	0	0	8	1.5	0	0	0
56	0	19	0.4	0	0	4	0.5	0	0	0
194	0.5	83	1.4	0	0	61	2.5	2	0	0

listed in Short Tons

PASSENGERS AND CARGO LOADED THIS STATION FOR DESTINATIONS INDICATED

	US		HONG		GUAM		KWAJ		JAPAN		MANILA		TOTAL	
TG 7.4	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO
OCT	37	3.7	24	8.7	0	0	2	0	4	2.0	0	0	67	14.4
NOV	63	12.0	15	0.2	0	0	4	0	5	0.1	0	0	87	12.3
DEC	57	4.1	24	1.7	0	0	3	0	7	0.1	0	0	91	5.9
JAN	12	4.3	22	0.4	0	0	4	0	6	0.4	0	0	44	5.1
FEB	26	13.1	57	4.5	0	0.4	10	0.1	6	1.0	0	0	99	19.1
MAR	25	20.5	70	10.5	0	0	8	0.5	7	0.5	0	0	110	32.0
APR	42	65.6	60	5.0	0	0.5	8	0.5	23	0.5	0	0	133	72.1
MAY	88	73.0	82	7.0	0	0	5	0	10	0.5	0	0.5	185	81.0
JUN	115	86.5	46	6.5	3	1.5	3	5.0	6	0	0	0	173	99.5
JUL	580	84.5	98	9.5	1	0	1	1.0	11	1.0	0	0	691	96.0
TOTAL	1045	367.3	498	54.0	4	2.4	48	7.1	85	6.1	0	0.5	1680	437.4

Cargo is listed in Short Tons

TAB AA3

PASSENGERS AND CARGO LOADED THIS STATION FOR DESTINATION

	US		HONO		GUAM		KWAJ		JAPAN		
TG 7.5	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO	PAX	CARGO	PA
OCT	70	0.1	50	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
NOV	68	0.8	66	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
LEC	104	0.2	100	0.2	0	0	1	0	0	0	
JAN	79	0.1	52	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
FEB	84	0.5	77	0.3	0	0	5	0.4	0	0	
MAR	100	0.5	70	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	
APR	266	0.5	173	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MAY	237	0.5	173	0.5	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	
JUN	211	0.5	121	1.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	
JUL	239	0	123	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL	1458	3.7	1005	4.6	0	0	6	0.9	0	0	

Cargo is listed in Short Tons

TAB AA3

AVERAGE NUMBER OF VEHICLES AVAILABLE BY TYPE AND MILEAGE USED

	OCT		NOV		DEC		JAN		FEB		MAR		APR		MAY		JUN		JUL	
	No	Miles	No	Miles	No	Miles	No	Miles	No	Miles	No	Miles	No	Miles	No	Miles	No	Miles	No	Miles
1/4 ton	36	32252	43	32450	53	39743	56	40715	56	43354	60	56939	65	33115	74	61202	75	58959	77	57050
1/2 ton											29	20969	28	48696	28	31411	28	28760	28	28177
3/4 ton	22	17586	26	18942	30	26242	32	25548	34	28800	32	35807	22	24272	23	26440	24	25445	24	25351
1 1/2 ton											11	2862	11	9061	10	8868	10	9596	10	8571
2 1/2 ton	12	7664	13	7382	13	6451	15	6162	15	7067	15	7250	10	10592	18	9257	17	10488	16	10404
DUKW	2	297	2	363	2	549	2	621	3	804	4	996	5	1503	5	1380	5	1112	3	1356
Prime Mover	3	530	3	464	3	593	3	830	2	758	3	1092	3	1154	3	1248	3	1705	3	1506
Fork Lifts	16		18		18		20		20		19		16		22		21		23	
Bus	3	6484	2	5921	2	6127	2	6074	2	7581	2	8261	2	8246	4	10519	4	8201	3	9703
Spec. Equip.	7	1734	7	1765	2	1731	2	1868	4	1113	6	3638	9	3681	9	3791	9	3849	10	3432

GENERAL

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL
Bus pax carried	19649	17359	19465	10400	30729	43592	40299	42697	25006	18730
Dispatches issued	2093	2335	2610	2588	2430	3866	3811	4374	4113	4781
Gasoline dist.	15045	13570	18390	27595	19550	31479	35328	49680	35650	32400
Diesel dist.	32416	32777	60495	52960	65261	103165	112900	126775	129581	125725
Drivers license issued	148	106	121	118	59	255	196	195	79	104
Accidents	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	2	1

