-136well take a long time,

Practical considerations may dictate an intervening

stage of limitation rather than elimination, with the obligation not to use the
weapons except with the approval of the United Nations,

In this stage, as in

the final and ideal one, that part of the plan of control which has to do with
the production, possession and use of atomic weapons will necessarily come under
the direction of the Security Council.

Since that body is not in perpetual

Session, though "so organized as. to be aple to function continuously, 2? it will
have to entrust the routine of control, including inspection, either to such an
existing subordinate agency as the Military Starf Committee or to a specially
created subordinate body,

Clearly the continuous function of inspection cannot
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be subject to veto; and one advantage oftreating it as a technical, écministrative matter handled by a body other than, -thoydh responsible to, the Security
Council is that, if this is done, no guestion of changing voting rulcs estab-

lished with great difficulty need arise.
On the other hand, any question of enforcement against a nation found to be
violating the control regulations will have to be dealt with by the Security
Council.

Unless the veto of permanent members is abolished, no enforcenent can

operate against them or against their client states,

In a world that has learned

how to make and use atomic weapons, as before, the security of all will depend

or. the good faith of the great powers or on such strength as each nation can
muster from its own or allied resources.

The United Nations Organization falls

shorts of world governnent by a margin which includes the United States, the |
Soviet Union, Britain, China and France.
galiy speaking, eliminate this margin,

The abolition of the veto would, leWhether it would make any practical

difference is another and a highly debatabic question.
There seems to be little prospect that the great-power veto will be given
up in any near future, even for the limited purpose of controlling atomic

Oe.

San Francisco Charter, Article 28, 1.

Select target paragraph3