Planning and Programming
75
were Mr. TommyF. McCraw (AEC Operational Safety), Drs.
Task Greoup
Division of
W. Nervi x and D, Wilson (LLL), and Mr. W. Schroebel (AEC/
by
assisted
was
Group
The
Research).
Environmental
and
wedical
-
Bom consultants. All members and consultants worked either directly for
sever EC or for an AEC laboratory, and most had been associated with
t cEC efforts at Bikini Atoll. Liaison representatives of DNA, EPA, and
50 attended the Task Group meetings.
The AEC Task Group’s findings were compiled in a “‘Report by the
AEC Task Group on Recommendations for Cleanup and Rehabilitation of
Enewetak Atoll,” which was circulated in draft form for comment in
February 1974 and, after revisions, again in April 1974. There was lively
debate, even among the AECstaff, over aspects of the report. Typical
points at issue were: the appropriate contamination threshold for removal
of soil from Runit and Boken; the scientific or technical basis for making a
judgment that plutonium levels in the soil on Runit and Boken were high
enough to justify removal of large amounts ofsoil; and the limited (3
weeks versus an annual program) air sampling data which indicated that
airborne plutonium levels at Runit were quite low, comparable to some
ievels in the United States.56
Dr. William Ogle, an eminentscientist long associated with the nuclear
test program, was consulted by DNA on the Task Group Report. He
questioned the recommendation thatthe dri-Enewetak be keptoff Enjebi
until subsequent AEC measurements and analysis indicated that they
could return to that island. His concern was based on the belief that the
U.S. would not be in control indefinitely. He recommended that cleanup
actions be taken which would allow the dri-Enewetak free use of theatoll
in the future. Regarding Runit, he felt there was every reason to suspect
that the problem was caused by small particles of plutonium. He
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questioned the need for the dri-Enewetakto stay off Runit.*’ He realized
that the AEC recommendations assumed there was a genuine hazard, but
he felt that the information available did not fully support that assumption.
He felt that Runit should be cleaned as well as possible and turned over to
the people.>8
DNAbelieved that the recommendedcleanup standards (in terms of
residual radiation) were too low (thatis, too conservative), that cleanup to
these levels was not necessary, and that the funds likely to be made
available for cleanup would not permit reducing residual radiation to these
levels.
In commenting on the April 1974 draft, one AEC office expressed the
belief that the plutonium cleanup could be generally characterized as
“reduction of plutonium contamination accessibility’’ and recommended
that no numerical guides be published for residual plutonium levels in soil
except those essential for guidance of a group of experts in the field to
Eo