TAB BB

MAINTENANCE

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB
6000 mi inspections	27	29	31	26	29
1000 mi inspections	66	66	80	84	79
Weekly inspections	307	411	522	288	271
Emergency repairs	61	46	69	85	137
Vehicles painted	33	27	31	35	40
Tires repaired	112	122	129	154	149

VEHICLES DEADLINED OVER 72 HOURS

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB
1/4 ton	1	3	1	6	6
1/2 ton	0	0	0	0	0
3/4 ton	7	5	2	7	2
1 1/2 ton	0	0	0	0	0
2 1/2 ton	6	2	7	2	1
DUKWS	0	0	0	0	1
Prime Movers	1	0	1	0	0
Fork Lifts	3	2	6	9	5
Bus	2	3	2	2	2
Crane	0	0	1	2	1
Skip	0	1	1	1	0
Auger	0	0	1	1	0
5 ton tractor	0	1	1	1	1

TAB BB

[redacted]

INBOUND
CARGO BREAKDOWN - IN MEASUREMENT TONS
FOR PERIOD 1 OCT 1955 TO 31 JULY 1956

TG 7.1	GENERAL	SECURITY	SPECIAL	REEFER	AMMO	POL	LABEL	VEHICLES	TOTALS
1955									
OCT	11.0		1852.0						1863.0
NOV	1.8								1.8
DEC	1595.8	.6			4.5		41.5		1642.4
1956									
JAN	187.9	28.0					18.3		234.2
FEB	1754.8	69.6			.5		4.0	2726.0	4554.9
MAR	1371.6	17.8	92.0		1.3		197.2	5071.2	6751.1
APR	324.3	19.0					6.2	776.0	1125.5
MAY	23.1	.4			.3		17.0		40.8
JUN	23.0						0.5		23.5
JUL	69.5						0.5		70.0
TOTAL	5362.8	135.4	1944.0		6.6		285.2	8573.2	16307.2

TG 7.2	GENERAL	SECURITY	SPECIAL	REEFER	AMMO	POL	LABEL	VEHICLES	TOTALS
1955									
OCT	533.3	15.4	49.8	141.7			7.0	593.0	1340.2
NOV	395.2			188.3					583.5
DEC	719.8	23.4	31.8	226.1	2.0		69.7		1072.8
1956									
JAN	455.8	62.1	11.8	144.0	.7	121.0	2.2	204.2	1001.8
FEB	916.8	41.2	44.0	327.2	14.6		7.7	97.8	1449.3
MAR	1066.8	78.5	69.4	94.3	2.2		36.3	3386.9	4734.4
APR	702.2	219.1	21.6	695.6			2.4	367.0	2007.9
MAY	809.0	81.6	10.0	112.6			4.7	107.1	1125.0
JUN	717.0	20.5		399.2			12.1		1148.8
JUL	997.5	20.3		715.8		172.0	9.6		1915.2
TOTAL	7313.4	562.1	238.4	3044.8	19.5	293.0	151.7	4756.0	16378.9

TG 7.3	GENERAL	SECURITY	SPECIAL	REFFER	AMMO	POL	LABEL	VEHICLES	TOTALS
1955									
OCT	10.7								10.7
NOV	.8						1.3		2.1
DEC	35.4						.9		36.3
1956									
JAN	2.1					150.0			152.1
FEB	299.3		585.6			1.8			886.7
MAR	115.8	.1	72.0	51.3			3.2		242.4
APR	8.3	1.8	.1	2.8					13.0
MAY	234.9	.2		238.7	5.4		0.2		479.4
JUN	28.8						37.9		66.7
JUL									
TOTAL	736.1	2.1	657.7	292.8	5.4	151.8	43.5		1889.4

TAB CC$_1$

[redacted]

[redacted]

