=
Qperation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53
be much more difficult. Useful information by this means could be obtained
at considerable distances from the Atoll.
(B)
To observe and photograph the installations and detonations.
The limitations of submarine periscope observation and photography are such
that a submarine would have to approach within three (3) miles, and preferably
one (1) mile, to obtain useful information of shot sites.
Even then, it is
highly doubtful if any detailed information could be obtained, but only
information indicating the general progress of work, including instrumentation.
Radar observation or radar photographs could supplement the information
obteined by other means.
Useful visual, radar or photographic information
of the detonations could, of course, be obtained from much greater distances.
(C)
Direct attack by gunfire could harass the operation but
would probably result in little damage tc installations or injury to personnel.
On the other hand, such attacks would result in the detection and probable
eventual cestruction of the submarine. While no information is available
indicating that the USSR have modified submarines for guided missile launching, there is no reason to believe that they could not do so if they so
desired, in view of the relatively simple modifications required and the
widely publicized U.S. accomplishments in this field. A properly directed,
submarine-leunched guided missile, fitted with an atomic warhead, could
inflict great damage to installations and injury to personnel and thus
seriously interfere with the Operation. USSR submarines also have the capability of attacking ships of the Joint Task Force with torpedoes. The presence
of an escort could indicate that the ship or ships escorted are considered
valuable.
It is considered that direct attack probably would precede or
accompany the opening of hostilities by the USSR, although the USSR might
possibly take the risk of attempting to launch an undetected submarinelaunchcd guided missile in the hope that the resulting atomic cxplosion
might be considered (by the U.S.) as the accidental or premature explosion
of one of the test devices or a component thereof.
(D)
Raids and Sabotage.
ss discussed above.
(=)
Lagoon penetration could be attempted by a submarine
assigned any of the foregoing missions. However, lagoon penetration is not
necessary for the accomplishment of any of them and involves definite
acditional risks of detection and destruction.
.
DONA
(2)
Other USSR Naval Capabilities.
USSR surface ships also have
capabilitics for unauthorized instrumentation, cbservation, photography,
|
landing of raiders and saboteurs and direct attack, but except as noted below,
it is most unlikcly their employment would be attempted, short of actual
SS
Das
os
+t
,2e