-—60~ not need to fear retaliation. If it must fear retaliation, the fact that it destroys its opponent's cities some hours or even days before its ovm are destroyed may avail it little. It may indeed cormence the cvacuation of its own cities at the same moment it is hitting the enemyts cities (to do so carlicr would provoke a like move on the opponent's part) and thus present to retaliation cities which are empty. But the success even of such a move would depend on the time interval between hitting and being hit. It certainly would not save the enormous physical plant which is contained in the cities and which over any length of time is indispensable to the life of the nationalcormunity. o Thus the oe element of surprise may be less important than is genérallyassuned.55 If the aggressor state mst fear retaliation, stwavon that even if it is the victor it will suffer a degree of physical destruction incomparably greater than that suffered by any defeated nation of history, incomparably greater, that is, than that suffered by Germany in the recent war. Under those circunstances no victory, even if guaranteed in advance=-which it never is-- would be worth the price. The threat of retaliation does not have to be 100 per cent certain; it is sufficient if there is a good chance of it, has to be evident. But that chance The prediction is more important than the fact. The argument that the, victim of an attack might not know where the bombs are coming from is almost too preposterous to be worth answering, but it has been made so often by otherwise responsible persons that it cannot be wholly ignored. That the geographical location of the launching sites of lonz-range rockets may remain for a time unlmovm is conceivable, though wilikely, but that the identity’ of the attacker should remain unknown is not in modern times conccivable. The 556 A superior army which advances by surprise on a critical objective obliges the opponent to grapplo with it at a place and time of its omm choosing. A bombing attack has no such confining effect on the initiative of the enemy so long as his means of retaliation remain relatively intact. Bombs of any kind are generally not used against cach other, and the advantages which follow from surprise in their use are usually of a tactical rather than strategic nature.