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of Mutual Deterrence and Deterioration in the Western Position".
Genera] Cutler said it was the latter development which he personally found to be the most disturbing in the entire estimate. The
estimate's conclusions under this heading made many of the Planning
Board wonder what new long-range change, if any, we could find as a
- means of dealing with the situation. Should the United States,
asked General Cutler, in the face of the estimate's conclusions on
mutual deterrence and the deterioration of the Western position,
continue our existing national strategy? Or should the United States
proceed to exert greater pressures on the Soviet Union? Or, finally,
should we seek an accommodation with the Soviets by offering them
concessions? General Cutler said he thought it would be valuable
4f the Secretary of State would comment on the first tvo points--
to-wit, "Soviet Strength and Intentions" and "The State of Mutual
Déterrence and Deterioration in the Western Position". The other
points in the written statement had been sufficiently covered by
Mr. Allen Dulles, in particular the serious problem created by the
capability of the USSR to direct its economic strength in support
of any internal-external policy which it believed would help it
achieve world leadership.
In response to General Cutler's invitation, Secretary
Dulles said that he did have one or two observations to make on
this estimate. In the first place, the estimate paid far too much
attention to our U. S. problems than it did to the problems which
confronted the Soviet Union. Doubtless if the Soviets had written
a similar estimate, they would have emphasized their own problems
more than the problems which faced the United States.
Secondly, said Secretary Dulles, there was another fact
which must be constantly borne in mind. It was true thet the USSR
had now achieved greater influence in the world than it possessed
eight or ten years ago. This is primarily due to the fact that the
behavior of the Soviet Union was better now than it had been then.
In its attempts to control the destinies of other countries, it is
much more sophisticated and subtle. The Soviet Union no longer
dares try to reduce other countries to its control by direct and
forceful action, but feels obliged to use more subtle approaches.
Not only can we not prevent this improvement in the behavior of
the Soviet Union, it was a question whether we wanted to prevent
this improvement. Doubtless the ultimate intentions of the Soviets
were still bad, but their behavior, at least, was better, and ultimately the Soviets may become more civilized.
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There was yet another serious problem, said Secretary
Dulles, which had not been stressed in this intelligence estimate
but which he had been aware of and most recently in his trip to
the Far East. In scanning English-language publications in Far
Eastern cities, the basic fact had struck him that nothing in the
way of news comes out of the USSR except what the Soviets want to
ew RR
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