\ -162expe cted to be immediate and certain would not be an effective deterrent against aggression committed with atomic weapons. There would not be time for the Security Council to act after receiving word of an illegal use of the bomb, nor would its present organization and voting procedure permit it to act in the unhappy event that one of the great states were to use the bomb. It would thus be necessary, in order to insure retaliatory action, to make provision separate from the regular procedures for enforcement action and in advance of the aggression. Advance pro- vision for automatic retaliation by all other nations possessing the bomb against any one which had illegally used it would be a powerful deterrent to a would-be atomic aggressor. | ie Q Separate advance provision for automatic‘ebtigatory retaliation by-passes the great power veto, Would such a provision be acceptable to the great powers? Here reference should be made to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This article specifically reaffirms "ihe inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurst, 108 Legitimate collective self-defense against atomic attack surely includes the right to negotiate bilateral or multilateral treaties in which the possessors of the bomb undertake the obligation of automatic retaliation. There might even be a single general pact specifying this obligation, 109 - If a general obligation of instant and automatic retaliation were the sole safeguard evolved .by the international community against the new weapon, unlimited production of atomic bombs would be permitted. It might be argued that 108. See Chapter III, supra. 107. This is the suggestion of E. L. Woodward, Montagu Burton Professor of International Relations at Oxford, in Some Political Consequences of the Atomic Homb, L,ndon, Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 25, except that Professor Wood- ward would provide for obligatory retaliation unless the bomb had first been used with the unanimous consent of the Council. It would probably be preferable and certainly more practical if the Council's authorization were given in accordance with its usual voting procedure, as laid down in the so-called Yalta voting formula, which does not require the unanimous consent of the non-permanent members of the Council.