JAAYO FALLOUT EXPOSURES
BRAVO was without question the worst single incident of fa
-ores in all the U.S atmospheric testing program.
“scntours after 96 hours are shown in Figure 69.
7 AY
~~ ete
The accumul
Not only were
y personnel involved, but also foreign nationals and Marsha
The cumulative nature of the Consolidated List of CASTLE R
Exposures
out expoed dose
«S. miliIslanders. =
iological
(Reference 13) makes it impossible to assign portions of the
érsonnel exposure to BRAVO, as opposed to the CASTLE series as a whole.
"nae microfilm file of cards (Reference 87) on which it is presu nably based
snows, in some cases, event-by-event exposures, and estimates “re made
ror portions of the task force at the time.
Other estimates ha re been or
can be made for other personnel involved.
“ask Group 7.3 Exposures
In summing up BRAVO operations, the Navy prepared a tabulat on of the
exposures of the appropriate fleet units
(Table 23), and the co tribution
<O the BRAVO collective exposure by TG 7.3 forces can be derive
from this.
This tabulation was through 22 March and contains exposures rec ived in the
potentially hazardous decontamination activities and the survey visits by
the crews of the Renshaw and the Philip to the contaminated isl
nds of
Rongelap Atoll.
ENEWETAK-BASED PERSONNEL.
Badges were exposed on Enewetak
t fixed
locations and some of these, at least, are included in the micr
ilm file
of 5x8 cards (Reference 87)
Two of
from which Reference 13 is derived.
these badges, marked 103-and 106, were placed in the 8600th AAU
rea and
the "Laundry Area;" they read 0.075 R and 0.110 R, respectively [(Index 1020
control film 4904-10).
The cumulative exposure record of units
ence became unnecessary after BRAVO,
(that is, TU 2 and 3 of TG
hose pres-l;
(see
Chapter 3) and probably left the PPG before the completion of t
series,
is consistent with the two badges above.
person-
A credible exposure f
nel on Enewetak for the BRAVO period is 0.1 R.
235