TACAN facility in the proving ground was disapproved by
Joint Task Force SEVEN: instead, a mobile unit was to be
used, to afford utilization of the facility at other sites
during interim periods, A need for approximately 75
AN/ARN-21 radar units (airborne TACAN) for installation
in poeCk aircraft had been declared as early as February
1956.
2.
Raydist would be eliminated as a positioning
device.
3. The lst Mobile Communications Squadron would fur
nish communications personnel and equipment as a unit for
HARDT ACK,
A letter, 2° accompanied by a study, in June 1957, requested that
Joint Task Force SEVEN approve the establishment of a shore-based Air
Operations Center at Bikini,
This request was disapproved by the task™
force in July;7" the reply to the request revealed several important
developments in regard to aircraft control for HARDTACK,
First the Com
bat Information Center aboard the USS Estes or another suitable vessel
was being modified to effect communication and control improvementas these
improvements would insure UHF air~ground communication for longer distances,
would provide multi-channel selection, equipment operation flexibility,
and inter-position communications within the Combat Informtion Center, as
had been recommended by Task Group 7.4 after REDWING, and would provide
broad-band receivers to contact aircraft not precisely on frequency,
Lack
of these improvements had proved troublesome throughout RSDWING.
Second, inasmuch as Taongi was not to be a firing site for HARDTACK,
the air control area would not be increased over that of REDWING.
7)
Pn
a