program, the ultimate cost of which would be in the neighborhood of £49,000,090. Hence, the request was disapproved. In the House and Senate Interior committees to which the rehabilitation and resettlement phases were referred in a legislative package separate from the cleanup, sympathetic and favcrable action was zaken and $12,000,000 was authorized. Notably absent from the presentations made to the Congress and from the inquiries of the Congressmen themselves was realization of the enormous benefit which (in the view of the United States) has been derived from the use of Enewetak Atoll for nuclear testing and related national security activities. In the Armed Services hearings, the total projected cost of this program was divided by the number of Enewetak people and the suggestion made that perhaps the money should simply be given to the people. We do not have accurate figures for the total cost of the atomic energy program, the nuclear weapons testing program, nor for the amount of money actually spent for programs at Enewetak. But judging by figures we have seen (for example, Congress And The Nation, Vol. I, p. 262, Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965) indicate that the cost was on the order of several billions of dollars in the AEC budget, and that says nothing about the undoubtedly large sums contained in one or more places in the Defense budget. We will suggest a figure of, say, $50 billion for the sake of discussion. That represents the agreed minimum value to the benefit to the United States of the same activities, the effects of which must now be remedied. =-19- Beyond the dollar