TG 7.5	GENERAL	SECURITY	SPECIAL	REEFER	AMMO	POL	LABEL	VEHICLES	TOTALS
1955									
OCT	4632.5	22.0	1.2	184.1	4.0	1418.0	159.0	125.0	6545.8
NOV	4336.3	40.5		123.2	13.0	7.0	204.6	725.3	5449.9
DEC	5106.3	19.5		260.0	48.0		110.2	429.0	5973.0
1956									
JAN	6499.1	29.0	1.0	229.3		1247.4	184.5	135.0	8325.3
FEB	4936.1	46.4		288.6	.4	428.8	238.5	473.2	6412.0
MAR	5645.3	27.0	189.0	284.9	50.6	1475.0	214.5	934.1	8820.4
APR	1429.9	4.9	1998.7	422.5		2211.6	95.0		6162.6
MAY	1742.8	117.5		153.0		848.7	57.5		2919.5
JUN	912.8	9.7		65.4		730.8		265.7	1984.4
JUL	711.4	9.7		185.3		2439.2	551.3		3896.9
TOTAL	35952.5	326.2	2169.9	2196.3	116.0	10806.5	1815.1	3087.3	56489.8

GRAND	GENERAL	SECURITY	SPECIAL	REEFER	AMMO	POL	LABEL	VEHICLES	TOTAL
TOTALS	57249.4	1047.5	5499.9	5537.2	255.0	43157.7	3312.8	20246.8	136306.3

TAB CC$_1$

[redacted]

[redacted]

12APR56	AGAWAM	13APR56	1797.2	2152.9		
13APR56	GAMMON	16APR56	1176.0	3668.0	197.1	207.7
22APR56	NAMAKAGON	23APR56	1856.4	2188.6		
25APR56	AINSWORTH		42.7	245.5		

[redacted]

[redacted]

26MAY56	AGAWAM	27MAY56	1288.1	1999.1		
28MAY56	NAMAKAGON	29MAY56	1075.4	1317.2		
7JUN56	GAMMON	11JUN56	1081.0	2362.0	313.5	1535.6
9JUN56	NAMAKAGON	10JUN56	543.1	528.1		
10JUN56	SUSSEX	11JUN56	22.6	31.7		
11JUN56	MERAPI	14JUN56	550.7	926.7	5.0	11.6
16JUN56	NATCHAUG	16JUN56	1759.9	2200.0		
29JUN56	KISHWAUKEE	30JUN56	1799.5	2204.5		
7JUL56	KARIN	8JUL56	224.4	405.7	18.0	150.0
8JUL56	KISHWAUKEE	10JUL56	1843.9	2090.2		
12JUL56	AGAWAM	12JUL56	2914.7	1813.3		
16JUL56	NEMASKET	16JUL56	1762.9	1975.0		
20JUL56	GAMMON	23JUL56	1454.0	2426.1		
22JUL56	AGAWAM	23JUL56	1848.1	2033.2		
	CURMS	24JUL56			33.3	1397.2
	BADOENG STR.	25JUL56			114.3	5947.8
24JUL56	MANN	29JUL56			719.0	3847.6
26JUL56	MERAPI	27JUL56	499.5	887.5	14.7	53.0
		TOTALS	83229.3	147205.5	2085.9	15973.6

TAB CC2

[redacted]

[redacted]

OUTBOUND
CARGO BREAKDOWN - IN MEASUREMENT TONS
FOR PERIOD 1 OCT 1955 TO 31 JULY 1956

TG 7.1	GENERAL	LABEL	POL	VEHICLES	TOTAL
OCT 55	4.3				4.3
NOV 55	.3				.3
FEB 56	.1				.1
MAR 56	2.9				2.9
APR 56	3.0				3.0
MAY 56	29.3				29.3
JUN 56	198.9			769.2	968.1
JUL 56	559.6	32.3		1132.7	1724.6
TOTAL	798.4	32.3		1901.9	2732.6

TG 7.2	GENERAL	LABEL	POL	VEHICLES	TOTAL
OCT 55	106.5				106.5
NOV 55	70.2				70.2
DEC 55	1.4				1.4
JAN 56	27.8				27.8
FEB 56	86.5				86.5
MAR 56	1.2				1.2
APR 56	128.5	237.5			365.9
MAY 56	40.2		3.0		43.2
JUN 56	94.0	1.5			95.5
JUL 56	421.5				421.5
TOTAL	977.7	239.0	3.0		1219.7

