\ ~-137- \ arnanents. Statements which we have every reason to regard as approved by the Soviet government sharply oppose any such amendment of the San Francisco Charter, and present indications do not encourage the view that the United States Con- gress would take any more kindly to the idea than does Moscor, Even if so great an addition to the legal authority of the Security Council were politically possible, it would not automatically deliver the world from the terrifying risk of atomic war. The greatest states would still exercise a dom ‘inating influence in the Organization, and even though,the necessary majority were ans , obtained there would ures against onc of them. of war, , still he be grave "% fe reluctanée to Jainch To do so would still eS enforcement moas- ully Like the beginning It would still be possible for a determined aggressor to play off one interest against another and delay action until it believed itsclf in a position to defy the world. Such risks may be mitigated to some extent by organization, but only organized power based on willing consont and a deep sense of commmity can reduce them substantially. It is casy to design machinery; but the more essential condition of peace in an atom-splitting age, as beforc, is underlying acceptance of common values, Until such acceptance is achieved, the machincry, though far from useless, will be frail. Its justification is that it may help to preserve conditions in which the agrcement on common values can grow, thus providing the foundations indispensable to reliable organization. within the United Nations Organization, The legal situation,/then, is that no state is obliged to join in any action against any of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The veto means that action against one of thcse is not within the legal powers of the Organization, There is little likelihood that this situation will change ‘in the near future. As a control agency over atomic weapons, the Organization thus has the obvious wealness of providing no sanction enforceable egainst those very stctes which are most capable of accumulating tiis type of armancnt. The Organization can provide means of ascertaining danger and identifying a treatybreaker, At its very first session the Sccurity Council heard disputes in which