By May 1978, a high percentage of the Marshallese body levels were above the maximum permissible dose and the Bikinians were evacuated again. Conard and representatives of other U.S. government agencies, in apologizing for the complications (eft) People walking o8 the concrete dome coveriag as atomic bomb crater on Roaii Island, Ensewetak aioll. (below) Nociear clean ap of Renit Isinad. (eft) U.S. Army personae in fall protective gear, (right) Army persoanei mixing platoniam-cogtaminated soil with cement to form the massive coacrete dome. Robert Conard of Brookhaven National Laboratory—which has coordinated the Marshall Islands medical program since 1954— estimated the health msks of the exposure: ** Assuming that they [143 people] had all been there since 1970 and re- ceived the average estimated inte- grated total dose of 2.6 rems for the penod, based on known radiation- induced msk data, one would expect only about 0.005 total cases of leukemia to develop in that population as a result of their radiation ex- posure. The need for further medical which occurred, frequently say that radiation measurement techniques then were not as sophisticated as those available today; that the surveys of Bikini were far less extensive than those subsequently carned out at Enewetakatoll.'® The facts. however, suggest otherwise. In 1972-1973, the United States conducted an “exhaustive radiologi- cal survey of Enewetak.’* which included both ground and aenal sur- veys of the islands. according to the Department of Energy. It was not done at Bikini. however. In fact, it wasn't until the Bikiniansfiled a fed- eral law suit in 1975, asking for a thorough radiological survey of Bi- kini and the northern Marshall Islands, that the government agreed to do it. But because of three years of bureaucratic infighting among the Departments of Energy, State and Interior, the radiological survey was not conducted until afrer the evacu- “ation of Bikini in late 1978. examinations is not indicated based The United States did have sophisticated techniques for sociated with such low doses.’*'* the Bikini resettlement; it chose to on possible radiation effects as- But Dr. Konrad Kotrady, a former Brookhaven resident physician in the Marshalls, strongly disagreed with this philosophy: **The people fail to understand how scientists can say they do not knowall the possible late effects the radiation can cause. . . and then tell the people a medical program is un- necessary. If in 40 or 50 years medical prob- lems do occur as a result of the exposure, it would be better if a well designed medical program was already in progress to detect the problems.’’'’ December !980 measuring radiation at the outset of employ them only at Enewetak. U.S. policies with respect to pro- tecting the health of the Marshallese have been totally inconsistent. For example, in 1946, pnor to the first nuclear test senes, Operation Cross- roads. the people from islands within a radius of 300 miles of Bikini— including the Rongelap—were evacuated as a safety precaution.'’ The yield of these bombs was approximately 20 kilotons. But in 1954, there was no official warning of the Bravo test, much less an evacuation of the populations. Yet Bravo was the largest U.S. hydrogen bomb tested—more than 15 megatons. More than 200 Marshailese on The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 27