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moniters on the recovery missions. During the fall of 1983, selected individuals fros each project group ettended a short rad-

safe course oaducted by TG 7.1 at the HPG, designed te qualify

the individvald as monitors.

Inaddition to the individual pro-

ject monitors, £0 7.1 had available in the forward area a limited

mmber of full-time monitors.

Within TU-15 headquarters, one

officer was designated to monitor and coordinate all rad-saze
matters, md reascnably accurate dosage records on all personnel
were maintained, The high levels of contamination which resuited
fron several of the shots, together with the necessity for fre-

quent entry inte contaninated areas tc service equimment during

the long Geley periods between shots, posed a serious problem te
somtrol of muximm peraiesible exposwresa for preject pareonnel,

Riferte were made to rotate personnel whenever possitie, however,
2t waa necessary to request waiver of the Maximus Fersenne) Expo~
sure (NPE) in the case of several project personnei. in general,
the system of placing monitoring responsibilities on the indivi«
dual project groups worked very eatisfectorily,

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(8) Roll-up Achivition, Roll-up activities

began as soon as Shot 5 was fired at Bikini. Participation in
Bhot € at Rnivetek was rather limited end ali instrumntetion
had been ready approximately three weeks pricr to the actual shot
Gate. It was, thorefore, possible to utilise the time between
Shot § and Shot 6 fer report writing and relleup preparations,
To expedite submission ef preliminary reperts, many projects were
directed te inslude only the data fromthe first five shots in
their preliminary reports, After Shot 6 was fired, approxinately
one week was required to complete werk in the forward area for all
but a few projects. Headquarters of TU-18 departed on 19 May,
lenying one eaaeee to assist in final roli~up which was completed
R,

TEAPOF Activities
a,

Development of High Altitude Device

(1)

On 7 May 1956, the Chief, AFStP, authorised

the Ci, Field Command, to take such action as was necessnry to in~-

plement the deaign and procurement ef a test device te mest the ree
quirements for the high altitude ehot of Operation TEAPOE. The CG,
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