other personnel” (Reference 11, p. lla-11).
Shot BRAVO "contaminat
of the ships to the point that it would have been most desirable to f
film badges to all personnel on them... [because] .
no film badges received signficant radiation"
lla-12).
. . many people with
(Reference 11, pp. llafll and
Sufficient badges were not available, however, and furtherfhore
TU 7 lacked the personnel to process a larger number of badges.
Evel
so,
the TU 7 technicians attempted to estimate the doses of those withou
badges “based on film badges of similarly exposed personnel, but it
impossible to do this accurately in many cases."
After BRAVO, more
dges
became available, with assignment priorities given to "people expecte#i
to
receive significant radiation and people who had already received a rblatively large amount of radiation"
(Reference 11, p. lla-12).
Additionally, after BRAVO, a notice from CINCPAC directed all shi
entering a circular area within 450 nmi
(833 km) of a point near Biki
have 5 percent of their crews wear film badges or dosimeters until ou
the area.
Processing was to be performed when specifically directed
CINCPAC (Reference 16, Tab C).
There is no indication that it was necesr
Sary to process the badges.
Two methods of film badging were used in normally noncontaminated
areas, i.e., areas not under control of the TG 7.1 Radiation Control
Group.
The first was area badging.
This system involved “spotting” a
island or vessel with film badges in key places to provide coverage of
living and working areas.
Efforts were coordinated with the Radsafe
Officer to ensure coverage of areas assigned to each task group.
The second method was personnel badging.
Film badges to be worn
throughout presumed fallout periods were issued to certain individuals,
for example, detachment radsafe commissioned and noncommissioned officers.
The readings of the personnel and area badges for each detachment}
were averaged to make a blanket assessment of total radiation dose to edch
ae nene
member of the detachment.
102