532
RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATOLL]
boxes to provide them with shade and protection from the wind (Figure
10-35).40 Coconuts and pandanus were transplanted in the open in areas
prepared byrototilling copra pellets into the soil (Figure 10-36).4!
Transplanting of coconut and pandanusseedlings on the four southerp
islands began in early June 197942 and continued into late March 1980.43
The planting program encountered the commonagricultural problems of
heat, drought, and insects. In August 1979, heavy infestations of army
wormsappeared in the plantations on Japtan and Ananij. An entomologist
summoned from Kwajalein Atoll recommended continued use of
NORTHERN ISLAND PLANTING RECOMMENDATION: 1978
The discovery in early 1978 that the Bikinians were experiencing
unexpectedly high intakes of strontium and cesium from eating locally
grown coconuts and other foods was disturbing to the agencies involved in
the Enewetak Rehabilitation Program. The levels were attributable to the
Bikinians drinking and eating more coconut than predicted in the diet on
which the Bikini Atoll cleanup and resettlement was based. The Enewetak
cleanup and rehabilitation plans were based on the same diet assumptions
mm Pee
malathion spray which provedeffective in protecting the plants. *4
and on planting coconuts on six northern islands where fission products
also were found in measurable concentrations. The Bikini experience cast
a shadow of doubton the Enewetak diet model, predicted exposurelevels,
and island use plans.
,
The matter was discussed during the 4 May 1978 conference at DN
Headquarters and was examined in a study by Field Command.4> The
AEC Task Group Report in 1974 had indicated that coconuts could be
grown on the six northern islands, assuming that any plutonium
concentrations over 400 pico curies per gram (pCi/g) would have been
removed.*6 Based on this radiological assessment, the Enewetak Master
Plan and the EIS prescribed that these islands would be cleaned and
rehabilitated for agricultural use. Cleanup offission products on anyisland
was excluded in the EIS, as this would require excessive soil removal.
After the Bikini experience, it appeared that the Department of Energy
(DOE) might not recommendplanting the six islands until fission product
levels had been reduced by natural decay or as a by-productof transuranic
cleanup. This development created problems for H&N, whose fixed-price
delays
would
be
costly,
expecially
if they
required
islands.47
pr
requested, on 4 August 1978, DOE’s recommendations on planting these
we
remobilization of a logistics base. To resolve this question, H&N formally
Saw ale
substantial
Tr
contract with AIC-Pacific included planting the six northern islands. Any
_