EWETAK ALOLL
RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF EN
98
facility, one constructed contrary to
inherit yet another temporary storage
no changein
erence ended with
ERDA’s advice.!55 The 24 February conf
helped set the stage for a topit
but
ions on disposal,
the Agencies’ posit
level policy conference.
ENT:
FINALIZING THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEM
APRIL 1975
ment on the DEIS, which was
The normal! period for review and com
on 11 November 1974.15 However,
filed on 7 September 1974, end ed
Enewetak, was allowed almost2
MLSC, the legal counsel for the dri-
of consideration for the pravity ° nel
monthsto prepare comments out
Mi nS
d on the document. Mr.
commitments that would be made base
>.
uary
Febr
on!
ts
men
d the com
Executive Director of MLSC, submitte
ul
n
take
had
le
peop
the
tion
posi
These comments confirmed the basic
they nor the MLSC hae wavere
her
neit
h
whic
from
and
1973
in
Majuro
ed total cleanup of the atoll, SPOS \
throughout the project. They demand
rial away from the ato , a
of the radiological contaminated mate
05
e, to its original state."
restoration of the atoll, insofar as practicabl
on
ials
offic
action agency
LTG Johnson called a conference of
e policy decisions
ition and to mak
February 1975 to discuss the MLSC pos
of the project. Confereesveu e7
se
cour
re
futu
the
necessary to establish
Dr.
* ,
Ernest A. Graves,
Dr. W. A. Mills, of EPA; Major General
Mr. Joe Deal, and Mr. gommy
William Forster, Mr. Joseph Maher,
ha en,
of DOI; Captain E. D.
McCraw, of ERDA; Mr. Harry Brown,
senior
and
,
MSN
of
h, USA,
USN, of ASD(ISA); Colonel A. M. Smit
—
ials, 158
tion. me
situa
the
of
sis
with his analy
Oonaohason opened the meeting
to be
ares
appe
1974
r
embe
S of Sept
plans for cleanup described in the DEI
e
som
se
impo
they
ough
alth
and,
technically and economically feasible,
ts
esen
repr
ns
ictio
restr
e
thes
,
etak
unwanted restrictions on the dri-Enew
goal of maximum Teening the
the
een
betw
se
romi
comp
le
onab
a reas
well-being. The AEC guide inest i
need to guard the people’s health and
excess! ely
e who felt they were
been adopted, although there were som
oactive material was prefer
radi
of
restrictive. Although ocean dumping
at
le or,r
ssiboe
Me
legally impo
g t be legal
is migh
i ed that this
i had to be recogniz
by some, it
,
entomb
ment was adopted
e. Based on these
a s a reasonable alternativ
d to be a reasonable consensus among
compromises, there had appeare
published. !5°
those involved at the time the DEIS was
ared that the consensus was
appe
It
Now, according to the Director,
within ERDA, and
consensus eV en
disappearing. It seemed there was no
Add TGA CEI ab PURE ig
ay
he had lost confidence that the original AEC guidelines could be cited as
authoritative. They had been challenged by some at AEC-NV. Ocean
dumping continued to be proposed by some in AEC. There were demands
that the craters be lined with thick walls of concrete and steel liners. With
the apparent lack of consensus within the Government, the engineering
and fiscal feasibility were becoming more and more doubtful. !69
The new proposals were both time-consuming and expensive. With
inflation at 10 percent per year, the additional time and effort required to
authorize and accomplish ocean dumping could cost an additionat Sil
million. The Director estimated that, if the complete cleanup demanded by
MLSC were adopted, the project would cost between $200 and $300
million. The Congress had opposed a $40 million price for the project.
LTG Johnson was beginning to believe that he might be compelled to
recommend to the DOD that the project was economically and technically
infeasible. He felt very strongly, however, that the Government had a
moral obligation to do everything within reason to accomplish the cleanup.
Therefore, he proposed to reject the more stringent and expensive
proposals and to publish the final EIS essentially as it appeared in the draft.
If opposition to that proposal were sufficiently strong. then he must find
some acceptable lesser alternative, such as returning the dri-Enewetak to
the southern islands only, or conclude that the project was infeasible. !6!
LTG Johnson received the support he sought. MG Graves advised that
he saw no problem with crater disposal. ERDA hadfelt all along that, if it
were not for the law, deep-ocean dumping would be preferable. However,
they believed crater entombment was acceptable provided it was done
carefully. MG Graves mentioned the possibility of the crater leaking and
added that the effectiveness of crater containment could be a problem. All
those present seemed to realize that radioactive material was leaking out of
the crater even then and would continue to do so.!62 However, the
discussion raised the question, “If this crater containment breaks up in
time, who is responsible to right this wrong?’’ LTG Johnson quickly
answered that it was not DNA’s responsibility after the cleanup was
finished; it would be the responsibility of the United States. It was
assumed that by the United States he meant ERDA.!63
LTG Johnson askedif there wasstil! aconsensus on the AEC standards.
His question was evoked by remarks attributed to an ERDA-NYV official
that the standards adopted by the AEC Task Group might not stand up.
MG Gravesassured him that there wasstill a consensus at ERDA and that
ERDA on
,
Dr.W. A. Mills, EPA, stated that entombment was the way to go in
disposing of the radioactive debris for two reasons: (I) it would be
recoverable from the crater, if the need or desire ever arose to do so; and
(2) EPA was generally not in favor of ocean dumping.!® After further