TG 7.3	GENERAL	LABEL	POL	VEHICLES	TOTAL
OCT 55	.1				.1
NOV 55	11.1				11.1
FEB 56	9.2				9.2
MAR 56	764.2				764.2
APR 56	.1				.1
MAY 56	3.2				3.2
JUN 56	2.6				2.6
JUL 56	.9				.9
TOTAL	791.4				791.4

[redacted]

[redacted]

TG 7.4	GENERAL	LABEL	POL	VEHICLES	TOTAL
OCT 55	13.5				13.5
NOV 55	22.0				22.0
DEC 55	.9				.9
FEB 56	.1				.1
APR 56	69.8				69.8
MAY 56	60.0			17.1	77.1
JUN 56	153.2				153.2
JUL 56	706.4			7251.0	7957.4
TOTAL	1025.9			7268.1	8294.0

TG 7.5	GENERAL	LABEL	POL	VEHICLES	TOTAL
OCT 55	382.0				382.0
NOV 55	167.0				167.0
FEB 56	253.0				253.0
APR 56	203.3				203.3
MAY 56	257.2				257.2
JUN 56	317.7				317.7
JUL 56	1291.8				1291.8
TOTAL	2872.0				2872.0

GRAND TOTALS	GENERAL	LABEL	POL	VEHICLES	TOTAL
	6465.4	271.3	3.0	9170.0	15909.7

NOTE: DURING MONTHS NOT LISTED ABOVE INDIVIDUAL TASK GROUPS DID NOT SHIP OUTBOUND CARGO BY WATER

[redacted]

[redacted]

INTER-ISLAND SURFACE TONNAGES

1 OCT 55 TO 31 JUL 56

DATE	FROM FOGS LT	FROM FOGS MT	TO FOGS LT	TO FOGS MT	TOTALS LT	TOTALS MT
OCT 55	921.4	2524.5	278.7	1361.1	1200.1	3885.6
NOV 55	944.7	2540.4	270.8	1551.6	1215.5	4092.0
DEC 55	834.3	2384.3	288.7	1567.5	1123.0	3951.8
JAN 56	1575.1	5274.1	377.8	1258.2	1952.9	6532.3
FEB 56	3472.9	14728.3	193.2	1106.2	3666.1	15834.5
MAR 56	3351.2	16040.7	775.3	7978.9	4126.5	24019.6
APR 56	1878.2	7419.7	922.5	4230.2	2800.7	11649.9
MAY 56	133.8	420.8	290.7	1472.9	424.5	1893.7
JUN 56	594.9	3614.2	413.5	2631.3	1008.4	6245.5
JUL 56	231.5	949.8	422.8	2348.2	654.3	3298.0
TOTALS	13938.0	55896.8	4234.0	25506.1	18172.0	81402.9

TAB CC4

[redacted]

[redacted]

MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS



- - - - - - - - - INTERIM PERIOD

_____ OPERATIONAL PERIOD

[redacted]

TAB DD

OFFENSE AND INCIDENT RATE
(ENIWETOK Island)

INCIDENT	JAN 55	FEB 55	MAR 55	APR 55	MAY 55	JUN 55	JUL 55	AUG 55	SEP 55	OCT 55	NOV 55	DEC 55	JAN 56	FEB 56	MAR 56	APR 56	MAY 56	JUN 56	JUL 56
TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS	2	2	5	2	0	5	0	7	2	7	7	8	16	11	25	27	19	22	5
DRUNK AND DISORDERLY	0	1	2	0	2	1	0	0	6	1	1	7	14	12	25	14	13	31	16
VIOLATIONS OF GARRISON REG.	0	0	9	9	0	4	5	7	1	0	2	0	8	3	5	6	16	34	6
MISSCELLANEOUS	3	4	2	2	3	0	0	0	1	2	3	2	6	11	19	15	23	20	5
TOTALS	5	7	18	13	5	10	5	14	10	10	13	17	44	37	74	62	71	109	32

TAB EEE

PAY RECORDS MAINTAINED



1956

TAB FF

TRAVEL VOUCHERS RECEIVED AND PROCESSED



TRAVEL VOUCHERS RECEIVED

TRAVEL VOUCHERS PROCESSED

TAB GG

TRAVEL VOUCHER WORK LOAD



T.B HH

FISCAL WORK LOAD FACTORS



TAB I.I