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Governor Stassen suggested that it might be desirable for
the Administration to issue a laconic, factual account of the entire
missile devélopment in the United States. This might be published
some time between now and next January.
This would help to correct
the unfortunate impression provided by photographs of missile failures, which photographs had distorted the truth of our real progress
in this field. Within the limits of security, we should do our best
to counteract this distortion.
Mr. Cutler pointed out that the OCB was concerning itself
with publicity on the missiles program, and was even now preparing
@ proposal for the President's consideration.
The National Security Council:
a.
Noted and discussed a report by the Department of De-
fense on (1) the readjustment of ballistic and aero-
dynamic missile programs since the July 3, 1957, presentation to the Council on the subject (NSC Action
No. 1743); and (2) the study of combining the THOR
and JUPITER development programs into a single mis-
sile program, as called for by NSC Action No. 1765.
b.
Noted the President's approval of the recommendation
by the Secretary of Defense, contained in a-(1) above,
that, because the various factors to be considered do
not in total clearly favor the selection of one program at this time, both the THOR and JUFITER programs
be continued until successful flight tests are achieved
by either missile, in order that greater assurance of
the early availability of an operable missile system
may be achieved.
Noted the President's instructions to the Department of
Defense that, in approving the recommendation in b above:
(1)
He would expect the Department of Defense to keep
(2)
The overriding objective of the IRBM program, in
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c-
.
under constant study the most effective organizational structure for the ICBM and IRBM programs,
including the possibility of concentrating such
programs outside of the military services in one
organization similar to the wartime Manhattan District; and, if deemed desireble as a result of
such constant study, to make recommendations
thereon to him.
view of the political and psychological impact re-
ferred to in NSC Action No. 148h-c, continues to
be the successful achievement of an IREM with ap~
proximately 1500 miles range and reasonable
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