128
RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATOLL
and minimize the volume of soil excised. Possible disadvantages were the
limited soil depth which the system would survey andthe possibility that
this new approach might not be acceptable to EPA and other concerned
agencies. A prototype in situ detector was undergoing tests at the site of
the Hamilton event on the Nevada Test Site, and it was anticipated that
ERDA would approve the system for use at Enewetak.3?!
.
The Radiological Cieanup Plan was revised again on 16 July 1976, but it
left some basic questions relative to radiological cleanup criteria still
unanswered. Field Command asked for HQ DNA assistance in obtaining
definitive answers from ERDA assoon as possible.392.303 Detailed criteria
and guidance were required to complete a Radiological Cleanup Appendix
to the CONPLAN34 and to develop estimates of work requirements upon
which to base resource needs. The situation was complicated by two
factors: (1) ERDA Headquarters in Washington had not formally assigned
ERDA-NV the responsibility for furnishing radiological support, and (2)
MILCONfunds were limited.
The DNA-ERDA agreement stipulated that ERDA would provide
technical and scientific advice and assistance on radiological activities
associated with cleanup, including, but not limited to:
a, Advice and assistance on the preparation of the radiological cleanup
plan and the radiological safety program.
b. Interface with other Federal agencies concerning radiological matters.
c. Provision of on-atoll ERDA representation.
d. Performance of radiological support, to include: (1) Day-to-day field
~j.
monitoring, dosimetry, and record keeping for health andsafety. (2)
Radiological classification of material for removal, disposal, or reuse.
(3) Certification, on an island-by-island basis. (4) Establishment,
operation, and maintenanceof a field laboratory.
Item d of these ERDA commitments was contingent on reimbursement
from DNA. In view of the $20 million ceiling which had been set by
Congress and its charge to use all available economy measures, DNA 5
reimbursement to ERDA would of necessity be limited to the $1.5 million
which had been estimated earlier. A compromise was reached whereby the
military services would provide for radiological safety and the classification
of debris and ERDA would only provide for classification of soil and
management of the radiological laboratory.
Field Command and ERDA-NV representatives conferred on 28-29
tore
an-]
military personnel. To reduce project costs further, it was agreed that
military technicians would assist in the ERDA contractor laboratory, in
driving the in situ vans, and in maintaining and repairing radiation
detectors and other equipment. ERDA-NV representatives advised that
their radiological support would not be available in April 1977, as was
Planning and Programming
129
required to meet the then-planned | March 1977 D-Day. They estimated
it
would require 6 to 9 months; i.e., until | October 1977, before the
radiological laboratory would be operational.35
The major technical problem in completing the radiological cleanup plan
concerned criteria for evaluating debris and soil against radiological
cleanup requirements. Without adequate crileria, the type of equipment
needed for field and laboratory measurements was uncertain, necessary
survey procedures could not be developed, and there was no measure for
determining and certifying the quality of cleanup. The need for precise
criteria for the cleanup project was made even morecritical by the planned
periodic rotation of personne! throughout the life of the project.
The AEC Task Group had made recommendations on cleanup of
both
debris and soil, but these recommendations were too general and open
to
foo many interpretations to serve as criteria for those in the field.
With
respect to debris, the AEC Task Group had recommended that ‘all
radioactive
scrap
metal and
contaminated debris.
Should
be
removed."°3%6 This recommendation was modified in the EIS Case 3
cleanup actions to the requirement that ‘‘radioactive scrap be removed
from all islands in the atoll.”’ Although this guidance might seem clear-cut
at first glance, that was not the case. No material is totally devoid of
radioactivity; and clearly not every level of radioactivity is sufficient to
warrant disposal of the material containing it.
The ERDA radiological advisors to DNA on the Enewetak Cleanup
were reluctant to recommend criteria for use in deciding which debris was
radioactive and deserving of disposal and which was not. ERDA had
criteria in existence governing the release of matcrials for uncontrolled use
following use in contaminated areas, but these criteria were not Suitable
for the Enewetak debris situation. One reason was that much of the
Enewetak debris was situated in areas with considerable backgro
und
radiation, so that definitive measurements could not be made unless the
debris were relocated to a low background area. Such a practice would have
led to costly, unnecessary debris movement merely to make
measurements. Numerous attempts were madeto define ‘“‘background”’
and situations when debris might qualify for disposal, but none were
acceptable. A second reason why ERDA criteria were not suitable was that
they only addressed surface contamination. Normally, activate
d
contamination suchas that found in much of the Enewetak debris was not
oncoem re rrureranons.Panning mecing on debris
criteria, Mr. Tommy F. McCraw, of ERDA Headquarters, pointed out that
ERDA’s reluctance to provide advice stemmed in part from the fact that
they had not been successful in negotiating a contamination threshold
level with EPA. He also felt that, if criteria were more Stringent than had
been used at Bikini, the Bikinians would not understand. (Likewise, the